F16C/D (BLOCKS 50 AND 52+). FLIGHT MANUAL (15 OCTOBER 2002) - page 40

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

336

6.

Land as soon as possible. Plan a flameout

landing. Refer to FLAMEOUT LANDING, this

section.

LOW THRUST ON TAKEOFF OR AT LOW ALTITUDE

(NONAB) 

129

GE

Low altitude, for engine malfunction purposes, is

generally defined as 10,000 feet AGL or below.

Low thrust can be the result of DECrelated failures,

the nozzle failing, or an rpm rollback. These

situations may result in significant thrust loss and

the inability to take off or maintain level flight. If low

thrust occurs during takeoff and conditions permit,

the takeoff should be aborted.

If the takeoff must be continued or in any critical

phase of flight, when MIL thrust is insufficient, AB

should be used. An automatic transfer to HYB or SEC

may occur resulting in less than MIL thrust with no

AB capability (SEC). An excessively open nozzle may

reduce the chance for a successful AB light. If the AB

does not light, the ENG CONT switch should be

placed to SEC.

If an automatic transfer to SEC occurs or SEC is

selected manually, resulting thrust is 7095percent of

normal MIL thrust with no AB capability. If thrust is

still low, consider jettisoning stores.

If on takeoff and the decision is made to stop:

1.

Abort.

If takeoff is continued and/or thrust is insufficient:

1.

Throttle-AB.

The chances for a successful AB light with the

nozzle open more than 30 percent are

reduced.

If thrust is still insufficient or AB does not light:

2.

ENG CONT switch-SEC.

NOTE

In a partial thrust situation, thrust

available may increase as altitude

decreases. 250 knots approximates the

airspeed at which thrust required for

level flight is the lowest.

3.

Stores-Jettison (if required).

ENGINE FIRE ON TAKEOFF

An engine fire may be indicated by the ENG FIRE

warning and/or OVERHEAT caution lights, high

FTIT, smoke, or fumes. Refer to ENGINE FIRE, this

section.

LG FAILS TO RETRACT

If the LG handle warning light remains on after the

LG handle is placed to UP, the LG or LG doors are not

fully up and locked.

1.

Airspeed-300 knots maximum.

2.

LG handle-DN. (Use DN LOCK REL button

if required.)

If LG handle does not lower, select

BRAKES CHAN 2 and position ALT

FLAPS switch to EXTEND. 

PW 229

Nozzle remains closed, resulting in

higher than normal landing thrust.

If LG comes down normally:

3.

GW-Reduce prior to landing.

If LG does not indicate down:

Do not cycle LG handle. Damage to LG

or LG doors may result.

4.

Go to ALTERNATE LG EXTENSION, this

section.

LG HANDLE WILL NOT RAISE

If the left MLG WOW switch fails to the ground

position, the LG handle does not move out of the DN

position. In addition, the TO/LDG CONFIG warning

light and touchdown skid control system are affected.

The LG handle may be raised by first depressing the

LG handle downlock release button.

If conditions permit:

1.

Airspeed-300 knots maximum.

2.

GW-Reduce prior to landing.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

Change 1337

If LG must be raised:

1.

LG handle DN LOCK REL button-Depress.

2.

LG handle-UP.

TO/LDG CONFIG light is on if left MLG

WOW switch has failed.

When desired:

3.

LG handle-DN. (Use DN LOCK REL button

if required.)

If LG handle does not lower, select

BRAKES CHAN 2 and position ALT

FLAPS switch to EXTEND. 

PW 229

Nozzle remains closed, resulting in

higher than normal landing thrust.

After touchdown:

4.

Brakes-Apply after wheels spin up.

Touchdown antiskid protection may

not be available. Landing with feet on

the brake pedals may result in blown

tire(s).

BLOWN TIRE ON TAKEOFF

Tire failure on takeoff is difficult to recognize and may

not be noticed in the cockpit.

Possible indications of a NLG tire failure include a

loud explosion, slight deceleration, vibrations, flying

debris, and at night, a flash or flame. These

characteristics can be mistaken for an engine stall.

Rubber debris may cause damage to the engine, NWS

wiring harness, WOW switch assembly and/or gear

position sensor wiring. NWS may not be available

even though the AR/NWS light is on and the NWS

FAIL light is off.

