F16C/D (BLOCKS 50 AND 52+). FLIGHT MANUAL (15 OCTOBER 2002) - page 39

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

328

1.

BRAKES channel switch-Change channels.

Release brakes prior to changing

brake channels or turning antiskid off.

2.

b2t

 BRAKES channel switch-CHAN 2.

3.

ANTISKID switch-OFF.

Release brakes prior to changing

brake channels or turning antiskid off.

4.

NWS-Engage (if required).

5.

HOOK switch-DN.

If arresting cable is not available or if at low

groundspeed:

6.

ANTISKID switch-Intermittent PARKING

BRAKE, then ANTISKID.

If in a congested area, use the parking

brake immediately to stop.

HOT BRAKES

The pilot has the responsibility to determine when a

hot brake condition exists. The pilot evaluates the

situation by analyzing the variables that influence

brake temperature: GW, pressure altitude, OAT,

speed at brake application, etc. Refer to T.O.

GR1F16CJ11, PART 2, BRAKE ENERGY LIMITS

- MAXIMUM EFFORT BRAKING. Observations by

ground crewmembers should also be used as certain

malfunctions that result in overheated brakes, such

as dragging brakes, may not be readily apparent to

the pilot. Perform hot brake procedures anytime hot

brakes are suspected.

It is impossible for the ground crew to avoid the hot

brake and engine intake danger areas while pinning

the EPU or chocking the aircraft. Therefore, if

conditions permit, the aircraft should be shut down

without pinning the EPU or chocking the wheels.

Release brake pressure as soon as possible to

minimize heat transfer between the brake surfaces

and the wheel. This action also relieves hydraulic

pressure to the brakes, which if leaking, could feed a

hydraulic fire.

Perform the following after any event that may result

in hot brakes:

1.

Request firefighting equipment and proceed

directly to the designated hot brake area or

nearest area clear of other aircraft and

personnel.

F

If a hot brake condition is a result of a

dragging brake, taxiing the aircraft

worsens the condition.

F

Any leaking hydraulic fluid may be

ignited by hot wheel and brake

surfaces.

F

Wheel fusible plugs may relieve tire

pressure at anytime during the 15

minutes after brake application.

F

With hot brakes, avoid inflated MLG

tire side area within 300 feet for 45

minutes after aircraft has stopped. If

required, approach from the front or

rear for firefighting purposes only.

When in the hot brake area:

2.

Align aircraft with nose into wind if possible.

F

Do not use the parking brake.

F

If battery power is not available, toe

brakes will be inoperative after engine

shutdown.

F

Do not turn MAIN PWR switch to OFF

until the nosewheel is chocked.

F

Attempt to park in a level area to

minimize risk of aircraft rolling if the

brakes should fail after shutdown.

Use only minimum possible toe brake

pressure to hold aircraft stationary

until engine is shut down and nose

wheel is chocked.

3.

EPU switch - OFF.

4.

Throttle - OFF.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

329

5.

Nose wheel - Chocked.

6.

MAIN PWR switch - OFF.

7.

Exit toward the front of the aircraft.

If a brake fire occurs:

8.

Go to GROUND EGRESS, this section.

MAIN GENERATOR FAILURE (GROUND)

If the main generator fails on the ground, the standby

generator provides power for full normal braking

(both channels) and NWS. Abort the aircraft. Taxiing

is permissible.

MAIN AND STANDBY GENERATOR FAILURE

(GROUND)

If the main and standby generators fail on the

ground, the FLCS PMG and aircraft battery provide

power for full normal braking (both channels). The

EPU should activate and provide power for NWS.

Stop and engage the parking brake prior to

attempting to reset the generators.

If main or standby generator resets and further

taxiing is required, brakes should be checked

carefully. Allow the aircraft to begin rolling slowly

and check for normal braking. If normal braking is

inoperative, immediately engage the parking brake.

If MAIN GEN and STBY GEN lights illuminate:

1.

Stop the aircraft.

Turn EPU on, if required, to obtain NWS.

2.

ANTISKID switch-PARKING BRAKE.

3.

OXYGEN-100%.

