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The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S.
Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:
Document Title:
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States: A Path Forward
Author:
Committee on Identifying the Needs of the
Forensic Sciences Community, National
Research Council
Document No.:
228091
Date Received:
August 2009
Award Number:
2006-DN-BX-0001
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Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States: A Path Forward
Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic
Sciences Community, National Research Council
ISBN: 0-309-13131-6, 352 pages, 6 x 9, (2009)
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STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC
SCIENCE
IN THE UNITED STATES
A PATH FORWARD
Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community
Committee on Science, Technology, and Law
Policy and Global Affairs
Committee on Applied and Theoretical Statistics
Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Govern-
ing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the
councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineer-
ing, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for
the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropri-
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This study was supported by Contract No. 2006-DN-BX-0001 between the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences and the National Institute of Justice. Any opinions,
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Strengthening forensic science in the United States : a path forward : summary
/ Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community,
Committee on Science, Technology, and Law Policy and Global Affairs,
Committee on Applied and Theoretical Statistics, Division on Engineering and
Physical Sciences.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-309-13135-3 (hardcover)
ISBN-10: 0-309-13135-9 (hardcover)
ISBN-13: 978-0-309-13131-5 (pbk.)
ISBN-10: 0-309-13131-6 (pbk.)
1. Forensic sciences—United States. 2. Criminal investigation—United States.
3. Evidence, Criminal—United States. I. National Research Council (U.S.).
Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community. II.
National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Science, Technology, and Law
Policy and Global Affairs. III. National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on
Applied and Theoretical Statistics.
HV8073.S7347 2009
363.250973—dc22
2009011443
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Ralph J. Cicerone and Dr. Charles M. Vest are chair and vice chair, respectively, of
the National Research Council.
Committee on Identifying the Needs of the
Forensic Science Community
HARRY T. EDWARDS, (Co-chair), Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
CONSTANTINE GATSONIS, (Co-chair), Director, Center for Statistical
Sciences, Brown University
MARGARET A. BERGER, Suzanne J. and Norman Miles Professor of
Law, Brooklyn Law School
JOE S. CECIL, Project Director, Program on Scientific and Technical
Evidence, Federal Judicial Center
M. BONNER DENTON, Professor of Chemistry, University of Arizona
MARCELLA F. FIERRO, Medical Examiner of Virginia (ret.)
KAREN KAFADAR, Rudy Professor of Statistics and Physics, Indiana
University
PETE M. MARONE, Director, Virginia Department of Forensic Science
GEOFFREY S. MEARNS, Dean, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University
RANDALL S. MURCH, Associate Director, Research Program
Development, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
CHANNING ROBERTSON, Ruth G. and William K. Bowes Professor,
Dean of Faculty and Academic Affairs, and Professor, Department of
Chemical Engineering, Stanford University
MARVIN E. SCHECHTER, Attorney
ROBERT SHALER, Director, Forensic Science Program, Professor,
Biochemistry and Molecular Biology Department, Eberly College of
Science, The Pennsylvania State University
JAY A. SIEGEL, Professor, Forensic and Investigative Sciences Program,
Indiana University-Purdue University
SARGUR N. SRIHARI, SUNY Distinguished Professor, Department of
Computer Science and Engineering and Director, Center of Excellence
for Document Analysis and Recognition (CEDAR), University at
Buffalo, State University of New York
SHELDON M. WIEDERHORN (NAE), Senior NIST Fellow, National
Institute of Standards and Technology
ROSS E. ZUMWALT, Chief Medical Examiner, Office of the Medical
Examiner of the State of New Mexico
Staff
ANNE-MARIE MAZZA, Study Director
SCOTT T. WEIDMAN, Director, Board on Mathematical Sciences and
Their Applications
JOHN SISLIN, Program Officer, Board on Higher Education and
Workforce
DAVID PADGHAM, Program Officer, Computer Science and
Telecommunications Board (until 5/08)
STEVEN KENDALL, Senior Program Associate
KATIE MAGEE, Senior Program Assistant (until 9/07)
KATHI E. HANNA, Consultant Writer
SARA D. MADDOX, Editor
ROBIN ACKERMAN, Christine Mirzayan Science and Technology
Policy Fellow
GEMAYEL JEAN-PAUL, Christine Mirzayan Science and Technology
Policy Fellow
JOHNALYN D. LYLES, Christine Mirzayan Science and Technology
Policy Fellow
SANDRA OTTENSMANN, Christine Mirzayan Science and Technology
Policy Fellow
DEIRDRE PARSONS, Christine Mirzayan Science and Technology Policy
Fellow
SARAH RYKER, Christine Mirzayan Science and Technology Policy
Fellow
SUNBIN SONG, Christine Mirzayan Science and Technology Policy
Fellow
vi
Committee on Science, Technology, and Law
DONALD KENNEDY (NAS/IOM), (Co-chair), President Emeritus
and Bing Professor of Environmental Science Emeritus, Stanford
University; Emeritus Editor-in-Chief, Science
RICHARD A. MERRILL (IOM), (Co-chair), Daniel Caplin Professor of
Law Emeritus, University of Virginia Law School
FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, JR., Partner, McKenna, Long, & Aldridge
LLP
MARGARET A. BERGER, Suzanne J. and Norman Miles Professor of
Law, Brooklyn Law School
ARTHUR I. BIENENSTOCK, Special Assistant to the President for
SLAC and Federal Research Policy, Stanford University
BARBARA E. BIERER, Senior Vice President for Research, Brigham and
Women’s Hospital
ELIZABETH H. BLACKBURN (NAS/IOM), Morris Herzstein Professor
of Biology and Physiology, Department of Biochemistry and
Biophysics, University of California, San Francisco
JOE S. CECIL, Project Director, Program on Scientific and Technical
Evidence, Federal Judicial Center
RICHARD F. CELESTE, President, Colorado College
JOEL E. COHEN (NAS), Abby Rockefeller Mauzé Professor and Head,
Laboratory of Populations, The Rockefeller University and Columbia
University
KENNETH W. DAM, Max Pam Professor Emeritus of American and
Foreign Law and Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School
ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, Pauline Newman Professor of Law
and Director, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy, New
York University School of Law
ALICE P. GAST (NAE), President, Lehigh University
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN (IOM), Associate Dean for Research and
Academic Programs, Linda D. and Timothy J. O’Neill Professor
of Global Health Law, Georgetown University; Professor of Public
Health, The Johns Hopkins University
GARY W. HART, Wirth Chair Professor, School of Public Affairs,
University of Colorado, Denver
BENJAMIN W. HEINEMAN, JR., Senior Fellow, Harvard Law School
and Harvard Kennedy School of Government
DAVID BROCK HORNBY, Judge, U.S. District Court, District of Maine
DAVID KORN (IOM), Vice Provost for Research, Harvard University
RICHARD A. MESERVE (NAE), President, Carnegie Institution of
Washington
vii
DUNCAN T. MOORE (NAE), Professor, The Institute of Optics,
University of Rochester
ALAN B. MORRISON, Visiting Professor, Washington College of Law,
American University
HARRIET RABB, Vice President and General Counsel, Rockefeller
University
PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, Senior Partner, Rheingold, Valet, Rheingold,
Shkolnik & McCartney LLP
BARBARA ROTHSTEIN, Director, Federal Judicial Center
JONATHAN M. SAMET (IOM), Founding Director, Institute for
Global Health and Chairman, Department of Preventive Medicine,
University of Southern California
DAVID S. TATEL, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit
Staff
ANNE-MARIE MAZZA, Director
STEVEN KENDALL, Senior Program Associate
viii
Committee on Applied and Theoretical Statistics
KAREN KAFADAR, (Chair), Rudy Professor of Statistics and Physics,
Indiana University
AMY BRAVERMAN, MISR Co-Investigator, Statistics and Data Analysis,
Earth and Space Sciences Division, Jet Propulsion Laboratory
CONSTANTINE GATSONIS, Director, Center for Statistical Sciences,
Brown University
MICHAEL GOODCHILD (NAS), Professor, Department of Geography,
University of California, Santa Barbara
KATHRYN B. LASKEY, Professor, Department of Systems Engineering
and Operations Research, George Mason University
MICHAEL LESK (NAE), Professor, Library and Information Sciences,
Rutgers University
THOMAS A. LOUIS, Professor, Department of Biostatistics, Bloomberg
School of Public Health, The Johns Hopkins University
MICHAEL A. NEWTON, Professor, Department of Biostatistics and
Medical Informatics, University of Wisconsin, Madison
MICHAEL L. STEIN, Professor, Department of Statistics, The University
of Chicago
Staff
SCOTT WEIDMAN, Director
NEAL GLASSMAN, Senior Program Officer
BARBARA WRIGHT, Administrative Assistant
ix
Acknowledgments
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRESENTERS
The committee gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the follow-
ing individuals who made thoughtful presentations before it:
Chris Asplen, Gordon Thomas Honeywell Government Affairs; Peter
D. Barnett, Forensic Science Associates; Richard E. Bisbing, McCrone
Associates, Inc., and Scientific Working Group on Materials Analysis
(SWGMAT); Joseph P. Bono, U.S. Secret Service; Michael R. Bromwich,
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP; Bruce Budowle, Federal
Bureau of Investigation; James Burans, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Thomas Cantwell, U.S. Department of Defense; Larry Chelko,
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory; John Collins, DuPage
County Sheriff’s Office Crime Laboratory; Charles Cooke, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence; Robin Cotton, Boston University School
of Medicine; Joseph A. DiZinno, Federal Bureau of Investigation; James
Downs, National Association of Medical Examiners and Consortium of
Forensic Science Organizations and Georgia Bureau of Investigation; Itiel
Dror, University of Southampton; Arthur Eisenberg, Forensic Quality Ser-
vices; Barry A. J. Fisher, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department; Eric
Friedberg, Stroz Friedberg, LLC; Robert E. Gaensslen, University of Il-
linois at Chicago; Brandon L. Garrett, University of Virginia; Michael D.