Aborting takeoff at high speed with a

blown tire may be more dangerous

than continuing takeoff. For heavy

weight takeoffs, an abort at high speed

with a blown tire is extremely danger

ous because braking and directional

control are impaired.

NOTE

The decision to take off or abort depends

on the speed at the time of the failure,

GW, stopping distance required, and

arresting gear availability.

If takeoff is continued, do not retract the LG, reduce

GW if practical, and prepare to land as soon as

practical.

Directional control during stopping is the primary

concern when aborting with a blown tire. Heavy GW

and high speed aborts place greater demands on the

brakes and tires. This may cause damage to the NWS,

wheels, and struts which may result in loss of

directional control. In addition, heavy differential

braking may result in MLG tire failure.

If aborting with a blown MLG tire, leave antiskid on

to minimize possibility of skidding the good tire. If the

wheel with the blown tire does not turn, the antiskid

switches to the 

b2t

 alternate braking mode, 

LESS 

b2t

pulsating antiskid mode. Use roll control to relieve

pressure on the blown tire and NWS to maintain

directional control.

If aborting with a blown NLG tire, hold the nosewheel

off the runway (if able) and use twopoint

aerodynamic braking until control effectiveness

begins to decay. Lower the nosewheel to the runway

and immediately engage NWS, if available, to

maintain directional control. Use aft stick to reduce

load on the NLG after brakes are applied. If NWS is

not available, the aircraft tends to drift right.

Attempt to move to the left side of the runway before

rudder effectiveness is lost and maintain directional

control with rudder and differential braking. Stop

short of the departureend arresting cable if possible.

The small nosewheel rolling radius with the tire

missing may allow the cable to pass over top of the

nosewheel and cause NLG collapse.

A NLG tire failure accompanied by complete tire

separation from the wheel may cause reverse

castering. The conditions for this to occur are the

NWS disengaged or inoperative; the nose wheel rim

rolling on a deformable surface (i.e. asphalt); and

lateral force applied to the nose wheel from either a

rudder input or differential braking. If reverse

castering occurs the nose wheel will turn in the

opposite direction of rudder and brake inputs making

it extremely difficult to maintain directional control.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

338Change 1

If a blown NLG tire occurred and NWS

is not available, it may not be possible to

prevent departure from the runway. A

reverse castering effect may occur in

which the nosewheel moves opposite to

the rudder or differential braking input.

With a blown tire, avoid centerline

lights as they may cause wheel damage

and subsequent loss of directional

control. Failure to use full aft stick

with a blown NLG tire may lead to

wheel failure and directional control

problems.

Stop straight ahead and shut down the engine as soon

as firefighting equipment is available. Do not attempt

to taxi unless an emergency situation exists.

If takeoff is not feasible:

1.

Abort.

If takeoff is continued:

1.

LG - Do not retract.

2.

Airspeed - 300 knots maximum.

3.

Refer to LANDING WITH A BLOWN TIRE,

this section.

INFLIGHT EMERGENCIES

When preparing to activate backup systems which

rely on stored nitrogen pressure to function, consider

the potential for timerelated failures and do not

activate the system earlier than required. For

example, the hydrazine mode of the EPU requires

nitrogen pressure to force hydrazine to the EPU. If a

nitrogen leak exists, turning the EPU on early could

lead to an inability of the EPU to function on

hydrazine. Similarly, alternate LG and hook extension

use stored nitrogen pressure. If alternate LG

extension is used early and a nitrogen leak exists,

hydraulic system B could subsequently fail. Such a

leak could also result in insufficient pressure to

maintain proper hook holddown force. Since nitrogen

leaks are not apparent prior to system activation,

consider their potential existence and activate the

backup system when needed, but not excessively early.

CANOPY WARNING LIGHT ON

If CANOPY warning light illuminates:
1.

Canopy handle - Push outboard.

If CANOPY warning light remains on:
2.

Go to CANOPY LOSS/PENETRATION IN

FLIGHT, this section.

CANOPY LOSS/PENETRATION IN FLIGHT

Canopy loss/penetration in flight results in

disorientation and may result in structural damage

caused by the canopy striking the aircraft. Due to

the possibility of severe disorientation, vision loss,

injury, or incapacitation at high airspeed, immedi

ate ejection may be the only option. Slow to 180

knots or less and check for controllability. Wind

blasts up to 180 knots can be coped with by leaning

forward and down behind the glareshield and HUD.

