Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (August 2009)

FORENSIC SCIENCE DISCIPLINES

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cally sound copy is examined for saved computer files with probative value.

These so-called logical files often are pictures, documents, spreadsheets, and

e-mail files that have been saved by the user in various folders or directories.

Logical files are patent evidence. Next, the forensic copy is examined for

files that have previously been deleted. The computer files are sometimes

called physical, because the data are physically present on the hard drive

but they are not logically available to the computer operating system. Such

files constitute latent evidence.

Finally, system files that are created and saved by the operating system

are examined. These files are analogous to a surveillance tape that shows

programs that were running on the computer and files that were changed.

The goal of most of these examinations is to find files with probative infor-

mation and to discover information about when and how these files came

to be on the computer.¹⁴⁰

Digital evidence has undergone a rapid maturation process. This dis-

cipline did not start in forensic laboratories. Instead, computers taken

as evidence were studied by police officers and detectives who had some

interest or expertise in computers. Over the past 10 years, this process has

become more routine and subject to the rigors and expectations of other

fields of forensic science. Three holdover challenges remain: (1) the digital

evidence community does not have an agreed certification program or list

of qualifications for digital forensic examiners; (2) some agencies still treat

the examination of digital evidence as an investigative rather than a forensic

activity; and (3) there is wide variability in and uncertainty about the educa-

tion, experience, and training of those practicing this discipline.

A publication of the Department of Justice Computer Crime and Intel-

lectual Property Section, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining

Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations,¹⁴¹ describes the challenging

legal issues surrounding the examination of digital evidence. For example,

sometimes the courts have viewed computers as a piece of evidence that

is sent to a laboratory for forensic examination, and as having no special

legal constraints, while other times, the courts have viewed computers as

a virtual room or filing cabinet.¹⁴² For the latter cases, a warrant must be

¹⁴⁰ See E. Casey. 2004. Digital Evidence and Computer Crime. San Diego, CA: Academic

Press; E. Casey. 2001. Handbook of Computer Crime Investigation: Forensic Tools & Tech

nology. San Diego, CA: Academic Press; B. Carrier. 2005. File System Forensic Analysis.

Boston: Addison-Wesley; S. Anson and S. Bunting. 2007. Mastering Windows Network

Forensics and Investigation. Indianapolis: Sybex; and H. Carvey and D. Kleiman. 2007.

Windows Forensic Analysis. Burlington: Syngress.

¹⁴¹ Available at www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/s&smanual2002.htm.

¹⁴² See, e.g., G.R. McLain, Jr., 2007. United States v. Hill: A new rule, but no clarity for

the rules governing computer searches and seizures. George Mason Law Review 14(4):1071-

1104; D. Regensburger, B. Bytes, and B. Bonds. 2007. An exploration of the law concerning

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obtained that specifies how the examination will be conducted and which

files can be recovered before the electronic device can be examined.

Finally, the analysis of digital evidence differs from other forensic

science disciplines because the examination generates not only a forensic

report, but also brings to light documents, spreadsheets, and pictures that

may have probative value. Different agencies have handled these gener-

ated files in different ways: Some treat them as exhibits, while others treat

them as derivative evidence that requires a chain of custody and special

protection.

A growing number of colleges and universities offer courses in com-

puter security and computer forensics. Still, most law enforcement agencies

are understaffed in trained computer security experts.

CONCLUSIONS

The term “forensic science” encompasses a broad range of disciplines,

each with its own set of technologies and practices. Wide variability exists

across forensic science disciplines with regard to techniques, methodologies,

reliability, error rates, reporting, underlying research, general acceptability,

and the educational background of its practitioners. Some of the forensic

science disciplines are laboratory based (e.g., nuclear and mitochondrial

DNA analysis, toxicology, and drug analysis); others are based on ex-

pert interpretation of observed patterns (e.g., fingerprints, writing samples,

toolmarks, bite marks, and specimens such as fibers, hair, and fire debris).

Some methods result in class evidence and some in the identification of a

specific individual—with the associated uncertainties. The level of scientific

development and evaluation varies substantially among the forensic science

disciplines.

the search and seizure of computer files and an analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology

97(4)1151-1208.

Improving Methods, Practice, and

Performance in Forensic Science

In a presentation to the committee, Jennifer Mnookin, of the University

of California, Los Angeles School of Law, cautioned against yielding to two

extremes in developing expectations for the forensic science disciplines. The

first is the risk of letting the “perfect” be the enemy of the “good.” That is,

many forms of forensic investigation and analysis may work relatively well

once appropriate tasks have been set for them. “The opposite danger is the

risk of overconfidence about what we think we know—the risk of making

unjustified inferences on the basis of limited information, or sometimes a

resistance to gaining new information that would help us do it better.”¹

Nonetheless, a number of the forensic science disciplines, as they are

currently practiced, do not contribute as much to criminal justice as they

could. This chapter discusses the improvements that are needed and makes

four major recommendations. It does not evaluate the quality of evidence

collection and management—steps that provide the inputs to forensic meth-

ods—although, obviously, the quality of those steps is critical in maximizing

the investigative and probative value of that evidence.

INDEPENDENCE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE LABORATORIES

The majority of forensic science laboratories are administered by law

enforcement agencies, such as police departments, where the laboratory

administrator reports to the head of the agency. This system leads to

¹ J. Mnookin, Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles Law School. Presenta-

tion to the committee. April 23, 2007.

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significant concerns related to the independence of the laboratory and its

budget. Ideally, public forensic science laboratories should be independent

of or autonomous within law enforcement agencies. In these contexts, the

director would have an equal voice with others in the justice system on

matters involving the laboratory and other agencies. The laboratory also

would be able to set its own priorities with respect to cases, expenditures,

and other important issues. Cultural pressures caused by the different mis-

sions of scientific laboratories vis-à-vis law enforcement agencies would be

largely resolved. Finally, the forensic science laboratories would be able to

set their own budget priorities and not have to compete with the parent

law enforcement agencies.

UNCERTAINTIES AND BIAS

Few forensic science methods have developed adequate measures of the

accuracy of inferences made by forensic scientists. All results for every fo-

rensic science method should indicate the uncertainty in the measurements

that are made, and studies must be conducted that enable the estimation

of those values. For the identification sciences (e.g., friction ridge analysis,

toolmark analysis, handwriting analysis), such studies would accumulate

data about the intraindividual variability (e.g., how much one finger’s im-

pressions vary from impression to impression, or how much one toolmark

or signature varies from instance to instance) and the interindividual vari-

ability (e.g., how much the impressions of many fingerprints vary across

a population and in what ways). With that information, one could begin

to attach confidence limits to individualization determinations and also

begin to develop an understanding of how much similarity is needed in

order to attain a given level of confidence that a match exists. Note that

this necessary step would change the way the word “individualization” is

commonly used. The concept of individualization is that an object found

at a crime scene can be uniquely associated with one particular source. By

acknowledging that there can be uncertainties in this process, the concept

of “uniquely associated with” must be replaced with a probabilistic associa-

tion, and other sources of the crime scene evidence cannot be completely

discounted. The courts already have proven their ability to deal with some

degree of uncertainty in individualizations, as demonstrated by the success-

ful use of DNA analysis (with its small, but nonzero, error rate).

Finally, as discussed in Chapter 4, the accuracy of forensic meth-

ods resulting in classification or individualization conclusions needs to be

evaluated in well-designed and rigorously conducted studies. The level of

accuracy of an analysis is likely to be a key determinant of its ultimate

probative value.

Some initial and striking research has uncovered the effects of some

IMPROVING METHODS, PRACTICE, AND PERFORMANCE

185

biases in forensic science procedures,² but much more must be done to

understand the sources of bias and to develop countermeasures.³ Some

principles employed in other fields should be useful, although some (e.g.,

blinding) may not be feasible for some types of forensics work. The foren-

sic science disciplines are just beginning to become aware of contextual

bias and the dangers it poses. The traps created by such biases can be very

subtle, and typically one is not aware that his or her judgment is being af-

fected. An overview of the effect of bias in the forensic science disciplines

can be found in Risinger et al., 2002.⁴ Decisions regarding what analyses

need to be performed and in what order also can be influenced by bias and

ultimately have the potential to skew results.

Forensic scientists who sit administratively in law enforcement agencies

or prosecutors’ offices, or who are hired by those units, are subject to a

general risk of bias. Bias also is introduced through decisions made about

evidence collection, which controls who is listed as a suspect. Evidence col-

lection and crime scene investigation can require scientific knowledge and

judgment, and these functions are normally outside the control of forensic

scientists.

REPORTING RESULTS

There is a critical need in most fields of forensic science to raise the

standards for reporting and testifying about the results of investigations.

For example, many terms are used by forensic examiners in reports and

in court testimony to describe findings, conclusions, and the degrees of

association between evidentiary material (e.g., hairs, fingerprints, fibers)

and particular people or objects. Such terms include but are not limited to

“match,” “consistent with,” “identical,” “similar in all respects tested,”

and “cannot be excluded as the source of.” The use of such terms can

have a profound effect on how the trier of fact in a criminal or civil matter

perceives and evaluates evidence. Yet the forensic science disciplines have

not reached agreement or consensus on the precise meaning of any of these

² E.g., I.E. Dror and D. Charlton. 2006. Why experts make errors. Journal of Forensic

Identification 56 (4):600-616; I.E. Dror, D. Charlton, and A Peron. 2006. Contextual in-

formation renders experts vulnerable to making erroneous identifications. Forensic Science

International 156(1):74-78; D.E. Krane, S. Ford, J.R. Gilder, K. Inman, A. Jamieson, R. Koppl,

I.L. Kornfield, D.M. Risinger, N. Rudin, M.S. Taylor, and W.C Thompson. 2008. Sequential

unmasking: A means of minimizing observer effects in forensic DNA interpretation. Journal

of Forensic Sciences 53(4):1006-1007; L.S. Miller. 1987. Procedural bias in forensic science

examinations of human hairs. Law and Human Behavior 11(2):157-163.