Garris, National Institute of Standards and Technology; Ed German, U.S.
Army (ret.); Paul C. Giannelli, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law; Bruce A. Goldberger, American Academy of Forensic Sciences; Hank
xi
xii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Greely, Stanford University; Barbara Guttman, National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology; David W. Hagy, U.S. Department of Justice; Randy
Hanzlick, Fulton County Medical Examiner’s Center and Emory University
School of Medicine; Carol Henderson, National Clearinghouse for Science,
Technology and the Law and Stetson University; Matthew J. Hickman,
U.S. Department of Justice; Peter T. Higgins, The Higgins-Hermansen
Group; Max M. Houck, West Virginia University; Vici Inlow, U.S. Secret
Service; Jan L. Johnson, Illinois State Police; Jay Kadane, Carnegie Mellon
University; David Kaye, Arizona State University; Peter D. Komarinski,
Komarinski & Associates, LLC; Roger G. Koppl, Farleigh Dickinson Uni-
versity; Glenn Langenburg, Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension;
Deborah Leben, U.S. Secret Service; John Lentini, Scientific Fire Analysis,
LLC; Alan I. Leshner, American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence; William MacCrehan, National Institute of Standards and Technology;
Bill Marbaker, American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors; Kenneth
F. Martin, Massachusetts State Police; Carole McCartney, University of
Leeds; Stephen B. Meagher, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Scien-
tific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology
(SWGFAST); Jennifer Mnooken, University of California, Los Angeles
Law School; John E. Moalli, Exponent; John Morgan, U.S. Department of
Justice; Michael Murphy, Las Vegas Office of the Coroner; Peter Neufeld,
The Innocence Project; John Onstwedder III, Illinois State Police; Garry
F. Peterson, Hennepin County Medical Examiner’s Office and National
Association of Medical Examiners; Joseph L. Peterson, California State
University, Los Angeles; Peter Pizzola, New York Police Department Crime
Laboratory; Joe Polski, Consortium of Forensic Science Organizations and
International Association for Identification; Larry Quarino, Cedar Crest
College; Irma Rios, City of Houston Crime Lab; Michael Risinger, Seton
Hall Law School; Michael J. Saks, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University; Nelson A. Santos, Scientific Working Group for
the Analysis of Seized Drugs (SWGDRUG); David R. Senn, The University
of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio; Robert Stacey, American
Society of Crime Laboratory Directors, Laboratory Accreditation Board;
David Stoney, Stoney Forensic, Inc.; Peter Striupaitis, International Asso-
ciation for Identification and Scientific Working Group for Firearms and
Toolmarks (SWGGUN); Rick Tontarski, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation
Laboratory; Richard W. Vorder Bruegge, Federal Bureau of Investigation;
Victor W. Weedn; and Tom Witt, West Virginia University.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF REVIEWERS
This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for
their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with pro-
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
xiii
cedures approved by the National Academies’ Report Review Committee.
The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical
comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as
sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards
for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review
comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity
of the process.
We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this
report: R. Stephen Berry, University of Chicago; Christophe Champod,
Universite de Lausanne, Switzerland; William Chisum, Retired, National
Crime Investigation and Training; Joel Cohen, Rockefeller University; Peter
DeForest, John Jay College of Criminal Justice; Stephen Fienberg, Carnegie
Mellon University; Barry Fisher, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Depart-
ment; Mark Flomenbaum, Boston University; Ross Gardner, Gardner Fo-
rensic Consulting; Paul Giannelli, Case Western Reserve University; Randy
Hanzlick, Emory University; Keith Inman, Forensic Analytical Sciences,
Inc.; Dan Kahan, Yale Law School; Roger Kahn, Harris County Medical
Examiner’s Office; Elizabeth Loftus, University of California, Irvine; C.
Owen Lovejoy, Kent State University; Kenneth Melson, George Washington
University; Michael Murphy, Office of the Coroner/Medical Examiner, Las
Vegas, Nevada; Hyla Napadensky, Retired, Napadensky Energetics, Inc.;
Joseph Peterson, California State University, Los Angeles; William Press,
University of Texas, Austin; Jed Rakoff, U.S. District Court Southern Dis-
trict of New York; Carl Selavka, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Labora-
tory; David Stoney, Stoney Forensic, Inc.; and Charles Wellford, University
of Maryland.
Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive
comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions
or recommendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its
release. The review of this report was overseen by John Bailar, University
of Chicago, and Royce Murray, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
Appointed by the National Academies, they were responsible for making
certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in
accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments
were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report
rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.
