II. методические рекомендации 7 СОДЕРЖАНИЕ I . ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ......................................................................................... II .МЕТОДИЧЕСКИЕ РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ................................................. III . ОСНОВЫ АННОТИРОВАНИЯ И РЕФЕРИРОВАНИЯ. ПРАКТИЧЕСКИЕ РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ...................................................................................... IV . ТЕКСТЫ ДЛЯ РЕФЕРИРОВАНИЯ, АННОТИРОВАНИЯ И ПЕРЕВОДА UNIT I.GLOBALISATION........................................................................... Т ext A........................................................................................................... ONE WORLD ?......................................................................................... Text B........................................................................................................... EXPAND THE DEBATE ON GLOBALISATION.................................... Text C........................................................................................................... GLOBAL CAPITALISM, R.I.P.?............................................................... UNIT II........................................................................................................... WORLD TRADE............................................................................................ Text A........................................................................................................... TRADE WINDS........................................................................................ Text B........................................................................................................... THE RACE FOR THE BOTTOM............................................................. Text C........................................................................................................... SPOILLING WORLD TRADE.................................................................. UNIT III. ECONOMIC POLICY AND WORLD INTEGRATION.......... Text A........................................................................................................... BEARING THE WEIGHT OF THE MARKET ?...................................... Text B........................................................................................................... ARE THE POOR DIFFERENT ?.............................................................. Text C........................................................................................................... THE JOYS OF LIVING IN SYNE............................................................. UNIT IV Europe: Economic And Monetary Union.................................... Text A........................................................................................................... THE «EURO»............................................................................................ Text B........................................................................................................... ASKING FOR TROUBLE......................................................................... Text C........................................................................................................... WHY NON-EUROPEANS SHOULD CARE ABOUT EMU.................... UNIT V. Inflation........................................................................................... Text A........................................................................................................... MURDER, THEY WROTE....................................................................... Text B........................................................................................................... INFLATION IS DEAD.............................................................................. UNIT VI. BUSINESS AND BUSINESSES................................................... Text A........................................................................................................... WORLDBEATER, INC............................................................................. Text B......................................................................................................... BEHIND AMERICA’S SMALL BUSINESS SUCCESS STORY........... Text C......................................................................................................... THOROUGHLY MODERN MONOPOLY.............................................. UNIT VII. MANAGEMENT. MARKETING............................................ Text A......................................................................................................... INSTANT COFFEE................................................................................. Text B......................................................................................................... WHY TOO MANY MERGERS MISS THE MARK............................... Text C......................................................................................................... JOHANNESBURGERS AND FRIES...................................................... UNIT VIII. FINANCIAL MARKETS......................................................... Text A......................................................................................................... A SMOOTHER RIDE, BUT LESS FUN................................................. Text B......................................................................................................... INVESTORS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIAN EQUITIES.............................. Text C......................................................................................................... FIXED AND FLOATING VOTERS........................................................ UNIT IX. BANKS AND BANKING SAVING........................................... Text A......................................................................................................... HOW SAFE IS YOUR BANK ?.............................................................. Text B......................................................................................................... CENTRAL BANKS ON THE TRAIL OF THE MUTANT IFLATION MONSTER................................................................................................................. Text C......................................................................................................... THE LLOYDS MONEY MACHINE....................................................... Text D......................................................................................................... RATTLING THE PIGGY BANK............................................................ V . Наиболее распространенные трудности перевода экономических текстов с английского языка на русский................................................................ Упражнения для закрепления навыков перевода I РАЗДЕЛ Модальные и вспомогательные глаголы ............................................ 1. MAY (MIGHT).................................................................................... 2. MUST.................................................................................................. 3. SHOULD............................................................................................. 4. TO BE.................................................................................................. 5. HAVE TO............................................................................................ II РАЗДЕЛ.................................................................................................... Инфинитив................................................................................................. 1.Инфинитив в различных фукциях...................................................... 2. Инфинитивные конструкции.............................................................. III РАЗДЕЛ .................................................................................................. Герундий.................................................................................................... 1.Герундий в функции обстоятельства.................................................. 2. Герундий в функции определения, дополнения, подлежащего и составного сказуемого............................................................................................... 3. Герундиальный комплекс................................................................... IV РАЗДЕЛ.................................................................................................. Причастие.................................................................................................. 1.Причастие в различных функциях..................................................... 2. Причастные конструкции................................................................... 3. Абсолютная причастная конструкция с предлогом with.................. 4. Причастие в функции союзов и предлогов....................................... V РАЗДЕЛ.................................................................................................... Страдательный залог (пассив).................................................................. VI РАЗДЕЛ .................................................................................................. Оборот it is (was)… who (that, when и т.