³ See the discussion of biases provided in Chapter 4.

⁴ D.M. Risinger, M.J. Saks, W.C. Thompson, and R. Rosenthal. 2002. The Daubert/Kumho

implications of observer effects in forensic science: Hidden problems of expectation and sug-

gestion. California Law Review 90:1-56; Krane, et al., op. cit.

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STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

terms. Although some disciplines have developed vocabulary and scales to

be used in reporting results, they have not become standard practice. This

imprecision in vocabulary stems in part from the paucity of research in fo-

rensic science and the corresponding limitations in interpreting the results

of forensic analyses. Publications such as Evett et al.,⁵ Aitken and Taroni,⁶

and Evett⁷ provide the essential building blocks for the proper assessment

and communication of forensic findings.

As a general matter, laboratory reports generated as the result of a sci-

entific analysis should be complete and thorough. They should describe, at

a minimum, methods and materials, procedures, results, and conclusions,

and they should identify, as appropriate, the sources of uncertainty in the

procedures and conclusions along with estimates of their scale (to indicate

the level of confidence in the results). Although it is not appropriate and

practicable to provide as much detail as might be expected in a research

paper, sufficient content should be provided to allow the nonscientist reader

to understand what has been done and permit informed, unbiased scrutiny

of the conclusion.

Some forensic laboratory reports meet this standard of reporting, but

most do not. Some reports contain only identifying and agency information,

a brief description of the evidence being submitted, a brief description of

the types of analysis requested, and a short statement of the results (e.g.,

“The green, brown plant material in item #1 was identified as marijuana”).

The norm is to have no description of the methods or procedures used, and

most reports do not discuss measurement uncertainties or confidence limits.

Many disciplines outside the forensic science disciplines have standards,

templates, and protocols for data reporting. Although some of the Scientific

Working Groups have a scoring system for reporting findings, they are not

uniformly or consistently used.

Forensic science reports, and any courtroom testimony stemming from

them, must include clear characterizations of the limitations of the analyses,

including associated probabilities where possible. Courtroom testimony

should be given in lay terms so that all trial participants can understand

how to weight and interpret the testimony. In order to enable this, research

must be undertaken to evaluate the reliability of the steps of the various

identification methods and the confidence intervals associated with the

overall conclusions.

⁵ I.W. Evett, G. Jackson, J.A. Lambert, and S. McCrossan. 2000. The impact of the prin-

ciples of evidence interpretation on the structure and content of statements. Science and Justice

40(4):233-239.

⁶ C.G.G. Aitken and F. Taroni. 2004. Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for Forensic

Scientists. 2nd ed. V. Barnett, ed. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

⁷ I.W. Evett. 1990. The theory of interpreting scientific transfer evidence. Forensic Science

Progress 4:141-179.

IMPROVING METHODS, PRACTICE, AND PERFORMANCE

187

THE NEED FOR RESEARCH

Barry Fisher, Director of the Crime Laboratory of the Los Angeles

County Sheriff’s Department, has said, “We run the risk of our science

being questioned in the courts because there is so little research.”⁸ In

2001 Giannelli wrote, “In many areas [of forensic science] little system-

atic research has been conducted to validate the field’s basic premises and

techniques, and often there is no justification why such research would

not be feasible.”⁹ As Smith et al. note, the United States has a renowned

higher education system, and many basic research discoveries relating to

the forensic science disciplines have been made in academia.¹⁰ However, the

forensic science disciplines suffer from an inadequate research base: Few

forensic scientists have the opportunity to conduct research, few academics

are positioned to undertake such research, and, importantly, the funding

for forensic research is insufficient. Others believe that the field suffers be-

cause the research initiatives being funded and pursued lack an overarching

strategic plan.¹¹

There are several explanations for the relative lack of funding for ba-

sic and applied research in the forensic science disciplines. First, forensic

practice was started in, and has grown out of, the criminal justice and law

enforcement systems. Many forensic science techniques were developed to

aid in the investigatory phase of law enforcement and then were adapted to

the role of aiding in prosecution by providing courtroom testimony. Thus,

forensic practitioners who work in public crime laboratories often are seen

as part of the prosecution team, not as part of the scientific enterprise.

Second, some of the forensic science disciplines rely on an apprenticeship

model for training, rather than on codifying their methods in a scientific

framework. Third, federal agencies that fund scientific work, such as the

National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and the

Department of Defense, generally have not considered forensic science as

part of the science base they need to support. It has been only in recent

years that the National Institute of Justice has taken interest in funding fo-

rensic science research, but the majority of these funds have been awarded

to reduce case backlogs, especially for cases that involve the analysis of

DNA (see Chapter 2).

⁸ K. Pyrek. 2007. Forensic Science Under Siege: The Challenges of Forensic Laboratories and

the Medico-Legal Investigation System. Burlington, MA: Academic Press, p. 231.

⁹ P.C. Giannelli. 2001. Scientific evidence in civil and criminal cases. Arizona State Law

Journal 103:112.

¹⁰ F.P. Smith, R.H. Liu, and C.A. Lindquist. 1988. Research experience and future criminal-

ists. Journal of Forensic Sciences 33(4):1074-1080.

¹¹ IAI Positions and Recommendations to the NAS Committee to Review the Forensic Sci-

ences. September 19, 2007. See presentation by K.F. Martin, IAI President, to the committee.

December 6, 2007.

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The forensic science disciplines need to develop rigorous protocols for

performing subjective interpretations, and they must pursue equally rigor-

ous research and evaluation programs. The development of such research

programs can benefit significantly from work in other areas, notably from

the large body of research that is available on the evaluation of observer

performance in diagnostic medicine and from the findings of cognitive psy-

chology on the potential for bias and error in human observers.

In evaluating the accuracy of a forensic analysis, it is crucial to clarify

the type of question the analysis is called upon to address. Thus, although

some techniques may be too imprecise to permit the accurate identification

of a specific individual, they may still provide useful and accurate informa-

tion about questions of classification. For example, microscopic hair analy-

sis may provide reliable evidence on the subpopulation of the individual

from which the specimen was derived, even if it cannot associate reliably

the hair with a specific individual. However, the definition of the appropri-

ate question is only a first step in evaluating the performance of a forensic

technique. The research design should address the questions that arise in

the specific context of forensics.

A complete research agenda should include studies to establish the

strengths and limitations of each procedure, sources of bias and varia-

tion, quantification of uncertainties created by these sources, measures

of performance, procedural steps in the process of analyzing the forensic

evidence, and methods for continual monitoring and improving the steps

in that process.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Wide variability is found across forensic science disciplines not only

with regard to techniques and methodologies (see Chapter 5), but also with

regard to reliability, error rates, reporting, research foundations, general

acceptability, and published material. Some of the disciplines are labora-

tory based (e.g., nuclear and mitochondrial DNA analysis, toxicology and

drug analysis, and analyses of fibers and fire debris); others are based on

expert interpretation of observed patterns (e.g., of fingerprints, writing

samples, toolmarks, bite marks, and hairs). The briefings and materials that

informed this report illustrate that the level of scientific development and

evaluation varies substantially among the forensic science disciplines.

In most areas of forensic science, no well-defined system exists for

determining error rates, and proficiency testing shows that some examin-

ers perform poorly. In some disciplines, such as forensic odontology, the

methods of evidence collection are relatively noncontroversial, but disputes

arise over the value and reliability of the resulting interpretations.

In most forensic science disciplines, no studies have been conducted

IMPROVING METHODS, PRACTICE, AND PERFORMANCE

189

of large populations to establish the uniqueness of marks or features. Yet,

despite the lack of a statistical foundation, examiners make probabilistic

claims based on their experience. A statistical framework that allows quan-

tification of these claims is greatly needed. These disciplines also critically

need to standardize and clarify the terminology used in reporting and tes-

tifying about the results and in providing more information.

Little rigorous systematic research has been done to validate the basic

premises and techniques in a number of forensic science disciplines. The

committee sees no evident reason why conducting such research is not feasi-

ble; in fact, some researchers have proposed research agendas to strengthen

the foundations of specific forensic disciplines.¹² Much more federal fund-

ing is needed to support research in forensic science and forensic pathology

in universities and in private laboratories committed to such work. The

forensic science and medical examiner communities (see Chapter 9) will be

improved by opportunities to collaborate with the broader science and engi-

neering communities. In particular, collaborative efforts are urgently needed

to: (1) develop new technical methods or provide in-depth grounding for

advances developed in forensic science; (2) provide an interface between

the forensic science and medical examiner communities and basic sciences;

and (3) create fertile grounds for discourse among the communities. The

proposed National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) should recommend,

implement, and guide strategies for supporting such initiatives.

Although a long-term research agenda will require a thorough assess-

ment of each of the assumptions that underlie forensic science techniques,

many concerns regarding the forensic science disciplines can be addressed

immediately through studies in which forensic science practitioners are

presented with a standardized set of realistic training materials that vary in

complexity. Such studies will not explore the components of the decision

process, but they will permit an assessment of the extent to which skilled

forensic science practitioners will reach the same or similar conclusions

when presented with the types of materials that lead to disagreements.

Recommendation 2:

The National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS), after review-

ing established standards such as ISO 17025, and in consultation

with its advisory board, should establish standard terminology to

be used in reporting on and testifying about the results of forensic

science investigations. Similarly, it should establish model labora-

tory reports for different forensic science disciplines and specify

¹² See, e.g., L. Haber and R.N. Haber. 2008. Scientific validation of fingerprint evidence

under Daubert. Law, Probability and Risk 7(2):87-109.

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the minimum information that should be included. As part of the

accreditation and certification processes, laboratories and forensic

scientists should be required to utilize model laboratory reports

when summarizing the results of their analyses.