Contents
Preface
xix
Summary
1
Introduction, 1
Findings and Recommendations, 14
1
Introduction
35
What Is Forensic Science?, 38
Pressures on the Forensic Science System, 39
Organization of This Report, 53
2 The Forensic Science Community and the Need for Integrated
Governance
55
Crime Scene Investigation, 56
Forensic Science Laboratories and Service Providers, 57
Case Backlogs, 61
NIJ’s Coverdell Forensic Science Improvement Grant Program, 62
Forensic Services Beyond the Traditional Laboratory, 64
Federal Forensic Science Activities, 65
Research Funding, 71
Professional Associations, 75
Conclusions and Recommendation, 77
xv
xvi
CONTENTS
3
The Admission of Forensic Science Evidence in
Litigation Law and Science
85
Law and Science, 86
The Frye Standard and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 88
The Daubert Decision and the Supreme Court’s Construction of
Rule 702, 90
The 2000 Amendment of Rule 702, 92
An Overview of Judicial Dispositions of Daubert-Type
Questions, 95
Some Examples of Judicial Dispositions of Questions Relating to
Forensic Science Evidence, 99
Conclusion, 110
4
The Principles of Science and Interpreting Scientific Data
111
Fundamental Principles of the Scientific Method, 112
Conclusion, 125
5
Descriptions of Some Forensic Science Disciplines
127
Biological Evidence, 128
Analysis of Controlled Substances, 134
Friction Ridge Analysis, 136
Other Pattern/Impression Evidence: Shoeprints and Tire Tracks, 145
Toolmark and Firearms Identification, 150
Analysis of Hair Evidence, 156
Analysis of Fiber Evidence, 162
Questioned Document Examination, 164
Analysis of Paint and Coatings Evidence, 167
Analysis of Explosives Evidence and Fire Debris, 171
Forensic Odontology, 174
Bloodstain Pattern Analysis, 177
An Emerging Forensic Science Discipline: Digital and
Multimedia Analysis, 179
Conclusions, 183
6
Improving Methods, Practice, and Performance in
Forensic Science
183
Independence of Forensic Science Laboratories, 183
Uncertainties and Bias, 184
Reporting Results, 185
The Need for Research, 187
Conclusions and Recommendations, 188
CONTENTS
xvii
7
Strengthening Oversight of Forensic Science Practice
193
Accreditation, 195
Standards and Guidelines for Quality Control, 201
Proficiency Testing, 206
Certification, 208
Oversight as a Requirement of Paul Coverdell Forensic Science
Improvement Grants, 211
Codes of Ethics, 212
Conclusions and Recommendations, 213
8
Education and Training in Forensic Science
217
Status of Forensic Science Education, 218
Challenges and Opportunities to Improve Forensic
Science Education, 224
Research as a Component of Forensic Science Education
Programs, 230
Status of Training, 231
Education in the Legal System, 234
Conclusions and Recommendation, 237
9
Medical Examiner and Coroner Systems: Current and
Future Needs
241
Medical Examiners and Coroners (ME/C), 243
ME/C Jurisdiction, 244
ME/C Missions, 244
Variations in ME/C Systems, 245
Qualifications of Coroners and Medical Examiners, 247
ME/C Administration and Oversight, 249
ME/C Staffing and Funding, 249
The Movement to Convert Coroner Systems to Medical Examiner
Systems, 251
Utilization of Best Practices, 252
Potential Scientific Advances That May Assist ME/Cs, 253
The Shortage of Medical Examiners and Forensic Pathologists, 256
Standards and Accreditation for Death Investigation Systems, 258
Quality Control and Quality Assurance, 259
Continuing Medical Education, 259
Homeland Security, 260
Forensic Pathology Research, 261
Common Methods of Sample and Data Collection, 263
Conclusions and Recommendation, 265
xviii
CONTENTS
10 Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems
269
Interoperability Challenges, 273
Conclusions and Recommendation, 276
11 Homeland Security and the Forensic Science Disciplines
279
Conclusion and Recommendation, 285
Appendixes
A Biographical Information of Committee and Staff
287
B Committee Meeting Agendas
303
Index
315
Preface
Recognizing that significant improvements are needed in forensic sci-
ence, Congress directed the National Academy of Sciences to undertake
the study that led to this report. There are scores of talented and dedicated
people in the forensic science community, and the work that they perform
is vitally important. They are often strapped in their work, however, for
lack of adequate resources, sound policies, and national support. It is clear
that change and advancements, both systemic and scientific, are needed in
a number of forensic science disciplines—to ensure the reliability of the
disciplines, establish enforceable standards, and promote best practices and
their consistent application.
In adopting this report, the aim of our committee is to chart an agenda
for progress in the forensic science community and its scientific disciplines.
Because the work of forensic science practitioners is so obviously wide-
reaching and important—affecting criminal investigation and prosecution,
civil litigation, legal reform, the investigation of insurance claims, national
disaster planning and preparedness, homeland security, and the advance-
ment of technology—the committee worked with a sense of great commit-
ment and spent countless hours deliberating over the recommendations that
are included in the report. These recommendations, which are inexorably
interconnected, reflect the committee’s strong views on policy initiatives that
must be adopted in any plan to improve the forensic science disciplines and
to allow the forensic science community to serve society more effectively.
The task Congress assigned our committee was daunting and required
serious thought and the consideration of an extremely complex and decen-
tralized system, with various players, jurisdictions, demands, and limita-
tions. Throughout our lengthy deliberations, the committee heard testimony
xix
xx
PREFACE
from the stakeholder community, ensuring that the voices of forensic prac-
titioners were heard and their concerns addressed. We also heard from
professionals who manage forensic laboratories and medical examiner/
coroner offices; teachers who are devoted to training the next generation
of forensic scientists; scholars who have conducted important research in a
number of forensic science fields; and members of the legal profession and
law enforcement agencies who understand how forensic science evidence is
collected, analyzed, and used in connection with criminal investigations and
prosecutions. We are deeply grateful to all of the presenters who spoke to
the committee and/or submitted papers for our consideration. These experts
and their work served the committee well.
In considering the testimony and evidence that was presented to the
committee, what surprised us the most was the consistency of the message
that we heard:
The forensic science system, encompassing both research and practice, has
serious problems that can only be addressed by a national commitment to
overhaul the current structure that supports the forensic science commu-
nity in this country. This can only be done with effective leadership at the
highest levels of both federal and state governments, pursuant to national
standards, and with a significant infusion of federal funds.
The recommendations in this report represent the committee’s studied opin-
ion on how best to achieve this critical goal.
We had the good fortune to serve as co-chairs of the committee en-
trusted with addressing Congress’ charge. The committee, formed under
the auspices of the National Academies’ Committee on Science, Technol-
ogy, and Law and Committee on Applied and Theoretical Statistics, was
composed of many talented professionals, some expert in various areas of
forensic science, others in law, and still others in different fields of science
and engineering. They listened, read, questioned, vigorously discussed the
findings and recommendations offered in this report, and then worked
hard to complete the research and writing required to produce the report.
We are indebted to our colleagues for all the time and energy they gave
to this effort. We are also most grateful to the staff, Anne-Marie Mazza,
Scott Weidman, Steven Kendall, and the consultant writer, Kathi Hanna, for
their superb work and dedication to this project; to staff members David
Padgham and John Sislin, and editor, Sara Maddox, for their assistance;
and to Paige Herwig, Laurie Richardson, and Judith A. Hunt for their ster-
ling contributions in checking source materials and assisting with the final
production of the report.
Harry T. Edwards and Constantine Gatsonis
Committee Co-chairs
Summary
INTRODUCTION
On November 22, 2005, the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006 became law.1 Under the terms
of the statute, Congress authorized “the National Academy of Sciences to
conduct a study on forensic science, as described in the Senate report.”2 The
Senate Report to which the Conference Report refers states:
While a great deal of analysis exists of the requirements in the discipline
of DNA, there exists little to no analysis of the remaining needs of the
community outside of the area of DNA. Therefore . . . the Committee
directs the Attorney General to provide [funds] to the National Academy
of Sciences to create an independent Forensic Science Committee. This
Committee shall include members of the forensics community represent-
ing operational crime laboratories, medical examiners, and coroners; legal
experts; and other scientists as determined appropriate.3
The Senate Report also sets forth the charge to the Forensic Science
Committee, instructing it to:
(1) assess the present and future resource needs of the forensic science
community, to include State and local crime labs, medical examin-
ers, and coroners;
1 P.L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290 (2005).
2 H.R. Rep. No. 109-272, at 121 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
3 S. Rep. No. 109-88, at 46 (2005).
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
(2)
make recommendations for maximizing the use of forensic tech-
nologies and techniques to solve crimes, investigate deaths, and
protect the public;
(3)
identify potential scientific advances that may assist law enforce-
ment in using forensic technologies and techniques to protect the
public;
(4)
make recommendations for programs that will increase the number
of qualified forensic scientists and medical examiners available to
work in public crime laboratories;
(5)
disseminate best practices and guidelines concerning the collection
and analysis of forensic evidence to help ensure quality and con-
sistency in the use of forensic technologies and techniques to solve
crimes, investigate deaths, and protect the public;
(6)
examine the role of the forensic community in the homeland secu-
rity mission;
(7)
[examine] interoperability of Automated Fingerprint Information
Systems [AFIS]; and
(8)
examine additional issues pertaining to forensic science as deter-
mined by the Committee.4
In the fall of 2006, a committee was established by the National Acad-
emy of Sciences to implement this congressional charge. As recommended
in the Senate Report, the persons selected to serve included members of the
forensic science community, members of the legal community, and a diverse
group of scientists. Operating under the project title “Identifying the Needs
of the Forensic Science Community,” the committee met on eight occasions:
January 25-26, April 23-24, June 5-6, September 20-21, and December 6-7,
2007, and March 24-25, June 23-24, and November 14-15, 2008. During
these meetings, the committee heard expert testimony and deliberated over
the information it heard and received. Between meetings, committee mem-
bers reviewed numerous published materials, studies, and reports related
to the forensic science disciplines, engaged in independent research on the
subject, and worked on drafts of the final report.