д.).............................................. VII РАЗДЕЛ................................................................................................. Служебные слова....................................................................................... VIII РАЗДЕЛ............................................................................................... Артикль...................................................................................................... IX РАЗДЕЛ.................................................................................................. Сослагательное наклонение...................................................................... X РАЗДЕЛ.................................................................................................... Эллиптические конструкции..................................................................... XI РАЗДЕЛ.................................................................................................. Сложные атрибутивные конструкции...................................................... XII РАЗДЕЛ................................................................................................. Обзорные упражнения.............................................................................. СПИСОК ИСПОЛЬЗОВАННОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ................................ I. ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ Учебное пособие «Реферирование, аннотирование и перевод экономических текстов. Теория и практика» предназначено для студентов старших курсов и магистрантов экономических факультетов, овладевших основной экономической лексикой и базовыми навыками перевода с английского языка на русский. В основе содержания пособия лежит двуединая задача действий по реферированию и аннотированию: информативная и учебная. Цель создания пособия:. - обучение реферированию и аннотированию экономических текстов; - углубление и совершенствование навыков перевода экономических текстов с английского языка на русский; - дальнейшее ознакомление со специальной и общеэкономической лексикой; - развитие навыков ведения дискуссии и умения делать сообщения по экономической проблематике. Пособие включает аутентичные материалы, которые подобраны по тематическому признаку и охватывают основные тенденции в мировой экономической системе. Тексты, предлагаемые в рамках одной темы отражают различные точки зрения на проблему, носят полемический характер и могут служить основой для дискуссии. Кроме того, тексты насыщены переводческими и лексическими трудностями, более глубокая отработка которых может быть осуществлена с помощью соответствующих упражнений. Пособие имеет многоуровневую структуру и распределение материала организовано по принципу «от простого к сложному». Аналогичный подход сохраняется в рамках каждого отдельного раздела, поэтому материал может быть использован для обучения слушателей с разной языковой подготовкой. Конкретные рекомендации по работе с предложенным учебным материалом приводятся в методической записке, а также в разделе по теории и практике реферирования. II . МЕТОДИЧЕСКИЕ РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ Учебный материал по экономическому переводу для специалистов и магистрантов экономических вузов ориентирован на развитие навыков просмотрового, ознакомительного, поискового и аналитического чтения экономической литературы, написание ов и аннотаций, на дальнейшее совершенствование навыков перевода с английского на русский, на изучение узкоспециализированной лексики, а также на умение вести дискуссию и делать сообщения на экономические темы. Для достижения этих целей в пособие включены тексты общего и специализированного экономического содержания, представляющие интерес как для перевода, так и для анализа проблемы. Пособие состоит из нескольких разделов, подобранных по тематическому принципу. Оно включает ряд специализированных экономических тем, каждая из которых представлена целым рядом текстов для реферирования, и аннотированию. В отдельный раздел выделены грамматические трудности перевода. Исходя из основной задачи обучения данной категории студентов, можно рекомендовать следующий порядок работы с экономическими текстами на английском языке. Условно эта работа разделяется на несколько этапов, причем поурочное распределение этих этапов; выбор заданий для аудиторной и домашней самостоятельной работы; объем материала, предлагаемого для перевода и реферирования; а также выбор и порядок следования тем должен быть индивидуализированы для каждой группы в зависимости от конкретных задач и ее специализации. 1 ЭТАП (pre-reading) Предварительное, т.е. еще до чтения текста, введение в тему . Несколько общих тематических вопросов, заданных преподавателем, помогут лучшему пониманию проблематики текста. П ЭТАП (skimming and scanning) беглый просмотр текста для выявления основной идеи (skimming) путем быстрого прочтения первого и последнего абзацев, а иногда и первых предложений абзацев, идущих после подзаголовков, а также для поиска конкретной специальной информации (scanning), выраженной в цифрах, датах, терминах и т.д. Преподаватель проверяет точность найденных сведений, задавая конкретные вопросы по тексту. Ш ЭТАП (reading) внимательное чтение всего текста . Данный этап необходим в случае последующего письменного перевода, а также написания а и аннотации. Если же текст предлагается для перевода «с листа» (off-hand translation), то этот этап можно упразднить. 1У ЭТАП (translation) перевод всего текста или отдельных его частей по усмотрению преподавателя. При этом, проверяя перевод, преподаватель первое время может просить студента указать на ключевые фрагменты тех или иных абзацев, смысловых блоков или частей текста. Это своего рода подготовка к реферированию. Кроме того, на данном этапе совершенствуются навыки перевода и закрепляется изучаемая специальная лексика. Безусловно, от этого этапа также можно отказаться, если студенты свободно ориентируются в английском тексте и вполне овладели навыками реферирования и аннотирования. У ЭТАП (precis writing) Написание ов и аннотаций с обязательной их проверкой и обсуждением в аудитории. Практические рекомендации по реферированию и аннотированию приводятся в следующем разделе. По совершенно понятным причинам предварительная работа с английским текстом (этап 1 и П) ведется динамично и должна занимать лишь небольшую часть времени урока. В заключение хотелось бы подчеркнуть, что предложенный порядок работы с материалом опирается на исследования и опыт многих специалистов, но вместе с тем носит чисто рекомендательный характер. Творческий подход, профессиональная интуиция и возможности конкретной группы студентов помогут преподавателю найти оптимальный путь для достижения поставленной цели обучения. III . ОСНОВЫ РЕФЕРИРОВАНИЯ И АННОТИРОВАНИЯ. ПРАКТИЧЕСКИЕ РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ. Объем иноязычной информации, поступающей в наши дни, неуклонно растет. Полный перевод ее часто невозможен или нецелесообразен. Другими способами обработки информации является реферирование и аннотирование. Кроме того, ивная деятельность обладает высоким обучающим потенциалом. Она не только активизирует навыки различных видов чтения, а требует действий по смысловому свертыванию текста, что, в свою очередь, приводит к мотивированному усвоению иноязычного материала и преодолению возникающих при этом лексико-грамматических трудностей. ом мы называем текст, построенный на основе смысловой компрессии первоисточника с целью передачи его главного содержания. В ах не допускаются субъективные оценки переводчика - референта, а материал излагается с позиции автора исходного текста и не содержит никаких элементов интерпретации. Таким образом, можно дать следующее определение понятию : (precis) - это сжатое и обобщенное изложение содержания материала в соответствии с назначением а и полученным заданием. Из этого видно, что реферирование целиком построено на законах компрессии текста, т.е. на тех принципах, которые обуславливают понимание текста при чтении. Предельной краткости и необходимой полноты изложения содержания первоисточника позволяют достичь работа с так называемыми ключевыми фрагментами (ключевые слова, словосочетания и предложения). Выделяются два основных типа ов: -конспект и -резюме . -конспект - это подробное изложение материала (как в конспекте) с обобщением однородных фактов. -резюме - сжатое изложение содержания первоисточника и, следовательно, большая степень обобщения, выделение главного и нового (он граничит с аннотацией). Аннотация представляет собой предельно краткое изложение главного содержания текста оригинала и передает в нескольких строчках представление о его тематике. Назначение аннотации в том, чтобы дать возможность специалисту составить мнение о целесообразности более детального ознакомления с данным материалом. Таким образом, можно дать следующее определение понятию аннотация: аннотация ( annotation ) - это предельно сжатая характеристика первоисточника, имеющая целью информировать о наличии материала на определенную тему. Различают два основных типа аннотации: описательную и ивную . Описательная аннотация - это общая характеристика материала без конкретного развертывания ее содержания. Обычно она состоит из следующих частей: - библиографическое описание материала (автор, название, выходные данные); - тема; - предельно сжатая характеристика материала. ивная аннотация , помимо таких же разделов, как и описательная, выделяет также основную мысль, основные положения и выводы при очень высокой степени обобщения. Иными словами она отвечает не только на вопрос, о чем говорится в первоисточнике, но и что именно говорится в нем. Для лучшего понимания всего вышесказанного остановимся подробнее на основных различиях между ом и аннотацией. Если назначение а - знакомить читателя с содержанием оригинала и таким образом замещать его, то аннотация дает представление только о теме первоисточника и облегчает поиск необходимой информации по заданному предмету. строится на основе ключевых фрагментов, выделяемых из текста подлинника с позиции его автора, т.