F

Arms must be kept close to the body to

avoid letting wind blast pull arms out

of the cockpit.

F

HUD glass disintegration can be

expected following a medium to high

energy bird strike with or without

canopy penetration.

Wind buffet increases slightly with increased AOA.

Therefore, if fuel is not critical, TEF's should be

extended using the ALT FLAPS switch or by placing

the LG handle to DN.
1.

Airspeed-180 knots maximum.

2.

Seat-Full down.

3.

ALT FLAPS switch-EXTEND.

4.

Land as soon as possible.

DRAG CHUTE DEPLOYED IN FLIGHT

If the drag chute is deployed in flight below 190 knots:

NOTE

If the drag chute is deployed below

approximately 190 knots, it does not

break away from the aircraft.

1.

DRAG CHUTE switch - REL.

If the drag chute does not release:
2.

Throttle - MAX AB.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

339

COCKPIT PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE MALFUNC

TION

Loss of cockpit pressurization could be caused by

canopy seal, airconditioning system, or cockpit

pressure regulator safety valve malfunctions or

ECS shutdown or failure.

Certain ECS equipment malfunctions result in

temporary shutdown of the ECS. These shutdowns

are more prevalent at high altitude during low

speed flight with high engine thrust settings. An

ECS shutdown is characterized by an oily, smokey

smell, followed by loss of cockpit noise and airflow

and gradual loss of pressurization. These tempo

rary shutdowns typically last from 2045 seconds or,

on  occasion, up to 2 minutes. The EQUIP HOT

caution light may illuminate if the shutdown lasts

longer than 20 seconds.

F

With the ECS shut down or the AIR

SOURCE knob in OFF or RAM, the

gsuit does not inflate and PBG is

disabled.

F

PX III

 With the ECS shut down or the

AIR SOURCE knob in OFF or RAM,

OBOGS is inoperative. Activate EOS if

OXY LOW warning light illuminates

above 10,000 feet cockpit altitude.

Short duration (approximately 15 seconds) losses of

cockpit airflow when operating above 35,000 feet

MSL should not be confused with an ECS shutdown.

These are the result of an automatic ECS cutback

which is designed to prevent total system

shutdown.

NOTE

PX III

 The OBOGS caution light may

illuminate as a result of ECS cycling or

temporary ECS shutdown. This is

normal as long as the OXY LOW

warning light does not illuminate.

Most AUTO position temperature failures can be

corrected by use of the MAN position.

If cockpit pressure altitude exceeds 27,000 feet, the

CABIN PRESS caution light illuminates.

If the cockpit temperature is excessive and does not

respond to AUTO or MAN temperature commands

or cockpit pressure is lost, proceed as follows:

1.

OXYGEN-100%

2.

Altitude-25,000 feet  maximum.

3.

Airspeed-500 knots maximum.

4.

AIR SOURCE knob-OFF (1015 seconds),

then NORM.

PX III

 The OBOGS caution light illuminates

while AIR SOURCE knob is in OFF.

If cockpit pressure is not regained but all other

systems dependent on the ECS are operational:

5

Flight may be continued below 25,000 feet.

If ECS has failed or cockpit temperature control is not

regained:

5

AIR  SOURCE knob-OFF.

PX III

 If AIR SOURCE knob is placed to

OFF or RAM, OBOGS is inoperative.

Activate EOS if OXY LOW warning

light illuminates above 10,000 feet

cockpit altitude.

6.

AIR SOURCE knob-RAM (after cockpit is

depressurized).

PX III

 If AIR SOURCE knob is placed to

OFF or RAM, OBOGS is inoperative.

Activate EOS if OXY LOW warning

light illuminates above 10,000 feet

cockpit altitude.

NOTE

External fuel cannot be transferred in

OFF or RAM. Consider jettisoning

tank(s) to decrease drag if range is

critical and ECS cannot be turned on

for short periods of time to transfer

fuel.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

340Change 1

7.

Nonessential electrical equipment-Off.

NOTE

If in VMC and the ADI and HSI are not

required for flight, the EGI/INS should

be considered nonessential.

8.

Land as soon as practical.

9.

Check for failed emergency dc bus(es). Refer to

EMERGENCY POWER DISTRIBUTION, this

section.