Experts who provided testimony included federal agency officials; aca-
demics and research scholars; private consultants; federal, state, and local
law enforcement officials; scientists; medical examiners; a coroner; crime
laboratory officials from the public and private sectors; independent inves-
tigators; defense attorneys; forensic science practitioners; and leadership of
professional and standard setting organizations (see the Acknowledgments
and Appendix B for a complete listing of presenters).
4 Ibid.
SUMMARY
The issues covered during the committee’s hearings and deliberations
included:
(a) the fundamentals of the scientific method as applied to forensic
practice—hypothesis generation and testing, falsifiability and rep-
lication, and peer review of scientific publications;
(b) the assessment of forensic methods and technologies—the col-
lection and analysis of forensic data; accuracy and error rates of
forensic analyses; sources of potential bias and human error in in-
terpretation by forensic experts; and proficiency testing of forensic
experts;
(c) infrastructure and needs for basic research and technology assess-
ment in forensic science;
(d) current training and education in forensic science;
(e) the structure and operation of forensic science laboratories;
(f) the structure and operation of the coroner and medical examiner
systems;
(g)
budget, future needs, and priorities of the forensic science com-
munity and the coroner and medical examiner systems;
(h)
the accreditation, certification, and licensing of forensic science
operations, medical death investigation systems, and scientists;
(i)
Scientific Working Groups (SWGs) and their practices;
(j)
forensic science practices—
pattern/experience evidence
o fingerprints (including the interoperability of AFIS)
o firearms examination
o toolmarks
o bite marks
o impressions (tires, footwear)
o bloodstain pattern analysis
o handwriting
o hair
analytical evidence
o DNA
o coatings (e.g., paint)
o chemicals (including drugs)
o materials (including fibers)
o fluids
o serology
o fire and explosive analysis
digital evidence;
(k)
the effectiveness of coroner systems as compared with medical
examiner systems;
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
(l ) the use of forensic evidence in criminal and civil litigation—
o the collection and flow of evidence from crime scenes to
courtrooms
o the manner in which forensic practitioners testify in court
o cases involving the misinterpretation of forensic evidence
o the adversarial system in criminal and civil litigation
o lawyers’ use and misuse of forensic evidence
o judges’ handling of forensic evidence;
(m) forensic practice and projects at various federal agencies, including
NIST, the FBI, DHS, U.S. Secret Service, NIJ, DEA, and DOD;
(n) forensic practice in state and local agencies;
(o) nontraditional forensic service providers; and
(p) the forensic science community in the United Kingdom.
The testimonial and documentary evidence considered by the commit-
tee was detailed, complex, and sometimes controversial. Given this reality,
the committee could not possibly answer every question that it confronted,
nor could it devise specific solutions for every problem that it identified.
Rather, it reached a consensus on the most important issues now facing the
forensic science community and medical examiner system and agreed on 13
specific recommendations to address these issues.
Challenges Facing the Forensic Science Community
For decades, the forensic science disciplines have produced valuable
evidence that has contributed to the successful prosecution and conviction
of criminals as well as to the exoneration of innocent people. Over the last
two decades, advances in some forensic science disciplines, especially the
use of DNA technology, have demonstrated that some areas of forensic
science have great additional potential to help law enforcement identify
criminals. Many crimes that may have gone unsolved are now being solved
because forensic science is helping to identify the perpetrators.
Those advances, however, also have revealed that, in some cases, sub-
stantive information and testimony based on faulty forensic science analyses
may have contributed to wrongful convictions of innocent people. This fact
has demonstrated the potential danger of giving undue weight to evidence
and testimony derived from imperfect testing and analysis. Moreover, im-
precise or exaggerated expert testimony has sometimes contributed to the
admission of erroneous or misleading evidence.
Further advances in the forensic science disciplines will serve three im-
portant purposes. First, further improvements will assist law enforcement
officials in the course of their investigations to identify perpetrators with
higher reliability. Second, further improvements in forensic science practices
SUMMARY
should reduce the occurrence of wrongful convictions, which reduces the
risk that true offenders continue to commit crimes while innocent persons
inappropriately serve time. Third, any improvements in the forensic science
disciplines will undoubtedly enhance the Nation’s ability to address the
needs of homeland security.
Numerous professionals in the forensic science community and the
medical examiner system have worked for years to achieve excellence in
their fields, aiming to follow high ethical norms, develop sound profes-
sional standards, ensure accurate results in their practices, and improve
the processes by which accuracy is determined. Although the work of these
dedicated professionals has resulted in significant progress in the forensic
science disciplines in recent decades, major challenges still face the forensic
science community. It is therefore unsurprising that Congress instructed
this committee to, among other things, “assess the present and future re-
source needs of the forensic science community,” “make recommendations
for maximizing the use of forensic technologies and techniques,” “make
recommendations for programs that will increase the number of qualified
forensic scientists and medical examiners,” and “disseminate best practices
and guidelines concerning the collection and analysis of forensic evidence to
help ensure quality and consistency in the use of forensic technologies and
techniques.” These are among the pressing issues facing the forensic science
community. The best professionals in the forensic science disciplines invari-
ably are hindered in their work because these and other problems persist.
The length of the congressional charge and the complexity of the mate-
rial under review made the committee’s assignment challenging. In under-
taking it, the committee first had to gain an understanding of the various
disciplines within the forensic science community, as well as the communi-
ty’s history, its strengths and weaknesses, and the roles of the people and
agencies that constitute the community and make use of its services. In so
doing, the committee was able to better comprehend some of the major
problems facing the forensic science community and the medical examiner
system. A brief review of some of these problems is illuminating.5
Disparities in the Forensic Science Community
There are great disparities among existing forensic science operations in
federal, state, and local law enforcement jurisdictions and agencies. This is
true with respect to funding, access to analytical instrumentation, the avail-
ability of skilled and well-trained personnel, certification, accreditation, and
5 In this report, the “forensic science community,” broadly speaking, is meant to include
forensic pathology and medicolegal death investigation, which is sometimes referred to as “the
medical examiner system” or “the medicolegal death investigation system.”
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
oversight. As a result, it is not easy to generalize about current practices
within the forensic science community. It is clear, however, that any ap-
proach to overhauling the existing system needs to address and help mini-
mize the community’s current fragmentation and inconsistent practices.
Although the vast majority of criminal law enforcement is handled by
state and local jurisdictions, these entities often are sorely lacking in the
resources (money, staff, training, and equipment) necessary to promote and
maintain strong forensic science laboratory systems. By comparison, federal
programs are often much better funded and staffed. It is also noteworthy
that the resources, the extent of services, and the amount of expertise that
medical examiners and forensic pathologists can provide vary widely in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. As a result, the depth, reliability, and overall quality of
substantive information arising from the forensic examination of evidence
available to the legal system vary substantially across the country.