е. без субъективной оценки реферата. Аннотация же пишется своими словами, а следовательно может предполагать критическое переосмысление материала. И последнее, если объем а в среднем может составлять 10 % - 15 % от объема оригинала, то аннотация по объему часто не превышает 3-4 предложений. Что касается техники реферирования и аннотирования, то она в основном едина, с той лишь разницей, что степень обобщения при аннотировании значительно выше. Остановимся на основных приемах используемых при реферировании и аннотировании: 1. Реферирование и аннотирование иноязычного материала неизбежно сопряжено с предварительным чтением, а иногда хотя бы с устным полным или выборочным переводом текста; 2. В процессе чтения и/или перевода текста выделяются ключевые фрагменты (ключевые слова, словосочетания и предложения). Ключевые фрагменты либо подчеркиваются либо, выписываются из текста оригинала. При выделении ключевого фрагмента следует опираться на следующие правила (см. пример на стр. 12) а) ключевые фрагменты не связаны друг с другом (higher productivity/better division of labour/bigger economies of scale); б) форма, в которой записывается ключевой фрагмент может не совпадать с оригиналом (оригинал: to boost productivity; ключевой фрагмент higher productivity); в) число и порядок следования ключевых фрагментов произволен. Иногда в одном абзаце можно выделить несколько ключевых фрагментов, в то же время ряд абзацев могут не содержать ни одного; г) фиксирование ключевых фрагментов требует извлечения имплицитного смысла (от латинского implicitum - подразумеваемый, невыраженный, скрытый). Если информация эксплицитна (открытая, явная, непосредственная), то читающий ищет необходимые обобщения в тексте. Если информация имплицитна, то действия читающего приобретают характер умозаключений или обобщения суждений, содержащихся в тексте. Понимание имплицитного смысла требует ряда умений: - умение отвлечься от словарного значения данного слова или словосочетания и опереться на более широкий контекст ( ... «allowing low-wage countries to specialise in labour - intensive tasks» .. - здесь слово tasks следует переводить как отрасли или виды производства ); - умение увидеть внутреннюю логическую связь между двумя высказываниями (Inflation would not surrender. Interest rates too low. - Информация никак не снижается, поскольку уровень ссудного процента слишком низок); - умение восстановить пропущенные логические звенья (...«with the potential to boost productivity and living standards everywhere». Слово everywhere в данном контексте реконструируется в in the advanced and developing countries); - умение сделать обобщение на основе ряда фактов и аргументов, которые приводит автор, но не обобщает их. («Delayering». «Retooling». «Focus on excellence». «Putting the client first». When it comes to jargon, the World Bank’s restructuring plan is indisputably world class. - Если взглянуть на программу структурной реорганизации Всемирного банка с точки зрения формулировок, употребляемых в отношении совершенствования его деятельности, то она первоклассна); - умение пользоваться фоновыми знаниями для восполнения смысловых высказываний (To many, the global capital market is a truly wonderful thing. To firms, to investors and to those in the middle - the dealers and brokers who make trades happen - the global market, and the frenetic trading activity it generates, seems to promise a handsome living. В данном примере специальные знания помогут правильно понять значение слов «trades» и «trading» как «сделки и операции с ценными бумагами и другими финансовыми инструментами»). 3. Выделенные ключевые фрагменты можно перегруппировать и составлять логический план текста. При составлении и редактировании собственно текста а следует помнить, что - это самостоятельный текст с собственной логикой изложение. Например, ключевые фрагменты, дублирующие друг друга, могут сливаться в один пункт, а ключевой фрагмент заключительного абзаца может быть перемещен в начало текста реферата. 4. При составлении а и аннотации необходимо уметь использовать и систематизировать обобщения содержания материала, которые имеются в готовом виде в самом первоисточнике. Но для референта главное овладеть самому основными приемами обобщения: а) замена частного общим, видового понятия родовым, т.е. наиболее распространенные и универсальные способы обобщения; б) нахождение общих признаков у ряда явлений и их объединение (особенно при наличии массы показателей и статистических данных); в) сведение ряда явлений к их сущности или как это иначе называют «обобщение обобщений» (часто применяется при сводном аннотировании нескольких источников или очень дробного материала). 5. При составлении а и аннотации оформляются следующие сведения: - русское название статьи (текста) - название работы в оригинале - имя автора - название и выходные данные журнала (сборника) - указание страниц в журнале (сборнике) - указание на число рисунков, чертежей и схем в тексте оригинала. Можно привести следующий пример необходимой компрессии при реферировании и аннотировании. Проанализируем следующий абзац : Whether all of this is for good or ill is a topic of heated debate. One, positive view is that globalisation is an unmixed blessing, with the potential to boost productivity and living standards everywhere. This is because a globally integrated economy can lead to a better division of labour between countries, allowing low-wage countries to specialise in labour-intensive tasks while high-wage countries use workers in more productive ways. It will allow firms to exploit bigger economies of scale. And with globalisation, capital can be shifted to whatever country offers the most productive investment opportunities, not trapped at home financing projects with poor returns. Ключевые фрагменты : - positive view; - potential : a) higher productivity and living standards b) better division of labour c) bigger economies of scale d) capital can be shifted e) productive investment; В случае реферирования основную мысль данного абзаца можно с помощью компрессии передать следующим образом: Сторонники глобализации видят в ней потенциал роста производительности труда и уровня жизни; углубление разделения труда и экономию на масштабе; сводное движение капитала и эффективные инвестиции в развитие производства. Данный абзац характеризуется высокой информативностью, поэтому компрессия здесь минимальная. Но в ряде случаев основное содержание одного или даже нескольких абзацев в совокупности можно передать одним предложением. В случае аннотирования компрессия будет максимальной: Сторонники глобализации связывают с ней ряд позитивных тенденций. IV . ТЕКСТЫ ДЛЯ РЕФЕРИРОВАНИЯ, АННОТИРОВАНИЯ И ПЕРЕВОДА UNIT I. GLOBALISATION Text A. ONE WORLD ? 1. Дайте ответы на следующие 1.What is meant by globalisation? вопросы без предварительного 2. Is this phenomenon as new as it is generally чтения текста : held out to be? 3. Is globalisation for good or ill? 2. Дайте ответы на следующие 1. What are positive and critical views of вопросы после беглого просмотра globalisation? текста 2. Prove that international economic integration is not unprecedented. 3. Could the trend towards globalisation be reversed ? 3. Прочитайте следующий текст и найдите ключевые слова и предложения в каждом абзаце: ONE WORLD? For good or ill, globalisation has become the economic buzz-world of the 1990s. National economies are undoubtedly becoming steadily more integrated as cross-border flows of trade, investment and financial capital increase. Consumers are buying more foreign goods, a growing number of firms now operate across national borders, and savers are investing more than ever before in far-flung places. Whether all of this is for good or ill is a topic of heated debate. One, positive view is that globalisation is an unmixed blessing, with the potential to boost productivity and living standards everywhere. This is because a globally integrated economy can lead to a better division of labour between countries, allowing low-wage countries to specialise in labour-intensive tasks while high-wage countries use workers in more productive ways. It will allow firms to exploit bigger economies of scale. And with globalisation, capital can be shifted to whatever country offers the most productive investment opportunities, not trapped at home financing projects with poor returns. Critics of globalisation take a gloomier view. They predict that increased competition from low-wage developing countries will destroy jobs and push down wages in today’s rich economies. There will be a “race to the botom” as countries reduce wages, taxes, welfare benefits and environmental controls to make