Recommendation 3:

Research is needed to address issues of accuracy, reliability, and

validity in the forensic science disciplines. The National Institute

of Forensic Science (NIFS) should competitively fund peer-reviewed

research in the following areas:

(a) Studies establishing the scientific bases demonstrating the

validity of forensic methods.

(b) The development and establishment of quantifiable mea-

sures of the reliability and accuracy of forensic analyses.

Studies of the reliability and accuracy of forensic tech-

niques should reflect actual practice on realisticcase sce-

narios, averaged across a representative sample of forensic

scientists and laboratories. Studies also should establish

the limits of reliability and accuracy that analytic methods

can be expected to achieve as the conditions of forensic

evidence vary. The research by which measures of reliabil-

ity and accuracy are determined should be peer reviewed

and published in respected scientific journals.

in the conclusions of forensic analyses.

(d) Automated techniques capable of enhancing forensic

technologies.

To answer questions regarding the reliability and accuracy of a foren-

sic analysis, the research must distinguish between average performance

(achieved across individual practitioners and laboratories) and individual

performance (achieved by the specific practitioner and laboratory). Whether

or not a forensic procedure is sufficient under the rules of evidence govern-

ing criminal and civil litigation raises difficult legal issues that are outside

the realm of scientific inquiry.

Recommendation 4:

To improve the scientific bases of forensic science examinations

and to maximize independence from or autonomy within the law

enforcement community, Congress should authorize and appropri-

IMPROVING METHODS, PRACTICE, AND PERFORMANCE

191

ate incentive funds to the National Institute of Forensic Science

(NIFS) for allocation to state and local jurisdictions for the purpose

of removing all public forensic laboratories and facilities from the

administrative control of law enforcement agencies or prosecutors’

offices.

Recommendation 5:

The National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) should encourage

research programs on human observer bias and sources of human

error in forensic examinations. Such programs might include stud-

ies to determine the effects of contextual bias in forensic practice

(e.g., studies to determine whether and to what extent the results

of forensic analyses are influenced by knowledge regarding the

background of the suspect and the investigator’s theory of the

case). In addition, research on sources of human error should be

closely linked with research conducted to quantify and characterize

the amount of error. Based on the results of these studies, and in

consultation with its advisory board, NIFS should develop stan-

dard operating procedures (that will lay the foundation for model

protocols) to minimize, to the greatest extent reasonably possible,

potential bias and sources of human error in forensic practice.

These standard operating procedures should apply to all forensic

analyses that may be used in litigation.

Strengthening Oversight of

Forensic Science Practice

Several commentators appearing before the committee noted that

nearly anyone with a garage and some capital theoretically could open a

forensics laboratory and start offering services. Although this might be a

bit hyperbolic, the fact is that there are no requirements, except in a few

states (New York, Oklahoma, and Texas), for forensics laboratories to meet

specific standards for quality assurance or for practitioners to be certified

according to an agreed set of standards.¹ Well-publicized problems in large

crime laboratories have uncovered systematic deficiencies in quality control.

For example, in 2002, the Houston Police Department Crime Laboratory

and Property Room came under scrutiny because of a range of quality

concerns that created “profound doubts about the integrity of important

aspects of the criminal justice system in Harris County.”² Problems included

poor documentation, serious analytical and interpretive errors, the absence

of quality assurance programs, inadequately trained personnel, erroneous

reporting, the use of inaccurate and misleading statistics, and even “drylab-

bing” (the falsification of scientific results).³ In most cases, existing efforts

¹ See N.Y. Exec. § 995-b (McKinney 1996); (accreditation by Forensic Science Commis-

sion); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74 § 150.37 (requiring accreditation by the American Society

of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board or the American Board of

Forensic Toxicology); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code art. 38.35 (accreditation by the Department

of Public Safety).

² M.R. Bromwich. 2007. Final Report of the Independent Investigator for the Houston

Police Department Crime Laboratory and Property Room. June 13. Available at www.

hpdlabinvestigation.org, p. 1.

³ Ibid.

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to impose standards and best practices in forensic science practice rely on

the voluntary participation of some members of the forensic science com-

munity working diligently to improve overall quality in the field.

Despite important movement in recent years toward developing and

implementing quality control measures in the forensic science disciplines,

a lack of uniform and mandatory quality assurance procedures, combined

with some highly publicized problems involving large crime laboratories,

has led to heightened attention to efforts to remedy uneven quality among

laboratories through the imposition of standards and best practices. The

American Bar Association has recommended that, “Crime laboratories and

medical examiner officers should be accredited, examiners should be certi-

fied, and procedures should be standardized and published to ensure the

validity, reliability, and timely analysis of forensic evidence.”⁴

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,⁵ the Supreme Court cited

as a relevant factor in assessing expert testimony the “existence and main-

tenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation.” Standards and

best practices create a professional environment that allows organizations

and professions to create quality systems, policies, and procedures and

maintain autonomy from vested interest groups. Standards ensure desir-

able characteristics of services and techniques such as quality, reliability,

efficiency, and consistency among practitioners. Typically standards are

enforced through systems of accreditation and certification, wherein inde-

pendent examiners and auditors test and audit the performance, policies,

and procedures of both laboratories and service providers. In addition, re-

quirements for quality control can be imposed on entities receiving federal

funds, and professional groups can develop codes of ethics and conduct to

serve as measures against which performance can be assessed.

This chapter addresses some of the traditional approaches used by

technical professions to enhance the quality of performance—accreditation,

certification (including proficiency testing), and oversight—tied to federal

funding. In each approach, standards are used to measure the quality of

institutions or organizations, either in terms of their policies and proce-

dures or in terms of the proficiency and skills of an individual practicing

the discipline. However, as mentioned above, with the exception of three

states mandating accreditation (New York, Oklahoma, and Texas), the ac-

creditation of laboratories and certification of forensic examiners remains

voluntary.

⁴ American Bar Association. 2006. Report of the ABA Criminal Justice Section’s Ad Hoc

Innocence Committee to Ensure the Integrity of the Criminal Process. Achieving Justice:

Freeing the Innocent, Convicting the Guilty. P.C. Giannelli and M. Raeder (eds.). Chicago:

American Bar Association.

⁵ 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT

195

ACCREDITATION

Accreditation is just one aspect of an organization’s quality assurance

program, which also should include proficiency testing where relevant,

continuing education, and other programs to help the organization provide

better overall services. In the case of laboratories, accreditation does not

mean that accredited laboratories do not make mistakes, nor does it mean

that a laboratory utilizes best practices in every case, but rather, it means

that the laboratory adheres to an established set of standards of quality and

relies on acceptable practices within these requirements. An accredited labo-

ratory has in place a management system that defines the various processes

by which it operates on a daily basis, monitors that activity, and responds

to deviations from the acceptable practices using a routine and thoughtful

method. This cannot be a self-assessing program. Oversight must come

from outside the participating laboratory to ensure that standards are not

self-serving and superficial and to remove the option of taking shortcuts

when other demands compete with quality assurance. In addition, accredi-

tation serves as a mechanism to strengthen professional community ties,

transmit best practices, and expose laboratory employees directly to the

perspectives and expectations of other leaders in the profession.

An example of a strong accreditation system is that required through the

Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA).⁶ Through

this legislation, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) regu-

lates all clinical laboratory testing (except research) performed on humans

in the United States. In total, CLIA covers approximately 189,000 labora-

tory entities (see Box 7-1).

Some key elements of CLIA and of other accreditation programs that

might be incorporated into a mandatory accreditation system for forensic

science include:

• a national organization that can mediate the accreditation process;

• an application process with criteria by which organizations are

eligible to apply;

• a process of self-evaluation;

• an external evaluation process, including site visits by external

evaluators;

• an appeals process;

• a repeat cycle of evaluation and external evaluation, and;

• a set of standards by which entities can be evaluated.⁷

⁶ 42 U.S.C. § 263a.

⁷ Institute of Medicine. 2001. Preserving Public Trust: Accreditation and Human Research

Participation Protection Programs. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

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STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Box 7-1

Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA)

The objective of the CLIA program is to ensure quality laboratory testing. All

clinical laboratories must be properly certified to receive Medicare or Medicaid

payments. CLIA requires all entities that perform even one test using “materials

derived from the human body for the purpose of providing information for the

diagnosis, prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assess-

ment of the health of, human beings” to meet certain federal requirements. If an

entity performs tests for these purposes, it is considered to be covered by CLIA

and must register with the CLIA program.

CMS and CDC develop standards for laboratory certification (it is actually a

certificate of accreditation). In addition, CDC conducts studies and convenes con-

ferences to help determine when changes in regulatory requirements are needed.

Oversight is conducted through onsite inspections of laboratories conducted every

two years using federal surveyors or surveyors of deemed organizations or state-

operated CLIA programs approved for this purpose. Oversight includes a compre-

hensive evaluation of the laboratory’s operating environment and personnel, as

well as its proficiency testing, quality control, and quality assurance procedures.

The laboratory director plays a critical role in assuring the safe and appropriate

use of laboratory tests—he or she must meet required qualifications and must

ensure that the test methodologies selected are capable of providing the quality of

results required for patient care. Laboratory directors are required to take specific

actions to establish a comprehensive quality assurance program.

Six organizations are deemed to offer accreditation of laboratories for CLIA.

An accreditation organization that applies or reapplies to CMS for deeming author-

ity, or a state licensure program that applies or reapplies to CMS for exemption

from CLIA program requirements of licensed or approved laboratories within

the state, must provide extensive documentation of its process. This includes a

detailed description of the inspection process, a description of the steps taken to

monitor the correction of deficiencies, a description of the process for monitoring

performance, procedures for responding to and for the investigation of complaints

against its laboratories, and a list of all its current laboratories and the expiration

dates of their certification.