Lack of Mandatory Standardization, Certification, and Accreditation
The fragmentation problem is compounded because operational prin-
ciples and procedures for many forensic science disciplines are not stan-
dardized or embraced, either between or within jurisdictions. There is no
uniformity in the certification of forensic practitioners, or in the accredita-
tion of crime laboratories. Indeed, most jurisdictions do not require forensic
practitioners to be certified, and most forensic science disciplines have no
mandatory certification programs. Moreover, accreditation of crime labo-
ratories is not required in most jurisdictions. Often there are no standard
protocols governing forensic practice in a given discipline. And, even when
protocols are in place (e.g., SWG standards), they often are vague and not
enforced in any meaningful way. In short, the quality of forensic practice in
most disciplines varies greatly because of the absence of adequate training
and continuing education, rigorous mandatory certification and accredita-
tion programs, adherence to robust performance standards, and effective
oversight.6 These shortcomings obviously pose a continuing and serious
threat to the quality and credibility of forensic science practice.
The Broad Range of Forensic Science Disciplines
The term “forensic science” encompasses a broad range of forensic dis-
ciplines, each with its own set of technologies and practices. In other words,
there is wide variability across forensic science disciplines with regard to
6 See, e.g., P.C. Giannelli. 2007. Wrongful convictions and forensic science: The need to
regulate crime labs. 86 N.C. L. Rev. 163 (2007); B. Schmitt and J. Swickard. 2008. “Detroit
Police Lab Shut Down After Probe Finds Errors.” Detroit Free Press. September 25.
SUMMARY
techniques, methodologies, reliability, types and numbers of potential er-
rors, research, general acceptability, and published material. Some of the
forensic science disciplines are laboratory based (e.g., nuclear and mito-
chondrial DNA analysis, toxicology and drug analysis); others are based
on expert interpretation of observed patterns (e.g., fingerprints, writing
samples, toolmarks, bite marks, and specimens such as hair). The “forensic
science community,” in turn, consists of a host of practitioners, including
scientists (some with advanced degrees) in the fields of chemistry, biochem-
istry, biology, and medicine; laboratory technicians; crime scene investiga-
tors; and law enforcement officers. There are very important differences,
however, between forensic laboratory work and crime scene investigations.
There are also sharp distinctions between forensic practitioners who have
been trained in chemistry, biochemistry, biology, and medicine (and who
bring these disciplines to bear in their work) and technicians who lend sup-
port to forensic science enterprises. Many of these differences are discussed
in the body of this report.
The committee decided early in its work that it would not be feasible
to develop a detailed evaluation of each discipline in terms of its scientific
underpinning, level of development, and ability to provide evidence to ad-
dress the major types of questions raised in criminal prosecutions and civil
litigation. However, the committee solicited testimony on a broad range
of forensic science disciplines and sought to identify issues relevant across
definable classes of disciplines. As a result of listening to this testimony
and reviewing related written materials, the committee found substantial
evidence indicating that the level of scientific development and evaluation
varies substantially among the forensic science disciplines.
Problems Relating to the Interpretation of Forensic Evidence
Often in criminal prosecutions and civil litigation, forensic evidence
is offered to support conclusions about “individualization” (sometimes
referred to as “matching” a specimen to a particular individual or other
source) or about classification of the source of the specimen into one of
several categories. With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, however,
no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to
consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection
between evidence and a specific individual or source. In terms of scientific
basis, the analytically based disciplines generally hold a notable edge over
disciplines based on expert interpretation. But there are important varia-
tions among the disciplines relying on expert interpretation. For example,
there are more established protocols and available research for fingerprint
analysis than for the analysis of bite marks. There also are significant varia-
tions within each discipline. For example, not all fingerprint evidence is
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
equally good, because the true value of the evidence is determined by the
quality of the latent fingerprint image. These disparities between and within
the forensic science disciplines highlight a major problem in the forensic sci-
ence community: The simple reality is that the interpretation of forensic evi-
dence is not always based on scientific studies to determine its validity. This
is a serious problem. Although research has been done in some disciplines,
there is a notable dearth of peer-reviewed, published studies establishing
the scientific bases and validity of many forensic methods.7
The Need for Research to Establish Limits and Measures of Performance
In evaluating the accuracy of a forensic analysis, it is crucial to clarify
the type of question the analysis is called on to address. Thus, although
some techniques may be too imprecise to permit accurate identification of
a specific individual, they may still provide useful and accurate information
about questions of classification. For example, microscopic hair analysis
may provide reliable evidence on some characteristics of the individual from
which the specimen was taken, but it may not be able to reliably match the
specimen with a specific individual. However, the definition of the appro-
priate question is only a first step in the evaluation of the performance of a
forensic technique. A body of research is required to establish the limits and
measures of performance and to address the impact of sources of variability
and potential bias. Such research is sorely needed, but it seems to be lack-
ing in most of the forensic disciplines that rely on subjective assessments
of matching characteristics. These disciplines need to develop rigorous
protocols to guide these subjective interpretations and pursue equally rigor-
ous research and evaluation programs. The development of such research
programs can benefit significantly from other areas, notably from the large
body of research on the evaluation of observer performance in diagnostic
medicine and from the findings of cognitive psychology on the potential for
bias and error in human observers.8
7 Several articles, for example, have noted the lack of scientific validation of fingerprint iden-
tification methods. See, e.g., J.J. Koehler. Fingerprint error rates and proficiency tests: What
they are and why they matter. 59 Hastings L.J. 1077 (2008); L. Haber and R.N. Haber.
2008. Scientific validation of fingerprint evidence under Daubert. Law, Probability and Risk
7(2):87; J.L. Mnookin. 2008. The validity of latent fingerprint identification: Confessions of
a fingerprinting moderate. Law, Probability and Risk 7(2):127.
8 The findings of forensic science experts are vulnerable to cognitive and contextual bias. See,
e.g., I.E. Dror, D. Charlton, and A.E. Péron. 2006. Contextual information renders experts
vulnerable to making erroneous identifications. Forensic Science International 156:74, 77.
(“Our study shows that it is possible to alter identification decisions on the same fingerprint,
solely by presenting it in a different context.”); I.E. Dror and D. Charlton. 2006. Why experts
make errors. Journal of Forensic Identification 56(4):600; Giannelli, supra note 6, pp. 220-
222. Unfortunately, at least to date, there is no good evidence to indicate that the forensic
SUMMARY
The Admission of Forensic Science Evidence in Litigation
Forensic science experts and evidence are used routinely in the service
of the criminal justice system. DNA testing may be used to determine
whether sperm found on a rape victim came from an accused party; a latent
fingerprint found on a gun may be used to determine whether a defendant
handled the weapon; drug analysis may be used to determine whether pills
found in a person’s possession were illicit; and an autopsy may be used
to determine the cause and manner of death of a murder victim. In order
for qualified forensic science experts to testify competently about forensic
evidence, they must first find the evidence in a usable state and properly
preserve it. A latent fingerprint that is badly smudged when found cannot
be usefully saved, analyzed, or explained. An inadequate drug sample may
be insufficient to allow for proper analysis. And, DNA tests performed on a
contaminated or otherwise compromised sample cannot be used reliably to
identify or eliminate an individual as the perpetrator of a crime. These are
important matters involving the proper processing of forensic evidence. The
law’s greatest dilemma in its heavy reliance on forensic evidence, however,
concerns the question of whether—and to what extent—there is science in
any given forensic science discipline.
Two very important questions should underlie the law’s admission
of and reliance upon forensic evidence in criminal trials: (1) the extent
to which a particular forensic discipline is founded on a reliable scientific
methodology that gives it the capacity to accurately analyze evidence and
report findings and (2) the extent to which practitioners in a particular
forensic discipline rely on human interpretation that could be tainted by
error, the threat of bias, or the absence of sound operational procedures
and robust performance standards. These questions are significant. Thus, it
matters a great deal whether an expert is qualified to testify about forensic
evidence and whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable to merit a fact
finder’s reliance on the truth that it purports to support. Unfortunately,
these important questions do not always produce satisfactory answers in
judicial decisions pertaining to the admissibility of forensic science evidence
proffered in criminal trials.