themselves more “competitive”. Pressure to compete will erode the ability of governments to set their own economic policies. The critics also worry about the increased power of financial markets to cause economic havoc, as in the European currency crises of 1992 and 1993, Mexico in 1994-1995 and South-East Asia in 1997. The aim of this survey is to look in detail at these controversial arguments on each side of the globalisation debate. But it is necessary first of all to examine what precisely is meant by globalisation, how far it has proceeded, and whether the phenomenon is as new as it is generally held out to be. Some of the answers are surprising. Old news Despite much loose talk about the “new” global economy, today’s international economic integration is not unprecedented. The 50 years before the first world war saw large crossborder flows of goods, capital and people. That period of globalisation, like the present one, was driven by reductions in trade barriers and by sharp falls in transport costs, thanks to the development of railways and steamships. The present surge of globalisation is in a way a resumption of that previous trend. That earlier attempt at globalisation ended abruptly with the first world war, after which the world moved into a period of fierce trade protectionism and tight restrictions on capital movement. During the early 1930s, America sharply increased its tariffs, and other countries retaliated, making the Great Depression even greater. The volume of world trade fell sharply. International capital flows virtually dried up in the inter-war period as governments imposed capital controls to try to insulate their economies from the impact of a global slump. Capital controls were maintained after the second world war, as the victors decided to keep their exchange rates fixed - an arrangement known as the Bretton Woods system, after the American town in which it was approved. But the big economic powers also agreed that reducing trade barriers was vital to recovery. They set up the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which organised a series of negotiations that gradually reduced import tariffs. GATT was replaced by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. Trade flourished. In the early 1970s, the Bretton Woods system collapsed and currencies were allowed to “float” against one another at whatever rates the markets set. This signalled the rebirth of the global capital market. America and Germany quickly stopped trying to control the inflow and outflow of capital. Britain abolished capital controls in 1979 and Japan (mostly) in 1980. However, France and Italy did not abandon the last of their restrictions on cross-border investment until 1990 This is part of the reason why continental Europeans tend to worry more about the power of global capital markets: America has been exposed to them for much longer. Two forces have been driving these increased flows of goods and money. The first is technology. With the costs of communication and computing falling rapidly, the natural barriers of time and space that separate national markets have been falling too. The cost of a three-minute telephone call between New York and London has fallen from $300 (in 1996 dollars) in 1930 to less than $1 today. The cost of computer processing power has been falling by an average of 30% a year in real terms over the past couple of decades. The second driving force has been liberalisation. As a result of both the GATT negotiations and unilateral decisions, almost all countries have lowered barriers to foreign trade. Most countries have welcomed international capital as well. Although liberalisation has proceeded at different speeds in different places, the trend is worldwide. Only a handful of renegades still try to isolate themselves. Over the past decade, trade has increased twice as fast as output, foreign direct investment three times as fast and cross-border trade in shares ten times as fast. The trend towards globalisation is clear. But its extent can be. exaggerated. Consider in turn the markets for products, capital and workers. One measure of the extent to which product markets are integrated is the ratio of trade to output. This has increased sharply in most countries since 1950. But by this measure Britain and France are only slightly more open to trade today than they were in 1913, while Japan is less open now than then. Another gauge of the degree оf product-market integration is the extent to which prices converge across countries. In theory, free trade should push prices together as competition forces high-cost producers to lower their prices. Studies show, however, that large divergences in price often persist for long periods. Laptop computers and Levi’s jeans, for example, are consistently cheaper in America than in Europe or Japan. This reflects a variety of factors, including tastes, transport costs, differences in taxes and inefficient distribution networks. But some of the difference is due to the persistence of import barriers. Product markets are still nowhere near as integrated across borders as they are within nations. Consider the example of trade between the United States and Canada, one of the least restricted trading borders in the world. On average, trade between a Canadian province and an American state is 20 times smaller than domestic trade between two Canadian provinces, after adjusting for distance and income levels. For all the talk about a single market, the Canadian and American markets remain substantially segmented from one another. For other countries this is truer still. The financial markets are not yet truly integrated either. Despite the newfound popularity of international investing, capital markets were by some measures more integrated at the start of this century than they are now. During the 30 years before the first world war, when most currencies were tied to gold, huge sums flooded from Western Europe into North America, Argentina and Australia. The net outflow of capital from Britain (i.e. its current-account surplus) averaged 5 % of GDP over the period 1880-1913, reaching almost 10 % of GDP at its peak. In comparison, Japan’s notoriously «excessive» current-account surplus has averaged only 2-3 % of GDP over the past decade. Foreign direct investment, involving control of businesses or property across national borders, is no new phenomenon either. Today, it equals about 6 % of the total domestic investment of rich economies. In the decade before 1914, by contrast, direct investments of British capitalists abroad were almost as big as their direct investments at home. Home work While product and capital markets have become increasingly integrated, labour markets have not. Tens of millions of people currently work outside their home countries. Yet labour is less mobile than it was in the second half of the 19th century, when some 60m people left Europe for the New World. Even within the European Union, which gives citizens of any member state the right to work and live in any other, only a small proportion of workers ventures across national borders. Language, cultural barriers, and incompatible educational and professional qualifications all combine to keep labour markets national. This does not mean that globalisation is just a myth. In some new and different ways the world economy is becoming more internationally integrated that it was at the turn of the century. For one thing, large parts of the world did not participate in the pre-1914 global economy. Today, more economies than ever before have opened their borders to trade and investment. Not only developed countries, but developing in Asia and Latin America have embraced market-friendly reforms. A second difference is that whereas 19th -century globalisation was driven by falling transport costs, it is now being driven by plunging communication costs. This has created new ways to organise firms at a global level, with closer international integration than in the past. Cheap and efficient communication networks allow firms to locate different parts of their production process in different countries while remaining in close contact. Modern information technology also reduces the need for physical contact between producers and consumers and therefore allows some previously untradable services to be traded. Any activity that can be conducted on a screen or over the telephone, from writing software to selling airline tickets, can be carried out anywhere in world, linked to head office by satellite and computer. Even medical advice or education can now be sold at a distance over telecoms networks. A third difference is that although net flows of global capital may be smaller than in the past, gross international financial flows are much bigger. Cross-border sales and purchases of bonds and equities by American investors have also risen. As yet, the world economy is still far from being genuinely integrated. In future, however, new technology is likely to encourage further integration. The Internet and its companion technologies, for example, are expected to help to make markets more transparent, allowing buyers and sellers to compare prices in different countries. Telecommunication prices will fall even more sharply over the next decade. So technology will continue to power the globalisation train. This poses a challenge for governments. By