4.

EPU switch-OFF.

If chocks are not installed, be prepared

to immediately engage the parking

brake if it disengages when the EPU is

shut off.

If further taxiing is required:

5.

ELEC CAUTION RESET button-Depress.

Toe brakes and parking brake are available

with or without the EPU as long as the MAIN

PWR switch is not moved to OFF.

If main or standby generator cannot be

reset, NWS is inoperative unless the

EPU is activated.

6.

Refer to ACTIVATED EPU/HYDRAZINE

LEAK, this section.

EMERGENCY ENTRANCE AND CREW RESCUE

Refer to figure 34 for emergency entrance and crew

rescue procedures.

EMERGENCY GROUND JETTISON

Ground jettison of the 300gallon, 370gallon, or

600gallon fuel tank(s) results in the tank(s) striking

the ground before the pylon aft pivots release. The

tank(s) will probably rotate horizontally and may

strike the LG. Use EMER STORES JETTISON on the

ground only as a last resort. Refer to EMERGENCY

JETTISON, this section.

GROUND EGRESS

The order of accomplishment of ground egress steps

depends on the nature of the emergency. For quickest

ground egress (without jettisoning the canopy), place

the canopy switch up and then prepare for exit while

the canopy is opening. However, if fire or danger of

explosion exists, accomplish steps necessary for

egress prior to opening canopy to retain maximum

protection until ready for exit. Disconnect parachute

risers, lapbelt, survival kit, and gsuit. Oxygen and

communication leads are quickdisconnect. If

required, the canopy can be jettisoned even after it

has been partially or fully opened. If the canopy is

restrained by debris or jammed by crash damage,

attempted jettison may result in a portion of the

canopy rocket exhaust entering the cockpit. This

exhaust may present a heat and blast hazard in the

cockpit; toxic gases are present and 100 percent

oxygen should be used.

1.

Throttle-OFF.

2.

Ejection safety lever-Safe (up).

3.

Harness and personal equipment-Release.

4.

EPU switch-OFF (time permitting).

Exit over the left side (conditions

permitting) to avoid EPU exhaust

gases.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

330

If time and conditions permit:

   a. Insert a 1/4-inch drive socket wrench/speed handle

      into canopy handle lock access plug and rotate ccw

      to remove plug.
   b. Insert an 8-inch or longer piece of number 25 drill

      rod (or 1/8-inch rod) into opening and push inboard

      to unlock canopy handle.
   c. Position external CANOPY switch to UP.

   d. If canopy is still not open, insert 1/4-inch drive

      socket wrench/speed handle into the external

      canopy handcrank receptacle and rotate cw

Open the canopy emergency release door and extend

the canopy jettison D-handle to full length of cable

(approximately 6 feet). When the cable tightens, pull

handle hard to jettison the canopy.

The canopy jettisons upward and back toward

the vertical tail with great force. Stand to the

side and slightly aft of canopy to full length

of the cable to avoid canopy rocket blast.

RIGHT OR LEFT

SIDE OF AIRCRAFT

1.c.

1.d.

2.

1.b.

1.a.

1.

2.

C

D

1F-16X-1-0027X

C

D

Emergency Entrance and Crew Rescue

(Typical)

DF

ACCESS PLUG

CANOPY HANDLE

C

(Locked)

(Unlocked)

DRILL ROD

Positioning the external CANOPY switch to UP

prior to unlocking the canopy will overheat

the canopy actuator motor or pop the circuit

breaker.

(approximately     52 or     87 revolutions

required to fully open canopy).

CANOPY

SWITCH

CANOPY SWITCH

Figure 34.(Sheet 1)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

331

GR1F-16CJ-1-0117X37

Emergency Entrance and Crew Rescue

(Typical)

3.

EJECTION SAFETY

LEVER (SAFE)

3.

Rotate ejection safety lever located on

left of seat to full up (vertical) position.

To prevent possible seat ejection

during rescue, rotate ejection safety

lever located on left of seat to full

up (vertical) position.

Disconnect crewmember from lapbelt,

g-suit hose, survival kit straps, and

4.

parachute risers.