CLIA also provides for sanctions that may be imposed on laboratories found

to be out of compliance with one or more of the conditions of accreditation (e.g.,

unsuccessful participation in proficiency testing). These include suspension, limi-

tation, or revocation of the certificate; civil suit to enjoin any laboratory activity that

constitutes a significant hazard to the public health; and imprisonment or fine for

any person convicted of the intentional violation of CLIA requirements. The regula-

tions also require that the Department of Health and Human Services Secretary

annually publish a list of all laboratories that have been sanctioned during the

preceding year. Sanctions can be appealed.

SOURCE: www.cms.hhs.gov/clia/.

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197

In addition, accrediting organizations typically offer education and

training programs to help the participating entities comply with the stan-

dards. Accreditation cannot guarantee high quality—that is, it cannot guard

against those who intentionally disobey or ignore requirements. However,

over time it can reduce the likelihood that violations will occur, and reports

of infractions should trigger increased scrutiny by an accrediting body. And,

by requiring that education be a standard that must be met as a condition of

accreditation, incremental change and quality improvement can be achieved

individual by individual.

Development of Current Forensic Laboratory Accrediting Organizations

In the 1970s, FBI Director Clarence Kelley and FBI Laboratory Director

Briggs White organized a group of crime laboratory directors that eventu-

ally became known as the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors,

or ASCLD. ASCLD’s Committee on Laboratory Evaluation and Standards

was focused on developing quality assurance standards, and in 1981 the

ASCLD/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB) was formed. In

1988, it was officially incorporated as a not-for-profit organization.

In 1994, the passage of the DNA Identification Act established a DNA

Advisory Board (DAB) to develop and enforce quality assurance standards

for crime laboratories seeking access to the FBI’s national database of DNA

profiles (see below). The DAB recommended that crime laboratories seek

accreditation as quickly as possible. According to the Crime Lab Report,

“Because ASCLD/LAB policies and procedures would not allow accredita-

tion to be awarded to a single work unit, laboratories that were not pre-

pared to undergo a full ASCLD/LAB accreditation assessment seemed to

have no other alternative but to forfeit access to the DNA database until

they were ready for a full accreditation audit.”⁸

In 1995, the private not-for-profit corporation National Forensic Sci-

ence Technology Center (NFSTC) was formed by the ASCLD executive

board for training, education, and support of accreditation.⁹ NFSTC could

support and assist crime laboratories preparing for a full ASCLD/LAB

accreditation as well as audit and temporarily certify DNA units that

complied with DNA-specific quality assurance standards.^10,11 NFSTC sub-

sequently formed a new independent accreditation corporation, Forensic

Quality Services (FQS), with the idea that its program would be based on

⁸ Crime Lab Report. December 20, 2007. Available at www.crimelabreport.com/monthly_

report/12-2007.htm.

⁹ See http://nfstc.org/aboutus/history/history.htm.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ DNA procedures are regulated under the DNA Identification Act of 1994. DNA Identi-

fication Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (1994).

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the new ISO/IEC 17025 international standard for testing and calibration

laboratories.¹²

In 2003, the ASCLD/LAB Delegate Assembly approved the implemen-

tation of an ISO/IEC 17025 program, and ASCLD/LAB began offering

these accreditations in April 2004. Accreditations for forensic science labo-

ratories are now conducted using General requirements for the competence

of testing and calibration laboratories 17025 ISO/IEC (2005),¹³ the same

requirements under which private and public laboratories are accredited.

The international standards are developed through technical committees

to deal with particular fields of technical activity. In order for sector spe-

cific requirements for forensic laboratories to be addressed, ISO allows for

the amplification of requirements or supplemental requirements, such as

ASCLD/LAB-International Supplemental requirements for the accredita-

tion of forensic science testing laboratories (2006).

ASCLD/LAB’s areas of focus are laboratory management and opera-

tions, personnel qualifications, and the physical plant. The following must

be in place for accreditation:

• procedures to protect evidence from loss, cross-transfer, contamina-

tion, and/or deleterious change;

• validated and documented technical procedures;

• the use of appropriate controls and standards;

• calibration procedures;

• complete documentation of all evidence examination;

• documented training programs that include competency testing;

• technical review of a portion of each examiner’s work product;

• testimony monitoring of all who testify; and

• a comprehensive proficiency testing program.¹⁴

The ASCLD/LAB accreditation cycle is five years, with annual reports

required from each accredited laboratory that consist of any changes in

management, staff, facilities, methodologies, proficiency testing, and testi-

mony monitoring. All accredited laboratories must maintain written cop-

ies of appropriate technical procedures, including descriptions of sample

preparation methods, controls, standards, and calibration procedures, as

well as a discussion of precautions, sources of possible error, and literature

references. In addition, ASCLD/LAB has a policy regarding the reporting of

noncompliance with requirements, a portion of which is excerpted below:

¹² See www.forquality.org.

¹³ See www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=39883.

¹⁴ R. Stacey, President, ASCLD/LAB. Presentation to the committee. January 25, 2007.

STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT

199

In keeping with the stated objective of ‘identifying those laboratories

which meet established standards,’ the ASCLD/LAB Board has determined

that, as an accrediting body, we must be timelier in reviewing instances

of significant non-compliance. To further this objective, all accredited

laboratories must disclose to ASCLD/LAB all substantive occurrences of

non-compliance within 30 calendar days of determining that the non-

compliance has occurred.¹⁵

In addition to this particular requirement, the ISO program has a re-

quirement for an annual surveillance visit. During this site visit, any issues

that may have come to the attention of ASCLD/LAB and/or requirements

selected by ASCLD/LAB are reviewed. The accreditation programs are

managed by a paid staff member working under the direction of a board

of directors, which is elected by the Delegate Assembly. The Delegate As-

sembly is composed of the directors of all accredited laboratories and labo-

ratory systems. Inspectors must complete a training program and must be

employed in an accredited laboratory. At any time, if an issue is brought to

the attention of ASCLD/LAB, the board of directors can, after determining

that the claim is substantive, implement an interim inspection of that par-

ticular issue and the entire laboratory. The program also includes a system

of sanctions and an appeal process.

Status of Accreditation

ASCLD/LAB’s international program has accredited 60 laboratories as

of April 2008, in addition to 337 laboratories accredited under the origi-

nal Legacy program.¹⁶ FQS-International (FQS-I) has accredited just over

50 laboratories in one or more disciplines; however, FQS-I allows forensic

laboratories to customize their accreditation by phasing in one discipline at

a time.¹⁷ A survey of International Association for Identification (IAI) mem-

bers, who tend to work in settings other than traditional crime laboratories,

revealed that only 15 percent of respondents are accredited.¹⁸

Only a few jurisdictions require that their forensics laboratories be

accredited. According to the 2005 census of 351 publicly funded crime

laboratories, more than three-quarters of laboratories (78 percent) were

¹⁵ 2008 version of the ASCLD/LAB Legacy Accreditation Manual.

¹⁶ See www.ascld-lab.org/legacy/aslablegacylaboratories.html.

¹⁷ See www.forquality.org/fqs_I_Labs.htm.

¹⁸ T.S. Witt. Director, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, West Virginia University.

Presentation to the committee. December 6, 2007.

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accredited by ASCLD/ LAB.¹⁹ Another 3 percent were accredited by some

other professional organization, such as the ISO. State-operated laborato-

ries (91 percent) were more likely to be accredited than laboratories serving

county (67 percent) or municipal (62 percent) jurisdictions. Among the 230

laboratories providing accreditation information in both the 2002²⁰ and

2005 censuses, the accreditation rate increased during the three years from

75 to 87 percent.

However, identification units—that is, those forensic entities outside

crime laboratories—do not participate in accreditation systems and are not

required to do so. Given that some disciplines are practiced largely outside

the laboratory environment (e.g., 66 percent of fingerprint analyses are not

conducted in crime laboratories), there is a substantial gap in the number

of programs participating in accreditation.^21,22

As mentioned previously, DNA analysis is regulated under the DNA

Identification Act of 1994, which created an advisory board on quality

assurance, tasked with promulgating standards for proficiency testing of

laboratories and analysts. The terms of the original advisory board expired,

and now the FBI Quality Assurance Standards apply to DNA laboratories

receiving federal funds. The standards require periodic (every other year)

audits using the FBI Quality Assurance Standards to ensure compliance.

The FBI guidelines require that two proficiency tests be completed annu-

ally by DNA examiners as well as by technical support personnel perform-

ing relevant analytical techniques. The tests must be administered by a

source external to the laboratory. The FBI is responsible for developing and

maintaining a DNA audit document for assessing compliance with DNA

standards and also provides DNA auditor instruction to all ASCLD/LAB

inspectors, in addition to the forensic DNA community, on how to inter-

pret the DNA standards. The FBI also reviews audit findings and remedial

action, if any. Once all standards are met, it notifies the laboratory of full

compliance.

¹⁹ M.R. Durose. 2008. Census of Publicly Funded Forensic Crime Laboratories, 2005. U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available at

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpffcl05.pdf.

²⁰ J.L. Peterson and M. J. Hickman. 2005. Census of Publicly Funded Forensic Crime

Laboratories, 2002. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice

Statistics. Available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpffcl02.pdf.

²¹ Witt, op. cit.

²² Accreditation is also available for other more specific forensic science disciplines. For

example, the National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME) operates an accreditation

program for coroners and medical examiners offices (see Chapter 9). The American Board of

Forensic Toxicology accredits toxicology laboratories.

STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT

201

STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR QUALITY CONTROL

Standards provide the foundation against which performance, reli-

ability, and validity can be assessed. Adherence to standards reduces bias,

improves consistency, and enhances the validity and reliability of results.