allowing more efficient use of world resources, globalisation should boost average incomes. However, the costs and the benefits will be unevenly distributed. Many people - notably unskilled manufacturing workers in rich economies - will find the demand for their labour falling as the jobs they used to do are performed more cheaply abroad. This raises the risk of a political backlash against free trade and capital flows. Could the trend towards globalisation be reversed a second time ? Doing so might be more difficult than before. New technology and new types of financial instruments make it tricky for governments to impose effective capital controls. Likewise, the growth of multinational firms that can switch production from one country to another would make it harder to erect effective trade barriers. New technology also creates distribution channels that protectionist governments will find it hard to block. A French government that wanted to shelter its film industry from American competition by restricting imports may find it impossible to stop foreign films being beamed by satellite or passed over the Internet. Foreign films will be able to squeeze through electronic windows that cannot be closed. Another reason to suppose that globalisation is more durable this time around is that free trade is built upon firmer institutional foundations than earlier in this century. At that time, free trade proceeded largely through bilateral treaties rather than multilateral institutions such as the WTO. Withdrawal from the WTO would not be done lightly. Nonetheless, past experience shows how quickly faith in markets and openness can be overwhelmed by big economic shocks, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s. Faced with another severe downturn, some governments may still be foolish enough to try to use protectionism and capital controls to shield workers and firms from global forces. That would also shield economies from powerful sources of growth. VOCABULARY 1. globalisation глобализация, интеграция мировой экономики 2. cross-border межнациональный, международный 3. productivity производительность труда 4 . living standard (s) жизненный уровень 5 . division of labour разделение труда 6 . economies of scale экономия на масштабе 7 . productive investment эффективные инвестиции в развитие производства. 8 . flows (of goods, capital, e.t.c.) движение, потоки (товаров, капитала и т.д.) 9 . trade barriers торговые барьеры 10 . protectionism протекционизм 11 . restrictions ограничения 12 . Great Depression Великая депрессия 13 . slump экономический спад 14 . capital control (s) ограничение движения капитала 15 . fixed exchange rate (s) твердый валютный курс (ы) 16 . Bretton Woods (system) Бреттонвудское соглашение о системе твердых валютных курсов 17 . General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Генеральное соглашение по тарифам и торговле (ГАТТ) 18 . World Trade Organisation (WTO) Всемирная торговая организация (ВТО) 19 . to «float» «плавать» (о валютных курсах) 20 . floating exchange rates плавающие валютные курсы 21 . inflow of capital приток капитала 22 . outflow of capital отток капитала 23 . liberalisation либерализация 24 . product market товарные рынки 25 . ratio of trade to output (со)отношение объема торговли к объему выпуска продукции 26 . inefficient distribution network неэффективная сеть сбыта (реализации товаров и услуг) 27 .current account surplus положительное сальдо платежного баланса по текущим операциям 28 . capital market рынок капитала 29 . labour market рынок рабочей силы 4. Переведите отрывок « Old News » с английского на русский язык. 5. Напишите и аннотацию к данному тексту. Text B. 1. Прочитайте и переведите следующий текст: EXPAND THE DEBATE ON GLOBALISATION. Asia’s financial crisis is stoking the debate over globalization. It can be a whirlwind of trade and in­vestment that builds economies and spurs develop­ment in even the world’s poorest nations. But it can also bring economies low overnight. Globalization’s effects have been overwhelmingly good. Spurred by unprecedented liberalization, world trade con­tinues to expand faster than overall global economic output, inducing a wave of productivity and efficiency and creating millions of jobs. Even more impressive is the stunning in­crease in international investment that is building roads, air­ports and factories in poorer countries. In the 1990s alone, foreign investors have poured $1 trillion into developing economies. This trade and in­vestment is raising living stan­dards in some countries faster than many thought possible. Until recently, it took at least two generations for living standards to double, but in China, living standards now double every 10 years. But while globalization has raised living standards for many, it has made life more difficult for those dislocated by change and it threatens to leave part of the world behind. It is no coincidence that the disappointing economic performance in much of Sub-Saharan Africa reflects a failure to integrate into the world econ­omy and, thus, to trade successfully and attract investment. The foremost challenge of globalization is to ensure that its fruits extend to all countries. Most forecasts say that eco­nomic growth in the developed world will continue to slow, and that expanding markets in developing countries are needed to ensure that living standards continue to rise. The second challenge of globalization is to allay the fear that the growth it brings is inherently destabilizing. The Asian crisis, threatening some of the most formidable eco­nomic competitors in the world, amplifies these fears. Nev­ertheless, the costs of being left behind by globalization are usually much greater than the losses caused by instability. The third challenge of globalization is to address the con­cern in wealthier nations that international competition will harm living standards. There is ample evidence that stagnant wages in the United States and unemployment in Europe have other causes - technological change, poor education, Europe’s inflexible labor markets, high taxes and an aging workforce. But polls show more and more people believe the causes lie in worldwide trade and investinent. This undermines the kind of leadership needed to respond to the Asian financial crisis and deal with other global pioblems. The fourth challenge of globalization is to tackle the problems complicated by expanded trade and investment-environmental degradation, disease, migration, crime and terrorism. Our ability to confront this set of new, post-Cold War challenges will require greater global cooperation. There is no doubt that globalization of trade and investment has in some ways weakened the independence of national governments and made life less predictable for many individuals. But those who would erect barriers to trade and investment to try to recapture an earlier era of independence confuse the cause and effect of globalization. In pursuit of higher living standards, we have created this new world of global markets and instant communication to deliver gains in efficiency and compe­tition that are beyond the powers of national governments. The goal is not.to disenfran-disenfranchise the individual, but to lower costs, broaden choices, deliver more capital and open more markets, giving the indi­vidual more power to control his or her destiny. The challenges raised by globalization yield no easy an­swers. They strain the abilities of national governments to confront them independently. VOCABULARY 1 . to stoke debate вызывать бурные споры 2 . whirlwind of trade and investment высокая степень активизации мировой торговли и инвестиций 3 . challenges of globalisation 1) движущие силы глобализации; 2) цели (задачи), возникающие в условиях глобализации (обеспечить, достичь, преодолеть и т.д. в зависимости от контекста) 4 . to address the concern ... зд. решить проблемы, которые вызывают беспокойство (заняться проблемами...) 5 . to tackle the problems решить проблемы 6 . post Cold - War challenges зд. проблемы и тенденции в период после холодной войны 7 . disenfranchise лишить гражданских прав зд. Лишить национальных различий. 