FLIP-UP PITOTS

(STOWED)

(FIXED PITOTS)

CONFIGURATION

ALTERNATE

SEAWARS

INSTALLED

SEAWARS

NOT INSTALLED

Figure 34.(Sheet 2)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

332

5.

Canopy-Open.

F

D

 Consider canopy jettison so rear

seat occupant can egress more rapidly.

F

Opening the canopy with the

MANUAL CANOPY CONTROL hand

crank is extremely difficult. If immedi

ate egress is required, the canopy

should be jettisoned rather than

opened with the handcrank.

If canopy does not raise:

6.

OXYGEN-100%.

F

If jettison is unsuccessful, heat, blast,

and toxic gas from the rockets may

enter the cockpit.

F

To prevent the flow of oxygen into the

cockpit after the oxygen hose is

disconnected, do not select EMER.

7.

Canopy-Jettison.

Pulling the CANOPY JETTISON T

handle other than straight out may

cause the handle to jam.

HOT REFUELING EMERGENCY

In the event of a fire or fuel leak/spill while refueling

in hot pit area, refer to FIRE/OVERHEAT/FUEL

LEAK (GROUND), this section. In the event of fire in

the area of refueling operation (other than in the hot

pit area), have the refueling operation discontinued

and taxi clear.

ACTIVATED EPU/HYDRAZINE LEAK

If landing with an activated EPU or a hydrazine leak

is detected while the engine is running:

Inform landing base of hydrazine leak or EPU

operation and request bioenvironmental services

support.

Treat any leak as a hydrazine leak

until investigation proves otherwise.

1.

OXYGEN-100%.

When on the ground:

2.

AIR SOURCE knob-OFF (if required).

Consider turning the ECS off to prevent the

possibility of hydrazine fumes or EPU

exhaust gases entering the cockpit.

F

If AIR SOURCE knob is placed to OFF,

also turn off nonessential avionic

equipment as electronic equipment

may be damaged.

F

PX III

 If AIR SOURCE knob is placed to

OFF, OBOGS caution light will illumi

nate. If OXY LOW warning light

illuminates before ground crew ar

rives with oxygen bottle, activate EOS.

3.

Taxi to designated isolated parking area (if

required) and park aircraft with left wing into

wind if possible.

4.

Insure all nonessential personnel are clear.

5.

EPU switch-OFF.

6.

Shut down the engine (after left  main wheel is

chocked).

NOTE

To prevent sitting in a sealed cockpit

(hot) without ECS, consider waiting

for ground crew to arrive with ladder

and oxygen bottle prior to shutting

down the engine.

NWS FAILURE/HARDOVER

NWS failure may be detected by the NWS FAIL

caution light or uncommanded NWS inputs with no

caution light. If NWS FAIL caution light is on, do not

engage NWS. If the NLG strut is overextended, the

NWS cannot engage. If the NLG strut overextends

after NWS engagement, NWS becomes disengaged

and the AR/NWS light goes off.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

333

NWS malfunctions at any speed may

cause an abrupt turn, tire skidding or

blowout, aircraft tipping, and/or

departure from the prepared surface.

1.

NWS-Disengage.

2.

AR/NWS light-Verify off.

3.

Rudder and brakes-As required.

TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES

DELAYED ROTATION

Several factors can cause the airspeed at which

rotation occurs to be greater than that determined

from T.O. GR1F16CJ11. As the weight of external

stores carried increases, more nose down moment

must be overcome to rotate for takeoff. Another

factor is the application of roll stick force in addition

to aft stick force. Applying a roll input reduces the

maximum trailing edge up position for one

horizontal tail and increased airspeed may be

required to compensate. The last and most

significant factor is improper servicing of the nose

gear strut. Improper servicing may not be detectable

during preflight inspection and may cause rotation

speed to increase by up to 15 knots. All of these

factors combined may add up to 25 knots to the

computed airspeed for rotation. If pretakeoff flight

control checks were normal and the engine is

operating normally (acceleration check normal), the

aircraft will rotate above computed rotation speed.