Standards reduce variability resulting from the idiosyncratic tendencies of

the individual examiner—for example, setting conditions under which one

can declare a “match” in forensic identifications. They make it possible to

replicate and empirically test procedures and help disentangle method er-

rors from practitioner errors. Importantly, standards not only guide practice

but also can serve as guideposts in accreditation and certification programs.

Many forensic science disciplines have developed standards, but others have

not, which contributes to questions about the validity of conclusions.

Several groups produce standards for use in the forensic science disci-

plines. For example, ASTM International (ASTM), originally known as the

American Society for Testing and Materials, is an international standards

organization that develops and publishes voluntary technical standards for

a wide range of materials, products, systems, and services. In the area of

forensic science it offers, for example:

• Standard Guide for Minimum Training Requirements for Forensic

Document Examiners

• Standard Guide for Forensic Paint Analysis and Comparison

• Standard Guide for Nondestructive Examination of Paper

• Standard Guide for Forensic Analysis of Fibers by Infrared

Spectroscopy

• Standard Terminology for Expressing Conclusions of Forensic

Document Examiners

At the federal level, the National Institute of Standards and Technology

(NIST) conducts research to establish standards in a limited number of fo-

rensic areas, for example, organic gunshot residue analysis, trace explosives

detectors, and improvised explosive devices.²³ Its laboratories develop tests,

test methods, produce reference data, conduct proof-of-concept implemen-

tations, and perform technical analyses. They also develop guides to help

forensic organizations formulate appropriate policies and procedures, such

as those concerning mobile phone forensic examinations. These guides

are not all-inclusive and they do not prescribe how law enforcement and

²³ B. MacCrehan. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Analytical Chemistry

Division. Presentation to the committee. September 21, 2007.

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STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

incident response communities should handle investigations. Instead, they

provide principles for establishing policies and procedures.²⁴

In accordance with ISO/IEC 17025, which states that all technical pro-

cedures used by a science laboratory should be fully validated before they

are used in casework, the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes

has developed a guidance document for its member laboratories to use in

validating techniques employed in forensic casework.²⁵

The FBI initiated the first Scientific Working Groups (SWGs) in the

early

1990s to facilitate consensus around forensic science operations

among federal, state, and local agencies.²⁶ Each SWG has a formal struc-

ture and functions in accordance with its bylaws. Membership is at the

discretion of the chair of the working group. Most SWGs include members

from both public and private organizations. Meetings held at least once a

year allow SWG members to discuss issues of concern and reach consensus

on documents drafted throughout the year. The SWGs create, prepare,

and publish standards and guidelines for their constituents in the forensic

science community. These documents provide crime laboratories a basis

for operational requirements, although the committee found that some

standards and guidelines lack the level of specificity needed to ensure con-

sistency. However, enforcement of the guidelines is left to the appropriate

governing agency and each group’s internal policies. The SWGs generate

voluntary guidelines and protocols, which carry no force of law. Nonethe-

less, the SWGs have been a source of improved standards for the forensic

science disciplines and represent the results of a profession that is working

to strengthen its professional services with only limited resources.

The FBI Laboratory currently sponsors the following groups:

• Scientific Working Group for Firearms and Toolmarks (SWGGUN)

• Scientific Working Group for Forensic Document Examination

(SWGDOC)

• Scientific Working Group for Materials Analysis (SWGMAT)

• Scientific Working Group on Bloodstain Pattern Analysis (SWGSTAIN)

• Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM)

• Scientific Working Group on Dog and Orthogonal Detector Guide-

lines (SWGDOG)

• Scientific Working Group on the Forensic Analysis of Chemical

Terrorism (SWGFACT)

²⁴ B. Guttman. National Institute of Standards and Technology National Software Reference

Library. Presentation to the committee. September 21, 2007.

²⁵ European Network of Forensic Science Institutes Standing Committee for Quality and

Competence (QCC). 2006. Validation and Implementation of (New) Methods.

²⁶ Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2000. Scientific Working Groups. Available at www.fbi.

gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july2000/swgroups.htm.

STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT

203

• Scientific Working Group on the Forensic Analysis of Radiological

Materials (SWGFARM)

• Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and

Technology (SWGFAST)

• Scientific Working Group on Microbial Genetics and Forensics

(SWGMGF)

• Scientific Working Group on Shoeprint and Tire Tread Evidence

(SWGTREAD)

Additional SWGs may be sponsored by other FBI divisions or other

agencies. For example, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration supports

the Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs (SWGDRUG)

(see Box 7-2).

Despite the proliferation of standards in many of the forensic science

disciplines, their voluntary nature and inconsistent application make it

difficult to assess their impact. Ideally, standards should be consistently

applicable and measurable. In addition, mechanisms should be in place

Box 7-2

A Sampling of SWGs

SWGDRUG^a

In 1997, the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Office of National Drug

Control Policy created and sponsored a Technical Working Group for the Analysis

of Seized Drugs (TWGDRUG), which was renamed a Scientific Working Group

(SWGDRUG) in 1999. The stated objectives of SWGDRUG include the specifica-

tion of requirements for forensic drug practitioners, the promotion of professional

development, the exchange of information within the forensic science community,

the promotion of ethical standards of practitioners, the provision of minimum

standards for drug examinations and reporting, the establishment of quality as-

surance requirements, the consideration of relevant international standards, and

the promotion of international acceptance of SWGDRUG recommendations. In-

dividual subcommittees currently are devoted to evaluating analytical methods,

setting standards for quality assurance, estimating uncertainty, formatting draft

and final recommendations, and maintaining a glossary. The subcommittee de-

velops recommendations, which the core committee votes to accept or reject. If

accepted, draft documents are released for public comment for at least 60 days.

Following public comment and possible revision, the core committee holds a final

vote. Three-quarters of the core committee must be present, and two-thirds of

those present must vote affirmatively in order to confer official status to a proposed

recommendation.

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STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Box 7-2 Continued

SWGDRUG has produced guidelines for quality assurance protocols, meth-

ods of analysis and identification of seized drugs, and education and training

materials for forensic practitioners. Quality assurance guidelines emphasize the

integrity and storage of evidence, the validation and documentation of procedures,

and the verification of standards. Among SWGDRUG’s recommendations for edu-

cation is a requirement that entry level forensic drug analysts possess at least a

bachelor’s degree in a natural science, with coursework in general, organic, and

analytical chemistry. Guidelines on methods and analyses categorize analytical

techniques into three groups, according to discriminating ability: “A” techniques

are deemed the most discriminating, and “C” techniques are considered the least

discriminating. For the purposes of identifying substances, SWGDRUG recom-

mends the use of at least one “A” technique and one other additional test for

validation. When an “A” technique cannot be used, at least two uncorrelated “B”

tests and one additional method are suggested. SWGDRUG also has released

supplementary documents to assist in implementing these guidelines.

SWGGUN^b

The FBI established SWGGUN in 1998 and has continued to fund the initia-

tive in subsequent years. Subcommittees of a 20-member board draft guidelines

in conjunction with external experts. Guidelines are posted on the SWGGUN Web

site for public comment before the board finalizes the recommendations with an

affirmative vote by two-thirds of the members present at a meeting.^c Currently,

SWGGUN offers guidelines on trigger pull analysis, education and experience

requirements for firearm and toolmark examiners and trainees, laboratory training

manuals, laboratory quality assurance programs, the range of possible conclu-

sions when comparing toolmarks, projectile path reconstruction, and the examina-

tion of silencers. The SWGGUN website also offers an “admissibility resource kit,”

which offers arguments intended to satisfy the prongs of the Daubert standard.

SWGMAT^d

Since 1996, SWGMAT has been issuing voluntary guidelines addressing

trace evidence, including hair comparison. Quality assurance guidelines, pub-

lished in 2000, advise that two examiners separately analyze samples and sug-

gest minimum levels for training and qualifications for examiners and laboratories.

Hair comparison guidelines, published in 2005, address techniques for collecting

hair samples, examining and interpreting protocols for microscopic examination,

and using DNA testing in hair analysis. Notably, the use of DNA testing of hair is

advised only after an initial microscopic analysis is conducted. In contrast to the

larger forensic science community’s recent interest in blind testing and statistical

verification, SWGMAT proposes the following approach: The examiner should con-

sider what meaning can be attached to an exclusion or association based upon

STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT

205

the known case circumstances. Probabilities and population statistics should not

be used in the interpretation of microscopic hair comparisons. Databases, from

which population statistics can be generated (as is done in DNA analysis), are not

practical or realistic for hair analysis.

SWGFAST^e

In 1995, the FBI created a Technical Working Group on Friction Ridge Analy-

sis, Study, and Technology (TWGFAST). The group was renamed as a Scientific

Working Group (SWGFAST) in 1998 and has continued to provide guidelines on

fingerprint evidence, with funding from the FBI. Additionally, a National Institute of

Justice grant has supported the development of a forthcoming SWGFAST refer-

ence manual.

The SWGFAST bylaws allow for up to 40 members and require biannual

meetings. Members have included agency employees from federal, state, lo-

cal, and foreign bodies and from the academic and private sectors. Proposed

guidelines are released to the community for comment after receiving an affirma-

tive vote by two-thirds of the SWGFAST members present at a meeting. A draft

document is adopted following community review and feedback, if two-thirds of

the members present at a meeting again vote in favor of such action. Accepted

guidelines are reconsidered five years after adoption. Existing SWGFAST guide-

lines address automation training, digital imaging, friction ridge analysis for latent

print examination, latent print proficiency testing, professional conduct, minimum

qualifications and competency for latent print trainees, quality assurance, inter-

pretation and conclusions, and validation research.^f

Like all other SWG documents, SWGFAST’s guidelines have no inherent

authority or force of law. However, in collaboration with academic institutions, law

enforcement agencies, and industry, SWGFAST has participated in the develop-

ment of a standard data format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, & Scar

Mark and Tattoo Information, through the American National Standard for Informa-

tion Systems-NIST (ANSI-NIST-ITL 1-2007). Additionally, crime laboratories have

purportedly relied on SWGFAST guidelines in order to meet the ASCLD/LAB

accreditation Standards.^g

^aN. Santos. 2007. “Drug Identification.” Presentation to the committee. April 23, 2007.