8. overall global economic output общемировой ВВП 2. Напищите аннотацию к данному тексту. Text C. 1. Прочитайте и найдите ключевые слова и предложения в следующем тексте: GLOBAL CAPITALISM, R.I.P.? Much of the world simply does not have the values needed for free markets. We pretended otherwise. Now comes the reckoning. Tumbling world stock markets contained a large, though muffled, mes­sage: global capitalism - whose triumph once seemed inevitable - is now in full re­treat, perhaps for many years. Who would have guessed this? After the cold war, global capitalism offered a pow­erful vision of world prosperity and, ulti­mately, democracy. Multinational compa­nies and investors would pour technology and capital into poorer regions, creating a transnational mass market of middle-class consumers who would drive Toyotas, watch CNN, eat Big Macs - and, inciden­tally, demand more freedom. World trade and investment did indeed surge, but not with the expected consequences. Global capitalism is now destabilizing the economies of poor countries and inflicting large losses on investors in rich countries. Worse are the collapses of economies around the world. The only good news is that most Ameri­can economists think-perhaps naively - that the United States will avoid a reces­sion. The Blue Chip Economic Indictors survey of 49 economists finds only one pre­dicting a slump. “Demand is strong, inflation is low and employment is high,” says Joel Prakken of Macroeconomic Ad­visers. But dangers are rising. Exports could disappoint, because economies in Latin America and Canada are weakening. With Asia, these areas buy nearly three quarters of U.S. exports. And economists may underestimate how much the dropping stock market demoral­izes consumers and cuts their spending. David Wyss of Standard & Poor’s DRI says that the total value of U.S. stocks (the mar­ket’s “capitalization”) has dropped about $2 trillion since the market’s peak. Wyss fig­ures that consumers reduce current spend­ing by 2.5 cents for each dollar of stock loss­es. The math: 2.5 percent of $2 trillion is $50 billion. That’s less than I percent of GDP. What might undo such estimates? Perhaps this: because more Americans own stocks than ever, the adverse effect could be larger than ever. But however the U.S. economy fares, global capitalism is under siege. The idea was to open up markets to trade and for­eign investment. But some markets were being shut. What went wrong? On one level, the answer is simple. Countries became overdependent on foreign capital, which, having entered in huge amounts, is trying to leave the same way. What initially triggered the reversal was the recognition that much for­eign money had been squandered through «crony capitalism» or misguided industrial policies. Asia was dotted with empty office buildings and surplus factories. Overseas banks refused to renew their loans; mutual-fund investors sold shares and converted their funds back into dollars. But now the fear of capital flight is feeding on itself - and spreading to Latin America. If people fear the Mexican peso will be devalued, they may convert pesos into dollars. The frightened include locals, not just foreign investors. But countries need hard currencies to pay for imports; and they can’t afford a depositor run on their banks. High interest rates are one way to halt the process by rewarding people for keeping funds in local currencies. The trouble, of course, is that punitive in­terest rates also crush local economies. If a few economies face this squeeze, it’s their problem; if many economies do, it’s everyone’s problem. This is happening. The threat of capital flight has shoved so many countries toward austerity that it’s inducing a worldwide slump. And, again, the process feeds on itself. Feeble economic growth has de­pressed prices of raw-material exports. Earning less abroad, the raw-material exporters must slow their economies to cut imports. This depresses U.S. exports and the profits of multinational companies operating in these countries. Thus does the Third World’s distress threaten the First World’s stock markets and prosperity. But global capitalism’s failure demands a deeper explanation. After all, capitalism is supposed to excel at allocating investment funds efficiently. In this case, it didn’t. The deeper explanation is that market capitalism is not just an economic system. It is also a set of cultural values that emphasizes the virtue of competition, the legitimacy of profit and the value of freedom. These values are not universally shared. Other countries have organized economic systems around different values and politics. As a result, spreading capitalism is not simply an exercise in economic engineering. It is an assault on other nations’ culture and politics that almost guarantees a collision. Even when countries adopt some trappings of capitalism, they may not embrace the basic values that make the system work. This is what happened. Led by the U.S., global agencies (the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund) sought to persuade poorer countries to become more open to trade and global capital. These countries tried to maximize the benefits of the process while minimizing changes to their politics and commerce. Mutual deception flourished. Countries like Korea and Russia pretended that they were changing more than they had. American, European and Japanese bankers, executives and government officials pretended the claims were true—or might become true. Loans were made on the basis of incomplete or faulty financial statements. Or they were made on the faith that, if a loan went sour, someone (the government, the IMF) would cover the losses. Global capitalism became a dangerous hybrid. On the one hand, investors committed huge sums and expected high returns. On the other, the money often went - through bank loans, bond issues and stock offerings - to borrowers who were not operating by strict rules of efficiency or profit and loss. “Crony” capitalism often meant corruption: contracts won with bribes; favoritism for the well-connected. But capital flowed freely while optimism and self-decep­tion prevailed. Banks collected interest on loans. “Emerging market” mutual funds rose, be­cause local stocks were buoyed by new investment money. While everyone enjoyed prof­its, there was a suspension of disbelief. Now comes the reck­oning. Capital flight has forced most developing countries to scramble to conserve scarce foreign exchange. All their choices are bad. Still, some U.S. economists see currency con­trols as a temporary way of avoiding high-interest rate aus­terity. A gentler way to achieve the same result would be debt relief: global bankers would write down loans, easing the re­payment burden. But so far, banks have shown little inter­est. A third approach is to at­tract new long-term capital to replace old short-term capital. But developing coun­tries are reluctant to sell too much of their economic bases to foreigners at fire-sale prices. Countries cannot expand their economies unless they replenish their foreign-exchange reserves of hard currencies. The IMF- which provides temporary hard-currency loans - has focused only on “reforms” that would enable countries to attract new capital. It might also usefully emphasize debt relief so that the burden of bad lending would be shared between creditors and debtors. But preventing an American or European slump is no less important; either one would deepen the world economy’s down­turn. The danger might ease if the Federal Reserve and Germany’s Bundesbank lowered interest rates. As yet, they show no signs of doing so. Even if the worst doesn’t occur, the world will never be the same. Global capi­talism won’t soon regain its aura of infalli­bility. There was nothing wrong with the theory. Free trade and the free movement of capital would, in a world where every­one worshiped efficiency and profits, en­rich all nations. The trouble is that we do not live in such a world. VOCABULARY 1 . R.I.P. (requiescat in pace = rest in peace) покойся в мире (надгробная надпись) 2 . transnational mass market транснациональный широкий рынок 3 . destabilizing дестабилизирующий, нарушающий стабильность 4 . inflicting large losses приводящий к значительным убыткам 5 . collapses of economies зд. резкое ухудшение экономических показателей в странах 6 . Blue Chip Economic Indictors обзор (анализ) деятельности ведущих компаний (США) 7 . total value of U.S. stocks общая стоимость акций компаний США 8 . capitalization капитализация 9 . «crony capitalism» зд. капитализм, основанный на личных связях 10 . surplus factories зд. Неиспользованные производственные мощности 11 . mutual fund взаимные (паевые) фонды 12 . to convert конвертировать (валюту) 13 . capital flight зд. отток капитала 14 . ... «a depositor run on their banks» зд. ... «изъятие вкладов из их банков» 15 . interest rate ссудный процент 16 . austerity жесткие меры 17 . economic engineering зд. управление экономикой; проведение определенной экономической политики 18 . finacial statements финансовые отчеты 19 . sour loan (bad loan) непогашенный займ 20 . to cover losses покрывать (компенсировать) убытки 21 . return (s) доход (ы) 22 . bond issue (s) выпуск облигаций 23 . stock offering (s) выпуск новых акций 24 . corruption коррупция 25 . debt relief списание или отсрочка долговых обязательств 26 . long-term capital долгосрочные инвестиции (капитал) 27 . short-term capital краткосрочные инвестиции (капитал) 28 . fire-sale prices «бросовые» цены; заниженные цены 29 . foreign-exchange reserves валютные резервы; резервы иностранной валюты 30 . hard currency твердая валюта 2. Переведите текст. 3. Напишите и аннотацию к данному тексту. « Globalisation » Topics for discussion 1. The growing integration of national economies is said to have changed the way the world works. 2. The extent of globalisation is exaggerated. 3. Today’s international economic integration is not unprecedented. 4. New technology creates distribution channels that protectionist governments will find it hard to block. 5. Free trade is built upon firmer multilateral institutional foundations (ex. WTO). 6. An attemp to shield economies in face of another crisis would also shield them from powerful sources of growth. 7. Tumbling world stock markets have sent a message: global capitalism is now in full retreat. UNIT II. WORLD TRADE Text A. TRADE WINDS. 1. Дайте ответы на следующие 1.What is world trade? вопросы без предварительного 2. Is international trade the most obvious чтения текста : manifistation of a globalising world economy ? 