Therefore, takeoff should not be aborted due to

delayed rotation until at least takeoff speed is

attained. Notify maintenance after flight if a

significantly delayed rotation occurred.

ABORT

The decision to abort or continue takeoff depends on

many factors. Considerations should include, but not

be limited to, the following:

S

Runway factors:Runway remaining, surface

condition (wet, dry, etc.), type and/or number of

barriers/cables available, obstructions alongside or

at the departure end, wind direction and velocity,

and weather and visibility.

S

Aircraft factors:GW, stores, nature of the

emergency, speed at decision point, and importance

of becoming airborne.

S

Stopping factors:Maximum antiskid braking,

speedbrakes, aerodynamic braking, hook, and drag

chute.

Aborting takeoff at high speed with a

blown tire may be more dangerous

than continuing takeoff. For heavy

GW takeoffs, an abort at high speed

with a blown tire is extremely danger

ous because braking and directional

control are impaired.

F

At high speed (prior to WOW), forward

stick pressure in excess of approxi

mately 2 pounds results in full trailing

edge down deflection of the horizontal

tails. This causes excessive loads on

the NLG which can lead to nose tire

failure and possible structural failure

of the NLG.

F

Failure to use full antiskid braking or

applying brakes with engine above idle

thrust significantly increases the

wheel brake temperature and proba

bility of a wheel brake fire.

Normally, with the short takeoff distances of the

aircraft, abort is not a problem unless directional

control is a factor (e.g., blown tire). An early decision to

abort provides the most favorable circumstances. If

there is any doubt about the ability to stop on the

runway, lower the hook.

Consider aborting after becoming airborne only when

sufficient runway is available and flight to a key

position is not possible.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

334

Aborts above 100 KCAS require diligent adherence to

the procedures in this section for the abort to be

successful. If aborting after rotation, retard throttle to

IDLE and maintain twopoint attitude while applying

maximum wheel braking (maximum pedal pressure

(antiskid on) consistent with maintaining directional

control). When wheel brakes become effective, the nose

automatically lowers. After the nosewheel is on the

runway, use maximum effort braking (full aft stick, full

open speedbrakes, and maximum wheel braking). If

aborting before rotation, retard throttle to IDLE,

maintain threepoint attitude and apply maximum

effort braking if stopping distance is critical. NWS

should be engaged if directional control is a problem.

Consider following hot brake procedures after any

abort. Taxiing after an abort will further increase brake

temperature.

F

When braking absorbs a high amount

of energy, do not shut down engine

until firefighting equipment is avail

able and do not use the parking brake.

F

Hot wheels and brakes may ignite

leaking hydraulic fluid. Wheel fusible

plugs may relieve tire pressure within

15 minutes after stop.

1.

Throttle-IDLE.

When the throttle is retarded to IDLE

from MAX AB, the thrust and rpm

decay to idle can take up to 24 seconds.

Do not mistake high thrust/rpm for

failure of the engine to respond to the

idle command. Engine shutdown from

MAX AB may result in a tailpipe fire.

2.

DRAG CHUTE switch-DEPLOY (if required).

3.

Wheel brakes-Apply (as required).

4.

HOOK switch-DN (if required).

S

The hook should be lowered at least 1500 feet

from the cable to allow adequate time for hook

to stabilize and for full holddown force to be

developed by the hook actuator.

S

Refer to CABLE ARRESTMENT, this section.

The hook may miss the cable if the

aircraft is not slow enough to compress

the MLG struts sufficiently to make

WOW or if forward stick pressure is

held.

If on fire:

5.

Throttle-OFF.

NOTE

With engine shut down, NWS is lost

and EPU does not activate automati

cally. After hydraulic pressure drops,

braking is available using the brake/

JFS accumulators only. Stop straight

ahead and engage parking brake.

6.

FUEL MASTER switch-OFF.

ENGINE MALFUNCTION ON TAKEOFF

An engine malfunction on takeoff presents a

demanding situation where critical actions must be

accomplished quickly with little time for analysis. If

takeoff is continued, a straight ahead climb is

generally preferred over an immediate turn to low

key. This action provides more favorable ejection

parameters and an increase in analysis time. If

necessary, use only shallow turns to avoid

aggravating the situation. Jettison stores if required

to reduce GW.