^b P. Striupaitis, Chair, IAI Firearm/Toolmark Committee, and member, SWGGUN. Presentation

to the committee. April 23, 2007.

^c Ibid.

^d R.E. Bisbing, Executive Vice President, McCrone Associates, Inc., and member SWGMAT.

Presentation to the committee. April 24, 2007.

^e S. Meagher, Fingerprint Specialist, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Vice-Chair

SWGFAST. Presentation to the committee. April 24, 2007.

^f See www.theiai.org/guidelines/swgfast/index.php.

^g Meagher, op. cit.

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STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

for their enforcement, with sanctions imposed against those who fail to

comply. As such, standards should be developed with a consideration of the

relevant measures that will be used to provide a meaningful evaluation of

an organization’s or individual’s level of compliance. Appropriate standards

must be coupled with effective systems of accreditation and/or certification

that include strong enforcement mechanisms and sanctions.

Individual laboratories undergoing accreditation develop their own

laboratory protocols. Whether these protocols adhere to the SWG stan-

dards depends on the individual examiners in the discipline in the labora-

tory in question. Accrediting bodies require that the methods meet a level of

acceptable practice. Currently, most of these practices are slight variations

of the SWG guidelines, with adjustments to accommodate differences in

equipment.

PROFICIENCY TESTING

Although many forensic science disciplines have engaged in proficiency

testing for the past several decades, several courts have noted that profi-

ciency testing in some disciplines is not sufficiently rigorous.²⁷ ASCLD/LAB’s

Web site states that “Proficiency testing is an integral part of an effective

quality assurance program. It is one of many measures used by laboratories

to monitor performance and to identify areas where improvement may be

needed. A proficiency testing program is a reliable method of verifying that

the laboratory’s technical procedures are valid and that the quality of work

is being maintained.”²⁸ Similarly, ISO/IEC 17025 policies state:

Proficiency testing is one of the important tools used by laboratories and

Accreditation Bodies for monitoring test and calibration results and for

verifying the effectiveness of the accreditation process. As such, it is an im-

portant element in establishing confidence in the competence of Signatories

and their accredited laboratories covered by this Arrangement.²⁹

²⁷ See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 274 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Llera Plaza,

188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2002); United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548,

554 (S.D. W.Va. 2002).

²⁸ See www.ascld-lab.org/legacy/pdf/aslabinternproficiencyreviewprogram.pdf. It is worth

noting that several studies have assessed or published crime laboratory proficiency testing

results, which generally reveal the need for improvement; J.L. Peterson, E.L. Fabricant, K.S.

Field, and J.I. Thornton. 1978. Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Research Program.

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office; J.L. Peterson and P. Markham. 1995.

Crime laboratory proficiency testing results, 1978-1991, I: Identification and classification of

physical evidence. Journal of Forensic Sciences 40(6):994-1008; J.L. Peterson and P. Markham,

1995. Crime laboratory proficiency testing results, 1978-1991, II: Resolving questions of com-

mon origin. Journal of Forensic Sciences 40(6):1009-1029.

²⁹ See www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=39883.

STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT

207

There are several types of proficiency tests, with the primary distinc-

tion among them being whether the examiner is aware that he or she is

being tested (an open or declared test) or does not realize that the sample

presented for analysis is a test sample and not a real case (a blind test).

Tests can be generated externally, by another laboratory (sometimes called

an interlaboratory test), or internally. Another type of testing involves ran-

dom case reanalysis, in which an examiner’s completed prior casework is

randomly selected for reanalysis by a supervisor or another examiner.³⁰

Interlaboratory testing can be conducted for a number of purposes:

(1) to determine the performance of individual laboratories for specific

tests or measurements and to monitor laboratories’ continuing

performance;

(2) to identify problems in laboratories and initiate remedial actions,

which may be related to, for example, individual staff performance

or the calibration of instrumentation;

(3) to determine the performance characteristics of a method and to

establish the effectiveness and comparability of new tests or mea-

surement methods; or

(4) to assign values to reference materials and assess their suitability

for use in specific tests or measurement procedures.³¹

Blind proficiency testing is recommended, but not required, by ASCLD/

LAB—not as a way to determine error rates, but as a more precise test of a

worker’s accuracy. Initially, mandatory blind testing was proposed as part

of the federal DNA Identification Act. A Department of Justice (DOJ) panel

designed blind tests, evaluated them, and estimated it would cost $500,000

to $1 million annually for one test per laboratory.³² In appropriate circum-

stances, proficiency testing should include blind testing.

ASCLD/LAB has a detailed proficiency testing program that requires

all active examiners to take at least one proficiency test per year (two tests

per year in DNA), that each discipline within the laboratory participate

in an external proficiency test that is reviewed by a proficiency test review

³⁰ Refer to ISO/IEC Guide 43-1:1997(E) Section 4 for a list of proficiency testing schemes.

Refer to ASTM E 1301 Section 6 for an overview of organization and design of proficiency

tests. SWGs also provide guidelines for proficiency testing in the relevant discipline.

³¹ European Network of Forensic Science Institutes. 2005. Guidance on the Conduct of

Proficiency Tests and Collaborative Exercises Within ENFSI. Available at www.enfsi.eu/

uploads/files/QCC-PT-001-003.pdf.

³² J.L. Peterson, G. Lin, M. Ho, Y. Chen, and R.E. Gaensslen. 2003. The feasibility of

external blind DNA proficiency testing. Available at www.astm.org/JOURNALS/FORENSIC/

PAGES/4241.htm.

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STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

panel, and that any proficiency test that is not successfully completed be im-

mediately reported to ASCLD/LAB along with a corrective action plan. To

retain accredited status for a full five-year term, a laboratory must continue

to meet the standards under which it was accredited. One of the means by

which ASCLD/LAB monitors compliance is by reviewing proficiency testing

reports submitted by approved test providers.

According to the 2002 BJS census,³³ 274 of the 351 publicly funded

laboratories were engaged in proficiency testing. Proficiency testing was

slightly less common among smaller laboratories and those serving munici-

pal jurisdictions (8 laboratories did not engage in such testing, and 69 did

not answer the survey question). Among the laboratories engaged in profi-

ciency testing, almost all use declared tests. Slightly more than half engaged

in proficiency testing use random case reanalysis. Twenty-six percent of

the laboratories engaged in proficiency testing use blind tests. In addition,

the BJS survey reported that almost all laboratories engaged in proficiency

testing used tests that were generated externally (thus allowing comparative

analysis). In addition to external tests, 74 percent of laboratories engaged in

proficiency testing also used internally generated tests. Data on proficiency

testing were not collected for the 2005 census.

CERTIFICATION

The certification of individuals complements the accreditation of labo-

ratories for a total quality assurance program. In other realms of science

and technology, professionals, including nurses, physicians, professional

engineers, and some laboratorians, typically must be certified before they

can practice.³⁴ The same should be true for forensic scientists who practice

and testify. Although the accreditation process primarily addresses the

management system, technical methods, and quality of the work of a labo-

ratory (which includes the education and training of staff), certification is

a process specifically designed to ensure the competency of the individual

examiner.

The American Bar Association has recommended that certification stan-

dards be required of examiners, including “demanding written examina-

tions, proficiency testing, continuing education, recertification procedures,

³³ Peterson and Hickman, op. cit.

³⁴ T. Ortelli. 2008. Characteristics of candidates who have taken the Certified Nurse Edu-

cator: CNE examination: A two-year review. Nursing Education Perspectives 29(2):120; P.

Nowak. 2008. Get IT-certified: Having employees with the right certifications can help deal-

ers and integrators qualify for business and gain access to IT networks. Network Technology

38(3):123; S. Space. 2007. Investigator certification. Issues in Clinical Trials Management

8(2):73.

STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT

209

an ethical code, and effective disciplinary procedures.”³⁵ In addition to

improving quality, certification programs can enhance the credibility of

certificate holders. An excellent description of the certification process is

contained in the following excerpt from the National Association of Medi-

cal Examiners (NAME) Web site:

In general, certification boards consist of respected professionals in a

particular area of professional practice who develop standards for educa-

tion, training, and experience that are required before one can become

‘certified’ in a particular professional discipline. Successful completion of

a written and/or practical examination is also usually required. In essence,

‘certification’ usually means that a particular individual has completed a

defined course of education, training, and experience, and has passed an

examination prepared by peers which demonstrates that the individual has

obtained at least the minimum level of competence required to practice the

specific discipline. A number of ‘Certification Boards’ exist for people in

various scientific disciplines

The professional forensic science community supports the concept of

certification. ASCLD recommends that laboratory managers support peer

certification programs that promote professionalism and provide objective

standards. In 2002, the Technical Working Group on Forensic Science

Education recommended certification of an individual’s competency by an

independent peer-based organization, if available, from a certifying body

with appropriate credentials. In addition, IAI supports certification of fo-

rensic science practitioners.³⁷

Some organizations, such as the American Board of Criminalists (ABC),

offer examiner certification programs, but some certification organizations

appear to lack stringent requirements.³⁸ In response, the American Academy

of Forensic Sciences has formed a Forensic Specialties Accreditation Board

to accredit certifying organizations. Organizations are invited to participate

if they meet established requirements, such as periodic recertification, a suf-

ficient knowledge base for certification, a process for providing credentials,

and a code of ethics.³⁹ Currently accredited boards include:

• American Board of Criminalistics

³⁵ American Bar Association, op. cit., p. 7.

³⁶ See http://thename.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=80&Itemid=41.

³⁷ K.F. Martin, President, IAI. Presentation to the committee. September 19, 2007.