2. Дайте ответы на следующие 1. Why does it make sense for вопросы после беглого просмотра countries to trade goods and services ? текста : 2. How much trade do they do ? 3. And why are there obstacles to freer trade ? 3. Прочитайте и найдите ключевые слова и предложения в следующем тексте: TRADE WINDS. Time was when trade flows were of interest mainly economic to experts and executives of big corporations. But over the past few years, the movement goods and services across national boundaries has become the subject of intense public attention all over the world. To the public at large, trade is the most obvious manifestation of a globalising world economy. Measured by the volume of imports and exports, the world economy has become increasingly integrated in the years since the second world war. A fall in barriers to trade has helped stimulate this growth. The volume of world merchandise trade is now about 16 times what it was in 1950, while the world’s total output is only five-and-a-half times as big. The ratio of world exports to GDP has climbed from 7% to 15%. Virtually all economists, and most politicians, would agree that freer trade has been a blessing. However, the economists and politicians would probably give quite different reasons for thinking so. Politicians, by and large, praise greater trade because it means more exports. This, in turn, purportesly means more jobs - and, if the exports involve sophisticated products such as cars or jet engines, more “good” jobs. The American government, zealous to promote exports, has even produced estimates that try to show how many new jobs are created by each $1 billion of American sales abroad. This is misleading. A big ex­port order may well cause an in­dividual company to add work­ers, but it will have no effect on a country’s total employment, which is determined mainly by how fast the economy can ex­pand without risking inflation and by microeconomic obsta­cles, such as taxes that deter em­ployers from hiring or workers from seeking jobs. America, where exports are a relatively small fraction of GDP, has fuller employment than Germany, where exports loom larger. Gains from trade To economists, the real benefits of trade lie in importing rather than in exporting. Politicians fre­quently urge consumers to fa­vour domestically made goods, and portray a widening trade deficit as a Bad Thing. But econo­mists know that the only reason for exporting is to earn the wherewithal to import. As James Mill, one of the first trade theo­rists, explained in 1821: The benefit which is derived from exchanging one commodity for an­other, arises, in all cases, from the commodity received, not the com­modity given. This benefit arises even if one country can make everything more cheaply than all others. The basic theory that explains this, the principle of comparative ad­vantage, has existed since Mill’s day. His contemporary, David Ricardo, usually gets the credit for expounding it. To see how this theory works, think about why two countries - call them East and West - might gain from trading with one an­other. Suppose, for simplicity, that each has 1,000 workers, and each makes two goods: computers and bicycles. West’s economy is far more productive than East’s. To make a bicycle, West needs the labour of two workers; East needs four. To make a computer, West uses ten workers while East uses 100. Suppose that there is no trade, and that in each country half the workers are in each industry. West produces 250 bicycles and 50 computers. East makes 125 bikes and five computers. Now suppose that the two countries specialise. Although West makes both bikes and com­puters more efficiently than East, it has a bigger edge in computer-making. It now devotes most of its resources to that industry, em­ploying 700 workers to make computers and only 300 to make bikes. This raises computer out­put to 70 and cuts bike produc­tion to 150. East switches entirely to bicycles, turning out 250. World output of both goods has risen. Both coun­tries can consume more of both if they trade. At what price? Neither will want to import what it could make more cheaply at home. So West will want at least five bikes per computer; and East will not give up mpre than 25 bikes per computer. Suppose the terms of trade are fixed at 12 bicycles per computer and that 120 bikes are exchanged for ten computers. Then West ends up with 270 bikes and 60 computers, and East with 130 bicycles and ten computers. Both are better off than they would be if they did not trade. This is true even though West has an “absolute advantage” in making both computers and bikes. The reason is that each country has a different “compar­ative advantage”. West’s edge is greater in computers than in bi­cycles. East, although a costlier producer in both industries, is a relatively less-expensive maker of bikes. So long as each country specialises in products in which it has a comparative advantage, both will gain from trade. Fair deal Some critics of trade say that this theory misses the point. They ar­gue that trade with developing countries, where wages tend to be lower and work hours longer than in Europe and North Amer­ica, is “unfair”, and will wipe out jobs in high-wage countries. It is generally accepted that trade with poor countries has been one of the factors reducing the wages of unskilled workers, relative to skilled ones, in the United States. That said, the threat to rich-country workers from developing-country com­petition is often overstated. For a start, it is important not to confuse absolute and compar­ative advantage. Even if develop­ing countries were cheaper pro­ducers of everything under the sun, they could not have a com­parative advantage in every­thing. There would still be work for people in high-wage coun­tries to do. Moreover, it is not true that countries with cheap labour al­ways have lower costs. Wage dif­ferences generally reflect differ­ences in productivity; com­panies in low-wage countries often need far more labour to produce a given amount of out­put, and must deal with less effi­cient communications and transportation systems. In most cases hourly wages are not deci­sive in determining where a product is made. Suppose that the “fair trad­ers” succeed in eradicating inter­national differences in produc­tion costs, so that a given product cost precisely the same to make in different countries. In that case, no country would have a comparative advantage, and hence there would be no trade. Rich-country workers, who are also consumers, would lose. At first blush, real-world trade patterns would seem to challenge the theory of compara­tive advantage. Most trade oc­curs between countries which do not have huge cost differences. America’s biggest trading part­ner, for instance, is Canada. Well over half the exports from France, Germany and Italy go to other European Union coun­tries. Moreover, these countries sell similar things to each other: cars made in France are exported to Germany, while German cars go to France, dependent largely upon consumers’ differing tastes rather than differences in costs. The importance of geogra­phy and the role of similar but different products appealing to diverse tastes expand our under­standing of why trade occurs. But they do not overturn the funda­mental insight of the theory of comparative advantage. The ag­ricultural exports of Australia, say, or Saudi Arabia’s reliance on oil, clearly stem from their natu­ral resources. Poorer countries tend to have relatively more un­skilled labour, so they tend to ex­port simple manufactures, such as clothing. So long as relative production costs differ between countries, there are gains to be had from trade. Enter the state What is confusing, perhaps, is that comparative advantage is often the product of history and chance, not of differences in nat­ural resources or workers’ skills. A stark example is America’s civil-aircraft industry. There is no God-given reason why the production costs of jumbo jets, relative to other goods and ser­vices, should be lower in Amer­ica than in Japan. But they are: America’s early embrace of air­mail, its large purchases of mili­tary aircraft and the great public demand for air travel in a large country all helped American plane makers get big early on, al­lowing them to achieve per-plane costs lower than those of foreign competitors. A logical question follows: if comparative advantage can be created, why should govern­ments not help create it? The idea is that through subsidies, such as those given by several Eu­ropean nations to finance the European-made Airbus passen­ger jets, governments can pro­mote their own national cham­pions and hobble foreign rivals. Since the late 1970 S. a stream of theoretical research has shown that governments can use such “strategic trade policy”, in prin­ciple, to make their own citizens better off. The theoretical work, how­ever, has shed little light on how, in practice, governments can se­lect which industries to subsi­dise - and which to tax in order to finance the subsidy - so that, in the end, the country’s welfare is improved. And then there is the matter of politics: once the government has agreed to sup­port “strategic” industries, every industry will assert its strategic importance in order to share in the pie. Under real-world politi­cal pressures, the allure of strate­gic trade policy fades quickly. Governments’ intervention in trade is not limited to fine cal­culations of