EQUIP HOT CAUTION LIGHT

If EQUIP HOT caution light illuminates:

NOTE

F

Certain ECS equipment malfunctions

result in temporary shutdown of the

ECS and illumination of the EQUIP

HOT caution light.

F

An ECS shutdown and EQUIP HOT

caution light illumination for up to 2

minutes can occur either during

extended LG down flight between sea

level and 7000 feet MSL or during

operation above a line from 42,000 feet

MSL at 0.2 mach to 50,000 feet MSL at

0.95 mach. These ECS shutdowns are

normal, but may still require addition

al action if the EQUIP HOT light

remains on for more than 1 minute.

F

If cockpit temperature is excessive,

refer to COCKPIT PRESSURE/TEM

PERATURE MALFUNCTION, this

section.

1.

AIR SOURCE knob-Confirm in NORM if

smoke or fumes are not present.

2.

Throttle-80 percent rpm minimum (in

flight).

If EQUIP HOT caution light remains on after 1

minute:

3.

Nonessential avionics-Off.

NOTE

If in VMC and the ADI and HSI are not

required for flight, the EGI/INS should

be considered nonessential.

4.

Land as soon as practical.

EJECTION

Refer to figure 34.1. Ejection should be accomplished

at the lowest practical airspeed.

F

The minimum altitude obtained from

EJECTION SEAT PERFORMANCE

charts, Section I, does not include any

allowance for pilot decision making,

changing flight conditions, or hand

movement from the stick and/or

throttle to the ejection handle. There

fore, minimum altitude for ejection

decision could be significantly higher.

F

When in a spin/deep stall or other

uncontrolled flight, eject at least 6000

feet AGL whenever possible. This is

the minimum altitude to initiate

ejection with minimal risk of injury

under the most adverse conditions.

The decision to eject must have been

made prior to this altitude. Delaying

ejection below this altitude may result

in serious injury or death.

F

Under controlled flight conditions,

eject at least 2000 feet AGL whenever

possible. If below 2000 feet AGL,

attempt to gain altitude if airspeed

permits. Do not delay ejection below

2000 feet AGL for any reason which

may commit you to unsafe ejection.

F

Failure to monitor sink rate and height

above terrain while performing an

airstart or applying low thrust recov

ery procedures can result in an ejection

outside the ejection seat performance

envelope.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

Change 1340.1/(340.2 blank)

F-16 ACES II Ejection Injury Risk Chart

103

120

140

160

180

200

245

0

100

200

300

400

500

700

AIRSPEED (KTS)

BODY WEIGHT (LBS)

220

240

600

EJECTION SEAT DESIGN LIMITS

INCREASED RISK

LIMB FLAIL

400 KTS

INCREASED RISK

SEAT STRUCTURE

FAILURE   500 KTS

AVG.

MAJOR/FATAL

INJURY RISK:

80%

INCREASED RISK

LIMB FLAIL AND DROGUE

OPENING SHOCK

LOW RISK

AVG. MAJOR INJURY

RISK: 9%

MODERATE RISK

AVG. MAJOR/FATAL

INJURY RISK: 36%

1F-16X-1-4023X

EJECTION SEAT DESIGN LIMITS

HIGH RISK.

420 KTS

Figure 34.1

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

Change 1341

F

The ACES II ejection seat was designed

for body weights in the 140 to 211 pound

range. There are additional ejection

injury risks associated with body

weights outside this range.

D

For body weights less than 140

pounds, limb flailing, less seat stabil

ity, and more severe drogue chute

opening shock (ejection modes 2 and

3) are concerns. The risk of injury

associated with limb flailing and

drogue chute opening shock increases

for ejection above 420 knots. This

injury risk also increases as body

weight decreases below 140 pounds.

D

For body weights greater than 211

pounds, limb flailing, seat structural

failure, and parachute landings are

concerns. The risk of injury from limb

flailing is high for ejection above 400

knots. The seat leg braces frequently

deform during ejections above 500

knots;  this deformation has led to

seat side panel failures (and unsuc

cessful ejections) during 600 knot

ejection tests. The risk of injury

during parachute landing is three

times the average. These injury risks

also increase as body weight in

creases above 211 pounds.

F

Wind blast exerts medium force on the

body up to 400 knots, severe forces

causing flailing and skin injuries

between 400600 knots, and excessive

force above 600 knots.