³⁸ See M. Hansen. 2000. Expertise to go. ABA J. 86:44-45; E. MacDonald. 1999. “The

Making of an Expert Witness: It’s in the Credentials.” Wall Street Journal. February 8,

p. B1.

³⁹See FABS Standards for Accrediting Forensic Specialty Certification Boards at www.

thefsab.org/standards_20070218.pdf.

210

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

• American Board of Forensic Document Examiners

• American Board of Forensic Toxicology

• American Board of Medicolegal Death Investigators

• Board of Forensic Document Examiners

• International Institute of Forensic Engineering Sciences

IAI also has established certification programs in:

• Bloodstain Pattern Analysis

• Crime Scene Investigation

• Footwear

• Forensic Art

• Forensic Photography/Imaging

• Latent Print

• Tenprint Fingerprint⁴⁰

Other certification programs exist for (but are not limited to) the fol-

lowing forensic science disciplines:

• Document Examination (The American Board of Forensic Docu-

ment Examiners [ABFDE])

• Drug Analysis, Fire Debris Analysis, Molecular Biology, Trace

Analysis, and General Criminalistics (ABC)

• Firearms and ToolMark Identification (Association of Firearm and

ToolMark Examiners [AFTE])

• Forensic Odontology (The American Board of Forensic Odontol-

ogy [ABFO])

• Forensic Pathology (The American Board of Pathology [ABP])

• Toxicology (American Board or Forensic Toxicology [ABFT])

Each of these entities has specific educational, training, and experience

requirements, including a series of competency tests—both written and

practical—and participation in proficiency testing, and provide continuing

education/active participation by means of publication, presentation, and

membership in professional organizations.

OVERSIGHT AS A REQUIREMENT OF PAUL COVERDELL

FORENSIC SCIENCE IMPROVEMENT GRANTS

One way of enforcing quality control is through the conditional fund-

ing of programs. The Justice for All Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-405) that created

⁴⁰ K.F. Martin, President, IAI. Presentation to the committee. September 19, 2007.

STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT

211

the Coverdell Forensic Science Improvement Grants required that grant

recipients certify that they have a process in place for independent, exter-

nal investigations if allegations arise of “serious negligence or misconduct

substantially affecting the integrity of the forensic results.”⁴¹

In December 2005, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of DOJ

issued a report of an audit that found that the Office of Justice Programs

(OJP), which administers the program, “had not enforced or exercised ef-

fective oversight over the external investigation requirement for the Fiscal

Year (FY) 2005 Coverdell Program.”⁴² OJP did not require grant applicants

to identify the government entities that they certified could perform inde-

pendent external investigations:

Our review found that NIJ did not enforce the Act’s certification require-

ment. NIJ’s FY 2005 Coverdell Grant Program Announcement did not give

applicants necessary guidance on what constitutes an independent external

investigation or how to make the required certification. In addition, the

announcement did not provide examples of external investigation certifi-

cations and did not require an applicant to name the government entity

responsible for conducting independent, external investigations. NIJ was

aware of the shortcomings in the announcement because of questions it

received from potential applicants and concerns expressed by the OIG, but

failed to correct them.⁴³

The OIG made three recommendations to improve the program announce-

ment and application process (see Box 7-3).

A second audit of the program was released in January 2008.⁴⁴ Again,

it reported that not all forensic laboratories that had received FY 2006

grant funds were covered by a government entity with the authority and

capability to independently investigate allegations of serious negligence or

misconduct. “Further, OJP’s guidance does not require grantees and sub-

grantees (forensic laboratories) to refer allegations of serious negligence

and misconduct to entities for investigation.”⁴⁵ The OIG found that 78 of

the 231 entities contacted did not meet the external investigation certifica-

tion requirement. It also found that “OJP did not adequately review the

information it did obtain to ascertain that the certifications submitted by

⁴¹ 42 U.S.C. § 3797k(4).

⁴² U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. 2005. Review of the Office of

Justice Programs’ Forensic Science Improvement Grant Program, Evaluation and Inspections

Report I-2006-002. Available at www.usdoj.gov/oig/semiannual/0605/ojp.htm.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. 2008. Review of the Office of

Justice Programs’ Forensic Science Improvement Grant Program, Evaluation and Inspections

Report I-2008-001.

⁴⁵Ibid., p, ii.

212

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

the grantees were properly completed.”⁴⁶ The OIG made three recommen-

dations to OJP to correct its certification process (see Box 7-3).

CODES OF ETHICS

A code of ethics is another mechanism for encouraging the development

and use of professional standards of conduct. However, there is disagree-

ment about how effective such codes are in achieving that goal.⁴⁷ In 1991,

Ladd argued that codes of ethics serve no good purpose and that reliance

on such codes confuses ethics with law.⁴⁸ Some authors have noted that

although practicing professionals rarely turn to their codes of ethics for

guidance, the adoption of a code of ethics is critical to the professionaliza-

tion of a group, because it indicates that the group recognizes an obligation

to society that transcends its own self-interest.⁴⁹ However, codes of ethics

can serve to provide rational bases for punishments, such as exiling viola-

tors from the community.

In the field of engineering, Davis asserts that codes of ethics should be

understood as conventions among professionals:

The code is to protect each professional from certain pressures (for ex-

ample, the pressure to cut corners to save money) by making it reason-

ably likely . . . that most other members of the profession will not take

advantage of her good conduct. A code protects members of a profession

from certain consequences of competition. A code is a solution to a coor-

dination problem.⁵⁰

Also in the field of engineering, Harris et al. argue that codes can serve

as a collective recognition by members of a profession of its responsibilities,

creating an environment in which ethical behavior is the norm.⁵¹ Moreover,

a code of ethics can serve as an educational tool, providing a starting point

for discussion in coursework and professional meetings.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. iii.

⁴⁷ A series of articles published in the Journal of Forensic Sciences 34(3) (May 1989) ad-

dressed a range of ethical dilemmas facing individuals practicing science in the criminal justice

system.

⁴⁸ J. Ladd. 1991. The quest for a code of professional ethics: An intellectual and moral

confusion. In: D.G. Johnson (ed.). Ethical Issues in Engineering. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:

Prentice-Hall, pp. 130-136.

⁴⁹ H.C. Luegenbiehl. 1983. Codes of ethics and the moral education of engineers. Business

and Professional Ethics Journal 2:41-61; D.G. Johnson (ed.). 1991. Ethical Issues in Engineer-

ing. 1991. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 137-154.

⁵⁰ M. Davis. 1991. Thinking like an engineer: The place of a code of ethics in the practice

of a profession. Philosophy and Public Affairs 20(2):150-167, p. 154.

⁵¹ C.E. Harris, M.S. Pritchard, and M.J. Rabins. 1995. Engineering Ethics: Concepts and

Cases. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.

STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT

213

Box 7-3

Recommendations from Two Reviews of

the Coverdell Grant Program

2005 - We believe that Coverdell Grant Program Announcements must provide

necessary guidance to applicants and request the information required for NIJ to

evaluate the external investigation certifications and conduct effective oversight of

the grants. To meet the requirements of the Justice for All Act of 2004, we recom-

mend that OJP, as part of its oversight of NIJ:

Require that all Coverdell Grant Program Announcements contain guid-

ance on what constitutes an independent external investigation and

examples of government entities and processes that could satisfy the

certification requirement.

Require that each Coverdell Grant applicant, prior to receiving funds,

provide the name of the government entity with a process in place to

conduct independent external investigations into allegations of serious

negligence or misconduct.

Consider requiring each Coverdell Grant applicant, prior to receiving

funds, to submit a letter from the government entity that will conduct in-

dependent external investigations acknowledging that the entity has the

authority and process to investigate allegations of serious negligence or

misconduct.

2006 - To improve OJP’s administration of the Coverdell Program and better

ensure that allegations of negligence or misconduct are subject to independent

external investigation, the OIG recommends that OJP take the following actions:

Revise the certification template to require that applicants name the

government entities and confirm that the government entities have:

a. the authority,

b. the independence,

a process in place that excludes laboratory management, and

the resources to conduct independent external investigations into

allegations of serious negligence or misconduct by labs that will

received Coverdell funds.

Provide applicants with guidance that allegations of serious negligence

or misconduct substantially affecting the integrity of forensic results are

to be referred to the certified government entities.

Revise and document the Coverdell Program application review process

so that only applicants that submit complete external investigation cer-

tifications are awarded grants.

SOURCE: U.S.DOJ Office of the Inspector General. 2005. Review of the Office of Justice

Programs’ Forensic Science Improvement Grant Program, Evaluation and Inspections Report

I-2006-002. Available at www.usdoj.gov/oig/semiannual/0605/ojp.htm; U.S. DOJ OFFICE of

Inspector General. 2008. Review of the Office of Justice Programs’ Forensic Science Improve-

ment Grant Program, Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2008-001.

214

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Many forensic science organizations—such as the American Acad-

emy of Forensic Sciences, the California Association of Criminalists, and

ASCLD—have codes of ethics or codes of professional practice imploring

members to act with honesty, integrity, and objectivity; to work within the

bounds of their professional competence; to present testimony and reports

in a clear and objective manner; and to avoid conflicts of interest and

potential bias, among other things. The codes that do exist are generally

comprehensive, but they vary in content. As a consequence, there is no

single code of ethics to which all members of the forensic science profession

subscribe. As the committee concluded its work, it learned of an effort by

ASCLD/LAB to develop a uniform code of ethics.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although some areas of the forensic science disciplines have made no-

table efforts to achieve standardization and best practices, most disciplines

still lack any consistent structure for the enforcement of “better practices,”

operating standards, and certification and accreditation programs. Accredi-

tation is required in only three states—New York, Oklahoma, and Texas.

In other states, accreditation is voluntary, as is individual certification.

Certification, while broadly accepted by the forensic science community, is

not uniformly offered or required.