In 1993, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,9 the Su-
preme Court ruled that, under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
(which covers both civil trials and criminal prosecutions in the federal
courts), a “trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”10 The Court indicated
science community has made a sufficient effort to address the bias issue; thus, it is impossible
for the committee to fully assess the magnitude of the problem.
9 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
10 Ibid., p. 589.
10
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
that the subject of an expert’s testimony should be scientific knowledge, so
that “evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.”11 The
Court also emphasized that, in considering the admissibility of evidence, a
trial judge should focus “solely” on the expert’s “principles and methodol-
ogy,” and “not on the conclusions that they generate.”12 In sum, Daubert’s
requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to “scientific knowledge”
established a standard of “evidentiary reliability.”13
In explaining this evidentiary standard, the Daubert Court pointed
to several factors that might be considered by a trial judge: (1) whether a
theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory
or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the
known or potential rate of error of a particular scientific technique; (4) the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s opera-
tion; and (5) a scientific technique’s degree of acceptance within a relevant
scientific community.14 In the end, however, the Court emphasized that the
inquiry under Rule 702 is “a flexible one.”15 The Court expressed confi-
dence in the adversarial system, noting that “[v]igorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden
of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.”16 The Supreme Court has made it clear that trial
judges have great discretion in deciding on the admissibility of evidence
under Rule 702, and that appeals from Daubert rulings are subject to a
very narrow abuse-of-discretion standard of review.17 Most importantly,
in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, the Court stated that “whether
Daubert’s specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability
in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad
latitude to determine.”18
11 Ibid., pp. 590 and 591 n.9 (emphasis omitted).
12 Ibid., p. 595. In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997), the Court
added: “[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. Trained
experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in Daubert or the Federal Rules
of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”
13 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 590 n.9, 595.
14 Ibid., pp. 593-94.
15 Ibid., p. 594. In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), the Court
confirmed that the Daubert factors do not constitute a definitive checklist or test. Kumho Tire
importantly held that Rule 702 applies to both scientific and nonscientific expert testimony;
the Court also indicated that the Daubert factors might be applicable in a trial judge’s as-
sessment of the reliability of nonscientific expert testimony, depending upon “the particular
circumstances of the particular case at issue.” Ibid., at 150.
16 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
17 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-143 (1997).
18 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153.
SUMMARY
11
Daubert and its progeny have engendered confusion and controversy.
In particular, judicial dispositions of Daubert-type questions in criminal
cases have been criticized by some lawyers and scholars who thought that
the Supreme Court’s decision would be applied more rigorously.19 If one
focuses solely on reported federal appellate decisions, the picture is not
appealing to those who have preferred a more rigorous application of
Daubert. Federal appellate courts have not with any consistency or clarity
imposed standards ensuring the application of scientifically valid reasoning
and reliable methodology in criminal cases involving Daubert questions.
This is not really surprising, however. The Supreme Court itself described
the Daubert standard as “flexible.” This means that, beyond questions of
relevance, Daubert offers appellate courts no clear substantive standard by
which to review decisions by trial courts. As a result, trial judges exercise
great discretion in deciding whether to admit or exclude expert testimony,
and their judgments are subject only to a highly deferential “abuse of dis-
cretion” standard of review. Although it is difficult to get a clear picture
of how trial courts handle Daubert challenges, because many evidentiary
rulings are issued without a published opinion and without an appeal, the
vast majority of the reported opinions in criminal cases indicate that trial
judges rarely exclude or restrict expert testimony offered by prosecutors;
most reported opinions also indicate that appellate courts routinely deny
appeals contesting trial court decisions admitting forensic evidence against
criminal defendants.20 But the reported opinions do not offer in any way a
complete sample of federal trial court dispositions of Daubert-type ques-
tions in criminal cases.
The situation appears to be very different in civil cases. Plaintiffs and
defendants, equally, are more likely to have access to expert witnesses in
civil cases, while prosecutors usually have an advantage over most defen-
dants in offering expert testimony in criminal cases. And, ironically, the
appellate courts appear to be more willing to second-guess trial court judg-
ments on the admissibility of purported scientific evidence in civil cases than
in criminal cases.21
19 See, e.g., P.J. Neufeld. 2005. The (near) irrelevance of Daubert to criminal justice: And
some suggestions for reform. American Journal of Public Health 95(Supp.1):S107.
20 Ibid., p. S109.
21 See, e.g., McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2005); Chapman
v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2002); Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.
Co., 215 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2000);
Walker v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2000); 1 D.L. Faigman, M.J. Saks, J.
Sanders, and E.K. Cheng. 2007-2008. Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of
Expert Testimony. Eagan, MN: Thomson/West, § 1.35, p. 105 (discussing studies suggesting
that courts “employ Daubert more lackadaisically in criminal trials—especially in regard to
prosecution evidence—than in civil cases—especially in regard to plaintiff evidence”).
12
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
Prophetically, the Daubert decision observed that “there are important
differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for
truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revi-
sion. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly.”22
But because accused parties in criminal cases are convicted on the basis of
testimony from forensic science experts, much depends upon whether the
evidence offered is reliable. Furthermore, in addition to protecting innocent
persons from being convicted of crimes that they did not commit, we are
also seeking to protect society from persons who have committed criminal
acts. Law enforcement officials and the members of society they serve need
to be assured that forensic techniques are reliable. Therefore, we must limit
the risk of having the reliability of certain forensic science methodologies
judicially certified before the techniques have been properly studied and
their accuracy verified by the forensic science community. “[T]here is no
evident reason why [‘rigorous, systematic’] research would be infeasible.”23
However, some courts appear to be loath to insist on such research as a
condition of admitting forensic science evidence in criminal cases, perhaps
because to do so would likely “demand more by way of validation than the
disciplines can presently offer.”24
The adversarial process relating to the admission and exclusion of
scientific evidence is not suited to the task of finding “scientific truth.” The
judicial system is encumbered by, among other things, judges and lawyers
who generally lack the scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and
evaluate forensic evidence in an informed manner, trial judges (sitting alone)
who must decide evidentiary issues without the benefit of judicial col-
leagues and often with little time for extensive research and reflection, and
the highly deferential nature of the appellate review afforded trial courts’
Daubert rulings. Given these realities, there is a tremendous need for the
forensic science community to improve. Judicial review, by itself, will not
cure the infirmities of the forensic science community.25 The development
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97.
23 J. Griffin and D.J. LaMagna. 2002. Daubert challenges to forensic evidence: Ballistics
next on the firing line. The Champion, September-October:20, 21 (quoting P. Giannelli and E.
Imwinkelried. 2000. Scientific evidence: The fallout from Supreme Court’s decision in Kumho
Tire. Criminal Justice Magazine 14(4):12, 40).
24 Ibid. See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 270 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting “that
while further research into fingerprint analysis would be welcome, to postpone present in-court
utilization of this bedrock forensic identifier pending such research would be to make the best
the enemy of the good.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
25 See J.L. Mnookin. Expert evidence, partisanship, and epistemic competence. 73 Brook.
L. Rev. 1009, 1033 (2008) (“[S]o long as we have our adversarial system in much its pres-
ent form, we are inevitably going to be stuck with approaches to expert evidence that are
imperfect, conceptually unsatisfying, and awkward. It may well be that the real lesson is this:
those who believe that we might ever fully resolve—rather than imperfectly manage—the
SUMMARY
13
of scientific research, training, technology, and databases associated with
DNA analysis have resulted from substantial and steady federal support
for both academic research and programs employing techniques for DNA
analysis. Similar support must be given to all credible forensic science dis-
ciplines if they are to achieve the degrees of reliability needed to serve the
goals of justice. With more and better educational programs, accredited
laboratories, certified forensic practitioners, sound operational principles
and procedures, and serious research to establish the limits and measures
of performance in each discipline, forensic science experts will be better
able to analyze evidence and coherently report their findings in the courts.
The current situation, however, is seriously wanting, both because of the
limitations of the judicial system and because of the many problems faced
by the forensic science community.