F

During high altitude ejections (mode

3), automatic pilot/seat separation and

recovery parachute deployment occur

between 16,00014,500 feet MSL. If

high terrain is a factor, manual seat

separation procedures must be used to

bypass the automatic sequence.

To eject, grasp ejection handle using a twohanded

grip with thumb and at least two fingers of each hand.

Pull up on handle and continue holding until

pilot/seat separation. The ejection handle does not

separate from the seat.

Refer to figure 35 for manual seat separation and

manual survival equipment deployment.

Ejection (Immediate)

1.

Ejection handle-Pull.

Ejection (Time Permitting)

If time permits, descend to avoid the hazards of high

altitude ejection. Stow all loose equipment and direct

the aircraft away from populated areas. Sit with head

against headrest, buttocks against back of seat, and

feet on rudder pedals.

1.

IFF MASTER knob-EMER.

2.

Loose equipment and checklist-Stow.

3.

Lapbelt and helmet chin strap-Tighten.

4.

Night vision devices-Remove (if appropriate).

Failure to remove night vision goggles

(NVG) prior to ejection may cause

serious injury. If unable to remove NVG,

a proper ejection body position (head

back against the seat headrest) reduces

the chance of injury from the NVG.

5.

Visor-Down.

6.

Throttle-IDLE.

Slow to lowest practical airspeed.

7.

Assume ejection position.

8.

Ejection handle-Pull.

Failure of Canopy To Separate

If canopy fails to separate, remain in position for

ejection while keeping arms inboard and perform the

following:

If canopy is jettisoned or manually

released/opened after pulling the

ejection handle, the ejection seat

functions immediately after canopy

separation. Be prepared to immediate

ly put arm back in ejection position

when the canopy starts to separate.

1.

Canopy - Open normally.

2.

Canopy - Jettison.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

342

IF EMERGENCY OXYGEN FAILS TO ACTIVATE AUTOMATICALLY

UPON EJECTION, PULL THE EMERGENCY OXYGEN GREEN

RING LOCATED NEAR THE LEFT HIP.

AFTER RECOVERY PARACHUTE ASSEMBLY DEPLOYMENT, RAISE

VISOR AND DISCARD OXYGEN MASK. IF SURVIVAL KIT DOES

NOT DEPLOY AUTOMATICALLY, GRASP KIT RIPCORD HANDLE

WITH RIGHT HAND AND PULL. KIT RIPCORD HANDLE IS LOCATED

LIFERAFT INFLATION IS INITIATED WHEN THE DROP LINE/

LANYARD IS FULLY EXTENDED AFTER SURVIVAL KIT

DEPLOYMENT. CHECK LIFERAFT AND IF NOT INFLATED,

SNATCH PULL DROP LINE/LANYARD TO INFLATE.

Manual Survival Equipment Deployment/

Manual Seat Separation

1F-16X-1-2023X

NOTE

A.

B.

C.

After ejection, the EMERGENCY MANUAL CHUTE

handle should only be used if the automatic

sequence has failed or if high terrain is a factor.

Pilot/seat separation in modes 1 and 2 should

occur rapidly after pulling the ejection handle.

If the pilot has time to realize seat separation

has not taken place, a failure has probably

occurred and manual seat separation should be

performed. In mode 3, pilot/seat separation

Do not attempt to open the lapbelt. If the lap-

belt is opened, the seat will partially fall away,

but the parachute risers remain attached to the

inertia reel straps. The only way to separate from

the seat is to pull the EMERGENCY MANUAL CHUTE

B.

C.

A.

NEAR RIGHT HIP.

MANUAL SEAT SEPARATION

SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT (TYPICAL)

If the survival kit is deployed after landing in

water, a snatch pull on the drop line/lanyard (near

CO  bottle) is required to inflate the liferaft.

2

TO PERFORM MANUAL SEAT SEPARATION AND DEPLOY THE RECOVERY PARA-

CHUTE ASSEMBLY, PULL THE EMERGENCY MANUAL CHUTE HANDLE.

Failure to fully pull the EMERGENCY MANUAL

CHUTE handle may result in ballistically deploying

the recovery parachute assembly without releasing

the lapbelt and inertia reel straps and unlatching

the seat pan lid.

occurs between 16,000-14,500 feet MSL. If

automatic pilot/seat separation does not occur

in this altitude range or if high terrain is a factor,

manual seat separation must be performed.

handle at least 6 inches.

Figure

 35.