Although many forensic science organizations have codes of ethics,

these codes can be enforced to regulate only the practices of persons who

belong to a given organization. A uniform code of ethics should be in place

across all forensic organizations to which all forensic practitioners and

laboratories should adhere.

Recommendation 6:

To facilitate the work of the National Institute of Forensic Science

(NIFS), Congress should authorize and appropriate funds to NIFS

to work with the National Institute of Standards and Technology

(NIST), in conjunction with government laboratories, universi-

ties, and private laboratories, and in consultation with Scientific

Working Groups, to develop tools for advancing measurement,

validation, reliability, information sharing, and proficiency testing

in forensic science and to establish protocols for forensic examina-

tions, methods, and practices. Standards should reflect best prac-

tices and serve as accreditation tools for laboratories and as guides

for the education, training, and certification of professionals. Upon

completion of its work, NIST and its partners should report find-

STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT

215

ings and recommendations to NIFS for further dissemination and

implementation.

Recommendation 7:

Laboratory accreditation and individual certification of forensic

science professionals should be mandatory, and all forensic science

professionals should have access to a certification process. In de-

termining appropriate standards for accreditation and certification,

the National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) should take into

account established and recognized international standards, such

as those published by the International Organization for Standard-

ization (ISO). No person (public or private) should be allowed to

practice in a forensic science discipline or testify as a forensic sci-

ence professional without certification. Certification requirements

should include, at a minimum, written examinations, supervised

practice, proficiency testing, continuing education, recertification

procedures, adherence to a code of ethics, and effective disciplinary

procedures. All laboratories and facilities (public or private) should

be accredited, and all forensic science professionals should be certi-

fied, when eligible, within a time period established by NIFS.

Recommendation 8:

Forensic laboratories should establish routine quality assurance

and quality control procedures to ensure the accuracy of forensic

analyses and the work of forensic practitioners. Quality control

procedures should be designed to identify mistakes, fraud, and

bias; confirm the continued validity and reliability of standard

operating procedures and protocols; ensure that best practices are

being followed; and correct procedures and protocols that are

found to need improvement.

Recommendation 9:

The National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS), in consultation

with its advisory board, should establish a national code of ethics

for all forensic science disciplines and encourage individual societies

to incorporate this national code as part of their professional code

of ethics. Additionally, NIFS should explore mechanisms of enforce-

ment for those forensic scientists who commit serious ethical viola-

tions. Such a code could be enforced through a certification process

for forensic scientists.

Education and Training

in Forensic Science

Forensic examiners must understand the principles, practices, and con-

texts of science, including the scientific method. Training should move away

from reliance on the apprentice-like transmittal of practices to education at

the college level and beyond that is based on scientifically valid principles,

as discussed in Chapter 4. For example, in addition to learning a particular

methodology through a lengthy apprenticeship or workshop during which

a trainee discerns and learns to copy the skills of an experienced examiner,

the junior person should learn what to measure, the associated population

statistics (if appropriate), biases and errors to avoid, other threats to the

validity of the evidence, how to calculate the probability that a conclusion

is valid, and how to document and report the analysis. Among many skills,

forensic science education and training must provide the tools needed to

understand the probabilities and the limits of decisionmaking under condi-

tions of uncertainty.

To correct some of the existing deficiencies, the starting place must

be better undergraduate and graduate programs, as well as increased op-

portunities for continuing education. Legitimating practices in the forensic

science disciplines must be based on established scientific knowledge, prin-

ciples, and practices, which are best learned through formal education and

training and the proper conduct of research.

Education and training in the forensic science disciplines serve at least

three purposes. First, educational programs prepare the next generation of

forensic practitioners. The number of secondary and postsecondary stu-

dents interested in the forensic science disciplines has grown substantially

in recent years. In response, colleges and universities have created new

217

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STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

certificate and degree programs to prepare students for forensic science

careers. There are several types of forensic practitioners, including crimi-

nalists (those who work in crime laboratories), who make up a large part

of the forensic science workforce and who often enter the profession with

a bachelor’s degree, and other forensic science practitioners (e.g., patholo-

gists, odontologists, entomologists, toxicologists, anthropologists), who

typically have advanced degrees, often Ph.D.s, and who might work part

time in forensic science activities. Another group of forensic examiners in-

clude crime scene investigators, who usually do not have advanced degrees;

many do not have college degrees above the associate level.

Second, forensic science practitioners require continuing professional

development and training. Scientific advances in forensic science techniques

and research in the forensic science disciplines are of interest to practitioners

who must be aware of these new developments. Forensic science practitio-

ners also may need to complete additional training for certification pur-

poses or may desire to learn new skills as part of their career development.

Training refers to the “formal, structured process through which a forensic

scientist reaches a level of scientific knowledge and expertise required to

conduct specific forensic analyses.”¹ Continuing professional development

is the “mechanism through which a forensic scientist remains current or

advances to a higher level of expertise, specialization, or responsibility.”²

Third, there is a need to educate the users of forensic science analyses,

especially those in the legal community. Judges, lawyers, and law students

can benefit from a greater understanding of the scientific bases underlying

the forensic science disciplines and how the underlying scientific validity of

techniques affects the interpretation of findings. These three objectives are

explored in more detail in this chapter.

STATUS OF FORENSIC SCIENCE EDUCATION

Demand for Forensic Science Practitioners

Demand for more and better-skilled forensic science practitioners is

rising at both the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, the appropri-

ate question to ask is, what is the need for forensic science expertise in the

United States? At the micro level, the question to ask is, what are the needs

of a crime laboratory in hiring new forensic science personnel?

¹ National Institute of Justice. 2004. Education and Training in Forensic Science: A Guide

for Forensic Science Laboratories, Educational Institutions, and Students. Washington, DC:

National Institute of Justice, p. 25.

² Ibid.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

219

As the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) notes:

In recent years, the demand for forensic scientists has increased for many

reasons, including population demographics, increased awareness of fo-

rensic science by law enforcement, increased numbers of law enforcement

officers, database automation in several categories of physical evidence,

jury expectations, legal requirements, accreditation and certification re-

quirements of laboratories and personnel, impending retirement of a large

number of currently practicing forensic scientists, and increased public

awareness of forensic science through the popular media.³

One manifestation of the need for more examiners is the backlog of

requests for forensic services at crime laboratories. As noted in previous

chapters of this report (based on the 2005 Census of Publicly Funded

Forensic Crime Laboratories), many forensic laboratories experience large

backlogs in requests for forensic services. To achieve a 30-day turnaround

on all 2005 requests, the different forensic science disciplines would have

needed varying increases in the number of full-time examiners performing

that work—ranging from an estimated 73 percent increase in DNA examin-

ers to an estimated 6 percent increase in examiners conducting toxicology

analysis.⁴

The most recent Occupational Outlook Handbook, prepared by the

Bureau of Labor Statistics at the U.S. Department of Labor, found that job

growth for forensic science technicians will grow much faster than aver-

age, with 13,000 jobs available in 2006 and a projected 31 percent rise,

or 17,000 jobs, projected by 2016.⁵ Yet one analyst argued that “existing

science programs overproduce graduates relative to the actual labor mar-

ket” in criminalistics.⁶ Having an accurate picture of demand—as well as

the capacity of employers to absorb new forensic science professionals—is

important for colleges and universities that are educating and training the

future workforce. Additional information on such factors as retirement

and attrition rates and on trends in funding for laboratory personnel could

assist educational providers in obtaining a more accurate picture of future

employment prospects for their students.

The micro level focuses on the skills that individuals need to gain

³ Ibid., p. 3.

⁴ M.R. Durose. 2008. Census of Publicly Funded Forensic Crime Laboratories, 2005. U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available at

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpffcl05.pdf.

⁵ Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor. “Science Technicians.” In: Occupa-

tional Outlook Handbook, 2008-09 edition. Available at www.bls.gov/oco/ocos115.htm#

projections_data.

⁶ R.E. Gaensslen. 2003. How do I become a forensic scientist? Educational pathways to

forensic science careers. Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry 376:1151-1155.

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STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Table 8-1 Educational Pathways to Some Forensic Science Careers

Forensic Discipline

Educational Requirements

Crime scene investigation

Jobs are typically held by law enforcement

personnel. Meet requirements for joining the

law enforcement agency. For federal jobs, a

college degree is required.

Computer crime investigation/forensic

B.S. in computer science or computer

computer science

engineering; M.S. may be common.

Criminalistics

B.S. in the physical sciences, with background

in chemistry

Forensic engineering

B.S. in engineering; practitioners may also be

licensed as professional engineers (PEs).

Forensic pathology

Appropriate college degree; M.D.; internship

and pathology residency; and specialized

training in forensic pathology; additionally

requires state license and board certification.

Forensic odontology

Appropriate college degree; D.D.S. or D.D.M.;

may include additional specialty training;

additionally requires state license and board

certification.

Forensic entomology

Ph.D. in entomology.

Forensic anthropology

M.S. or M.A. at minimum; many have Ph.D.s.

Forensic psychiatry

Similar to forensic pathology, with residency in

psychiatry.

Forensic psychology

M.S.W. or Ph.D. in psychology; often must meet

state requirements for clinical practice and may

be certified.

SOURCE: Gaensslen, 2003.

entry into forensic science careers (see Table 8-1). As a starting point, one

needs an appropriate degree. The required minimum degree for entry-level

forensic science positions ranges from a bachelor’s degree to a doctoral or

medical degree.⁷ Almirall and Furton⁸ suggest that it is possible to begin

a career as a crime scene investigator or in firearms, documents, or finger-

prints with an associate degree.

It should be noted that the preferred degree is often higher than an

⁷ Gaensslen, op. cit.

⁸ R. Almirall and K.G. Furton. 2003. Trends in forensic science education: Expansion and

increased accountability. Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry 376:1156-1159.

Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (August 2009) - page 6