Political Realities
Most forensic science methods, programs, and evidence are within
the regulatory province of state and local law enforcement entities or are
covered by statutes and rules governing state judicial proceedings. Thus,
in assessing the strengths, weaknesses, and future needs of forensic disci-
plines, and in making recommendations for improving the use of forensic
technologies and techniques, the committee remained mindful of the fact
that Congress cannot directly fix all of the deficiencies in the forensic sci-
ence community. Under our federal system of government, Congress does
not have free reign to amend state criminal codes, rules of evidence, and
statutes governing civil actions; nor may it easily and directly regulate local
law enforcement practices, state and local medical examiner units, or state
policies covering the accreditation of crime laboratories and the certifica-
tion of forensic practitioners.
Congress’ authority to act is significant, however. Forensic science pro-
grams in federal government entities—whether within DOJ, DHS, DOD,
or the Department of Commerce (DOC)—are funded by congressional
appropriations. If these programs are required to operate pursuant to the
highest standards, they will provide an example for the states. More im-
portantly, Congress can promote “best practices” and strong educational,
certification, accreditation, ethics, and oversight programs in the states by
offering funds that are contingent on meeting appropriate standards of
practice. There is every reason to believe that offers of federal funds with
“strings attached” can effect significant change in the forensic science com-
deep structural tensions surrounding both partisanship and epistemic competence that per-
meate the use of scientific evidence within our legal system are almost certainly destined for
disappointment.”).
14
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
munity, because so many state and local programs currently are suffering
for want of adequate resources. In the end, however, the committee recog-
nized that state and local authorities must be willing to enforce change if
it is to happen.
In light of the foregoing issues, the committee exercised caution before
drawing conclusions and avoided being too prescriptive in its recommen-
dations. It also recognized that, given the complexity of the issues and the
political realities that may pose obstacles to change, some recommenda-
tions will have to be implemented creatively and over time in order to be
effective.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Fragmented System: Symptoms and Cures
The forensic science disciplines currently are an assortment of methods
and practices used in both the public and private arenas. Forensic science
facilities exhibit wide variability in capacity, oversight, staffing, certifica-
tion, and accreditation across federal and state jurisdictions. Too often they
have inadequate educational programs, and they typically lack mandatory
and enforceable standards, founded on rigorous research and testing, cer-
tification requirements, and accreditation programs. Additionally, forensic
science and forensic pathology research, education, and training lack strong
ties to our research universities and national science assets. In addition to
the problems emanating from the fragmentation of the forensic science
community, the most recently published Census of Crime Laboratories
conducted by BJS describes unacceptable case backlogs in state and local
crime laboratories and estimates the level of additional resources needed
to handle these backlogs and prevent their recurrence. Unfortunately, the
backlogs, even in DNA case processing, have grown dramatically in recent
years and are now staggering in some jurisdictions. The most recently
published BJS Special Report of Medical Examiners and Coroners’ Offices
also depicts a system with disparate and often inadequate educational and
training requirements, resources, and capacities—in short, a system in need
of significant improvement.
Existing data suggest that forensic laboratories are underresourced
and understaffed, which contributes to case backlogs and likely makes it
difficult for laboratories to do as much as they could to (1) inform investi-
gations, (2) provide strong evidence for prosecutions, and (3) avoid errors
that could lead to imperfect justice. Being underresourced also means that
the tools of forensic science—and the knowledge base that underpins the
analysis and interpretation of evidence—are not as strong as they could
be, thus hindering the ability of the forensic science disciplines to excel at
SUMMARY
15
informing investigations, providing strong evidence, and avoiding errors in
important ways. NIJ is the only federal agency that provides direct support
to crime laboratories to alleviate the backlog, and those funds are minimal.
The forensic science system is underresourced also in the sense that it has
only thin ties to an academic research base that could support the forensic
science disciplines and fill knowledge gaps. There are many hard-working
and conscientious people in the forensic science community, but this under-
resourcing inherently limits their ability to do their best work. Additional
resources surely will be necessary to create high-quality, self-correcting
systems.
However, increasing the staff within existing crime laboratories and
medical examiners’ offices is only part of the solution. What also is needed
is an upgrading of systems and organizational structures, better training,
the widespread adoption of uniform and enforceable best practices, and
mandatory certification and accreditation programs. The forensic science
community and the medical examiner/coroner system must be upgraded if
forensic practitioners are to be expected to serve the goals of justice.
Of the various facets of underresourcing, the committee is most con-
cerned about the knowledge base. Adding more dollars and people to the
enterprise might reduce case backlogs, but it will not address fundamental
limitations in the capabilities of forensic science disciplines to discern valid
information from crime scene evidence. For the most part, it is impossible
to discern the magnitude of those limitations, and reasonable people will
differ on their significance.
Forensic science research is not well supported, and there is no uni-
fied strategy for developing a forensic science research plan across federal
agencies. Relative to other areas of science, the forensic disciplines have
extremely limited opportunities for research funding. Although the FBI and
NIJ have supported some research in forensic science, the level of support
has been well short of what is necessary for the forensic science community
to establish strong links with a broad base of research universities. Moreover,
funding for academic research is limited and requires law enforcement col-
laboration, which can inhibit the pursuit of more fundamental scientific
questions essential to establishing the foundation of forensic science. The
broader research community generally is not engaged in conducting re-
search relevant to advancing the forensic science disciplines.
The forensic science enterprise also is hindered by its extreme
disaggregation—marked by multiple types of practitioners with different
levels of education and training and different professional cultures and
standards for performance and a reliance on apprentice-type training and
a guild-like structure of disciplines, which work against the goal of a
single forensic science profession. Many forensic scientists are given scant
opportunity for professional activities, such as attending conferences or
16
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
publishing their research, which could help strengthen the professional
community and offset some of the disaggregation. The fragmented nature
of the enterprise raises the worrisome prospect that the quality of evidence
presented in court, and its interpretation, can vary unpredictably according
to jurisdiction.
Numerous professional associations are organized around the forensic
science disciplines, and many of them are involved in training and educa-
tion (see Chapter 8) and are developing standards and accreditation and
certification programs (see Chapter 7). The efforts of these groups are
laudable. However, except for the largest organizations, it is not clear how
these associations interact or the extent to which they share requirements,
standards, or policies. Thus, there is a need for more consistent and har-
monized requirements.
In the course of its deliberations and review of the forensic science en-
terprise, it became obvious to the committee that, although congressional
action will not remedy all of the deficiencies in forensic science methods
and practices, truly meaningful advances will not come without significant
concomitant leadership from the federal government. The forensic science
enterprise lacks the necessary governance structure to pull itself up from
its current weaknesses. Of the many professional societies that serve the
enterprise, none is dominant, and none has clearly articulated the need for
change or presented a vision for accomplishing it. And clearly no munici-
pal or state forensic office has the mandate to lead the entire enterprise.
The major federal resources—NIJ and the FBI Laboratory—have provided
modest leadership, for which they should be commended: NIJ has contrib-
uted a helpful research program and the FBI Laboratory has spearheaded
the SWGs. But again, neither entity has recognized, let alone articulated,
a need for change or a vision for achieving it. Neither has the full confi-
dence of the larger forensic science community. And because both are part
of a prosecutorial department of the government, they could be subject to
subtle contextual biases that should not be allowed to undercut the power
of forensic science.
The forensic science enterprise needs strong governance to adopt and
promote an aggressive, long-term agenda to help strengthen the forensic
science disciplines. Governance must be strong enough—and independent
enough—to identify the limitations of forensic science methodologies, and
must be well connected with the Nation’s scientific research base to effect
meaningful advances in forensic science practices. The governance structure
must be able to create appropriate incentives for jurisdictions to adopt and
adhere to best practices and promulgate the necessary sanctions to discour-
age bad practices. It must have influence with educators in order to effect
improvements to forensic science education. It must be able to identify
standards and enforce them. A governance entity must be geared toward
SUMMARY
17
(and be credible within) the law enforcement community, but it must have
strengths that extend beyond that area. Oversight of the forensic science com-
munity and medical examiner system will sweep broadly into areas of crimi-
nal investigation and prosecution, civil litigation, legal reform, investigation
of insurance claims, national disaster planning and preparedness, homeland
security, certification of federal, state, and local forensic practitioners, public
health, accreditation of public and private laboratories, research to improve
forensic methodologies, education programs in colleges and universities, and
advancing technology.