ENGINE FAILURE ON TAKEOFF

Engine failure shortly after liftoff may not permit

time for analysis or corrective action. The primary

concern should be to trade any excess airspeed for

altitude and to eject prior to allowing a sink rate to

develop. Jettisoning stores may aid in gaining

altitude but must not delay the ejection decision. If

the failure occurs later in the takeoff phase, time may

be available for analysis or corrective action.

If conditions permit:

1.

Abort.

If conditions do not permit an abort:

1.

Zoom.

2.

Stores-Jettison (if possible).

3.

Eject.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

335

AB MALFUNCTION ON TAKEOFF

An AB malfunction can be detected by a thrust loss

and nozzle closure or failure of AB to light within

allowed time or stalls accompanied by a loud bang

or pop. An AB failure (other than a slow/no light)

may indicate other engine problems. If possible,

abort the takeoff. If takeoff is continued, the throttle

should be retarded to MIL. If normal thrust is not

available in MIL, refer to LOW THRUST ON

TAKEOFF OR AT LOW ALTITUDE (NONAB), this

section. AB operation should not be reattempted

unless required to sustain flight.

If decision is made to stop:

1.

Abort.

If takeoff is continued:

1.

Throttle-MIL.

2.

Stores-Jettison (if required).

LOW THRUST ON TAKEOFF OR AT LOW ALTITUDE

(NONAB) 

PW 229

Low altitude, for engine malfunction purposes, is

generally defined as 10,000 feet AGL or below.

Low thrust can be the result of DEECrelated

failures; a failed open, damaged or missing nozzle; or

an engine rpm rollback. A failed open, damaged or

missing nozzle may result in significant thrust loss

and the inability to take off or maintain level flight.

For description of failed open, damaged or missing

nozzle, refer to NOZZLE FAILURE 

PW 229

, this

section. Low thrust can also be the result of the start

bleed strap failing to close during the normal start

cycle.

If low thrust occurs during takeoff and conditions

permit, the takeoff should be aborted. If the takeoff

must be continued or in any critical phase of flight

and MIL thrust is not sufficient, AB should be used.

An excessively open nozzle may reduce the chance

for successful AB light. If the AB does not light

(allow the DEEC to automatically resequence the

AB if conditions permit), place the ENG CONT

switch to SEC.

If an automatic transfer to SEC occurs or SEC is

selected manually, resulting thrust is 7080 percent

of normal MIL thrust with no AB capability. If

thrust is still low, consider jettisoning stores.

If on takeoff and the decision is made to stop:

1.

Abort.

If takeoff is continued and/or thrust is insufficient:

1.

Throttle-AB.

The chances for a successful AB light with the

nozzle open more than 30 percent are

reduced.

If thrust is still insufficient or AB does not light:

2.

ENG CONT switch-SEC.

With nozzle loss, catastrophic engine

failure and fire are probable with

prolonged high power settings above

850

_

C FTIT while in SEC.

NOTE

In a partial thrust situation, thrust

available may increase as altitude

decreases. 250 knots approximates the

airspeed at which thrust required for

level flight is the lowest.

3.

Stores-Jettison (if required).

If nozzle is failed open, damaged, or missing:

4.

Airspeed-Climb to arrive at 250 knots or

descend at 250 knots to obtain level flight

above minimum recommended ejection altitude

or minimum safe altitude, whichever is

appropriate.

NOTE

F

With a missing nozzle, level flight may

not be attainable above 5000 feet MSL.

F

If descent is required, maintain 250

knots with throttle set at 850

_

C FTIT.

If level flight cannot be maintained by 1000 feet above

minimum recommended ejection altitude or mini

mum safe altitude, whichever is appropriate:

5.

Throttle-As required to maintain 250 knots

in level flight.

If airspeed drops below 250 knots,

trade altitude to reacquire 250 knots.

Do not descend below minimum

recommended ejection altitude or

minimum safe altitude, whichever is

appropriate.