The committee considered whether such a governing entity could be
established within an existing federal agency. The National Science Founda-
tion (NSF) was considered because of its strengths in leading research and
its connections to the research and education communities. NSF is surely
capable of building and sustaining a research base, but it has very thin ties
to the forensic science community. It would be necessary for NSF to take
many untested steps if it were to assume responsibility for the governance
of applied fields of science. The committee also considered NIST. In the end
analysis, however, NIST did not appear to be a viable option. It has a good
program of research targeted at forensic science and law enforcement, but
the program is modest. NIST also has strong ties to industry and academia,
and it has an eminent history in standard setting and method development.
But its ties to the forensic science community are still limited, and it would
not be seen as a natural leader by the scholars, scientists, and practitioners
in the field. In sum, the committee concluded that neither NSF nor NIST has
the breadth of experience or institutional capacity to establish an effective
governance structure for the forensic science enterprise.
There was also a strong consensus in the committee that no existing
or new division or unit within DOJ would be an appropriate location for
a new entity governing the forensic science community. DOJ’s principal
mission is to enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States
according to the law. Agencies within DOJ operate pursuant to this mission.
The FBI, for example, is the investigative arm of DOJ and its principal mis-
sions are to produce and use intelligence to protect the Nation from threats
and to bring to justice those who violate the law. The work of these law
enforcement units is critically important to the Nation, but the scope of the
work done by DOJ units is much narrower than the promise of a strong
forensic science community. Forensic science serves more than just law
enforcement; and when it does serve law enforcement, it must be equally
available to law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and defendants in the
criminal justice system. The entity that is established to govern the forensic
science community cannot be principally beholden to law enforcement. The
potential for conflicts of interest between the needs of law enforcement and
the broader needs of forensic science are too great. In addition, the com-
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STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
mittee determined that the research funding strategies of DOJ have not
adequately served the broad needs of the forensic science community. This
is understandable, but not acceptable when the issue is whether an agency is
best suited to support and oversee the Nation’s forensic science community.
In sum, the committee concluded that advancing science in the forensic sci-
ence enterprise is not likely to be achieved within the confines of DOJ.
Furthermore, there is little doubt that some existing federal entities are
too wedded to the current “fragmented” forensic science community, which
is deficient in too many respects. Most notably, these existing agencies have
failed to pursue a rigorous research agenda to confirm the evidentiary reli-
ability of methodologies used in a number of forensic science disciplines.
These agencies are not good candidates to oversee the overhaul of the fo-
rensic science community in the United States.
Finally, some existing federal agencies with other missions occasionally
have undertaken projects affecting the forensic science community. These
entities are better left to continue the good work that defines their principal
missions. More responsibility is not better for these existing entities, nor
would it be better for the forensic science community or the Nation.
The committee thus concluded that the problems at issue are too seri-
ous and important to be subsumed by an existing federal agency. It also
concluded that no existing federal agency has the capacity or appropriate
mission to take on the roles and responsibilities needed to govern and im-
prove the forensic science enterprise.
The committee believes that what is needed to support and oversee the
forensic science community is a new, strong, and independent entity that
could take on the tasks that would be assigned to it in a manner that is as
objective and free of bias as possible—one with no ties to the past and with
the authority and resources to implement a fresh agenda designed to address
the problems found by the committee and discussed in this report. A new
organization should not be encumbered by the assumptions, expectations,
and deficiencies of the existing fragmented infrastructure, which has failed
to address the needs and challenges of the forensic science disciplines.
This new entity must be an independent federal agency established to
address the needs of the forensic science community, and it must meet the
following minimum criteria:
• It must have a culture that is strongly rooted in science, with strong
ties to the national research and teaching communities, including
federal laboratories.
• It must have strong ties to state and local forensic entities as well
as to the professional organizations within the forensic science
community.
SUMMARY
19
• It must not be in any way committed to the existing system, but
should be informed by its experiences.
• It must not be part of a law enforcement agency.
• It must have the funding, independence, and sufficient prominence
to raise the profile of the forensic science disciplines and push ef-
fectively for improvements.
• It must be led by persons who are skilled and experienced in de-
veloping and executing national strategies and plans for standard
setting; managing accreditation and testing processes; and devel-
oping and implementing rulemaking, oversight, and sanctioning
processes.
No federal agency currently exists that meets all of these criteria.
Recommendation 1:
To promote the development of forensic science into a mature
field of multidisciplinary research and practice, founded on the
systematic collection and analysis of relevant data, Congress should
establish and appropriate funds for an independent federal entity,
the National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS). NIFS should have
a full-time administrator and an advisory board with expertise in
research and education, the forensic science disciplines, physical
and life sciences, forensic pathology, engineering, information tech-
nology, measurements and standards, testing and evaluation, law,
national security, and public policy. NIFS should focus on:
(a) establishing and enforcing best practices for forensic sci-
ence professionals and laboratories;
(b) establishing standards for the mandatory accreditation of
forensic science laboratories and the mandatory certifica-
tion of forensic scientists and medical examiners/forensic
pathologists—and identifying the entity/entities that will
develop and implement accreditation and certification;
(c) promoting scholarly, competitive peer-reviewed research
and technical development in the forensic science disci-
plines and forensic medicine;
(d) developing a strategy to improve forensic science research
and educational programs, including forensic pathology;
(e) establishing a strategy, based on accurate data on the fo-
rensic science community, for the efficient allocation of
available funds to give strong support to forensic method-
ologies and practices in addition to DNA analysis;
20
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
(f) funding state and local forensic science agencies, inde-
pendent research projects, and educational programs as
recommended in this report, with conditions that aim to
advance the credibility and reliability of the forensic sci-
ence disciplines;
(g) overseeing education standards and the accreditation of
forensic science programs in colleges and universities;
(h) developing programs to improve understanding of the fo-
rensic science disciplines and their limitations within legal
systems; and
(i) assessing the development and introduction of new tech-
nologies in forensic investigations, including a comparison
of new technologies with former ones.
The benefits that will flow from a strong, independent, strategic, coher-
ent, and well-funded federal program to support and oversee the forensic
science disciplines in this country are clear: The Nation will (1) bolster
its ability to more accurately identify true perpetrators and exclude those
who are falsely accused; (2) improve its ability to effectively respond to,
attribute, and prosecute threats to homeland security; and (3) reduce the
likelihood of convictions resting on inaccurate data. Moreover, establishing
the scientific foundation of the forensic science disciplines, providing better
education and training, and requiring certification and accreditation will
position the forensic science community to take advantage of current and
future scientific advances.
The creation of a new federal entity undoubtedly will pose challenges,
not the least of which will be budgetary constraints. The committee is not
in a position to estimate how much it will cost to implement the recom-
mendations in this report; this is a matter best left to the expertise of the
Congressional Budget Office. What is clear, however, is that Congress must
take aggressive action if the worst ills of the forensic science community
are to be cured. Political and budgetary concerns should not deter bold,
creative, and forward-looking action, because the country cannot afford to
suffer the consequences of inaction. It will also take time and patience to
implement the recommendations in this report. But this is true with any
large, complex, important, and challenging enterprise.
The committee strongly believes that the greatest hope for success in
this enterprise will come with the creation of the National Institute of Fo-
rensic Science (NIFS) to oversee and direct the forensic science community.
The remaining recommendations in this report are crucially tied to the
creation of NIFS. However, each recommendation is a separate, essential
piece of the plan to improve the forensic science community in the United
States. Therefore, even if the creation of NIFS is forestalled, the committee
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