strategy. There is plenty of aid to politically sensi­tive industries, such as agricul­ture. And governments often rush to obstruct “unfair” compe­tition from abroad. Anti-dumping duties are a case in point. In theory, these are intended to keep foreign produc­ers from “dumping” goods abroad at less than their cost of production, by subjecting the goods to extra import duties. In practice, they are a politically neat method of protecting a par­ticular industry. Once the favoured weapon of rich-world governments, anti-dumping du­ties have been been taken up ea­gerly by developing countries . Despite such machinations, world trade flows more freely than it used to. This is due mainly to international agree­ments under which govern­ments agree to forswear trade barriers - most notably, the Gen­eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). All told, there have been eight rounds of gatt talks since 1947, in which countries have cut their import tariffs. Tar­iffs on manufactured goods are now down to around 4% in in­dustrial countries. The most recent gatt round, the Uruguay round, ended in 1993. The Uruguay round did much more than cut tariffs on goods. It heralded a big institu­tional change, creating the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which now boasts 132 members, as a successor to GATT. It also made three big changes to the rules of world trade. First, it began the process of opening up the most heavily protected in­dustries, agriculture and textiles. Second, the Uruguay round vastly extended the scope of in­ternational trade rules. The rules were extended to cover services, as well as goods. New issues, such as the use of spurious technical barriers to keep out imports and the protection of foreigners’ “intellectual property”, such as patents and copyrights, were ad­dressed for the first time. Of these new agreements, the one in services is especially inter­esting. A lot of trade no longer in­volves putting things into a crate and sending them abroad on ships. Many services, can be traded internationally: a British construction firm can build an airport in Japan, and an Ameri­can insurance company can sell its products in Germany. Lots to talk about The WTO EStimates that commer­cial-service trade was worth $1.2 trillion in 1996, around one-quarter of the value of trade in goods. The services agreement, plus a recent deal on telecom­munications trade, should ease the barriers that limit such trade. The third change wrought by the Uruguay round was the cre­ation of a new system for settling disputes. In the past, countries could (and sometimes did) break GATT rules with impunity. Un­der the new system, decisions can be blocked only by a consen­sus of wto members. Once found guilty of breaking the rules (and after appeal) countries are supposed to mend their ways. This system so far seems to be working better than the old one, and is helping to build up the new institution’s credibility. Despite these recent ad­vances, there are plenty of diffi­culties ahead. China, the world’s second-biggest economy, and its 11th -biggest exporter, is not yet a member of the WTO, and talks on its accession have been diffi­cult. Some countries, such as America and France, would like to see the wto address itself to the relationships between trade, labour standards and the envi­ronment. Others, notably India and Malaysia, are opposed. In 1996 the WTO’S members agreed to study the issues, but there is no agreement about whether the wto should go further. VOCABULARY 1 . trade flows товарные потоки 2 . imports импортные товары (сравн. Import- импорт) 3 . exports экспортные товары (срав. export - экспорт) 4 . merchandise trade торговля товарами (в отличие от услуг) 5 . total output общий объем выпуска продукции 6 . the ratio of world exports to GDP отношение объема мирового экспорта к валовому внутреннему продукту 7 . sophisticated products высокотехнологические товары 8 . sales объем продаж 9 . microeconomic на микроэкономическом уровне 10 . the real benefits of trade реальные выгоды (преимущества), которые приносит торговля 11 . domestically made goods товары отечественного производства 12 . trade deficit дефицит торгового баланса 13 . commodity товар (главным образом сырьевые товары) 14 . the principle of comparative advantage принцип сравнительного преимущества 15 . it has a bigger edge in computer making имеет большее преимущество в производстве компьютеров 16 . terms of trade условия торговли 17 . absolute advantage абсолютное преимущество 18 . skilled (unskilled) workers квалифицированные/ неквалифицированные) рабочие 19 . manufactures готовые товары 20 . natural resources природные ресурсы 21 . costs издержки производства 22 . subsidies субсидии 23 . government intervention вмешательство государства 24 . politically sensitive industries отрасли важные с политической точки зрения 25 . anti-dumping duties анти-демпинговые пошлины 26 . dumping демпинг, продажа товаров за границей по заниженным ценам 27 . cost of production себестоимость 28 . by subjecting the goods to extra import duties облагая товары дополнительной импортной пошлиной 29 . spurious technical barriers зд. Искусственные (скрытые) технические барьеры 30 . intellectual property интеллектуальная собственность 31 . patents and copyrights патенты и авторские права 32 . putting things into a crate зд. Упаковать товары 33 . commercial-service trade торговля коммерческими услугами 4. Переведите отрывок «Enter the state». 5. Напишите и аннотацию к данному тексту. Text B. 1. Прочтите и переведите следующий текст: THE RACE FOR THE BOTTOM Cast your eye over a list of the bitterest trade rows of the past few years. Many concern not the traditional tools of protection, such as tariffs, import quotas and export subsidies, but differences in domestic regulations. For example, rules supposedly intended to protect consumers from dangerous products are some­times seen by foreigners as trade barriers. Plenty of America’s frequent spats with Japan stem from American companies’ inability to break down the ties between Japanese manufacturers, distributors and retailers; Japan’s antitrust authorities, the Americans say, are slack. Such disputes are likely to occur more often in future. One reason is the growth of international trade: as national econo­mies become more integrated, firms will complain more often about the rising cost of having to adapt to different rules in dif­ferent markets. More serious is the growing worry, es­pecially in America, that countries in which the regulation of labour standards tends to be weak, and protection of the environment scanty, will have an “un­fair” advantage in trade and in attracting direct inviestment. Some attribute the fall in the wages of unskilled American males, at a time when rich workers’ earnings have risen, to competition from countries with slacker regulations. Thus fear of regulatory protection on the one hand, and cheap imports on the other, is making some politicians, businessmen and labour leaders argue that more harmonisation of national standards would be a good thing. But would it? In some respects, per­haps. In a recent book Alan Sykes, a law professor at the University of Chicago, shows how national product standards and regulations can act as trade barriers. Frequently, he argues, there is no need for governments to intervene at all. The mar­ket can be relied upon to ensure, say, that software and computers are compatible, or that goods are of sufficient quality; if they are not, consumers will not buy them. In such instances, differences in na­tional regulations that are unnecessary in the first place are likely to hobble trade. Where regulation can be justified - for example, in ensuring that food is safe to eat or that children’s nightclothes are not inflammable - so might differences be­tween countries’ rules. The reason, says Mr Sykes, is that consumers’ preferences and incomes vary from one country to the next: just as the market might produce goods of lower quality in poorer coun­tries, or with differences tailored to na­tional tastes, so governments should re­spond in the same way. Yet such diversity has costs as well as benefits: firms find it expensive to ensure that their products comply with regula­tions in every country in which their wares are sold. Much of the time, reckons Mr Sykes, it is impossible to decide whether international differences are jus­tified. Sometimes, though, they clearly are not. Too often, they are designed to cod­dle local producers at the expense of for­eigners and the local consumers they are supposed to protect. In one celebrated example, the Thai government once used an anti-smoking campaign to justify taxes and restrictions on imported cigarettes - but not on locally made ones. A new paper by Jagdish Bhagwati, an economist at Columbia University in New York, examines the demands for re­ducing other forms of diversity: structural differences between economies, notably Japan’s keiretsu system of closely related companies; labour standards; and envi­ronmental rules. Not surprisingly to anyone familiar with Mr Bhagwati’s work, he finds them less than compelling. In part, he attributes America’s attacks on the structure of the Japanese economy, and its demands for stricter labour and green laws in poorer countries, to Ameri­ca’s diminishing share of world output. This makes it more reluctant to play by the rules of free trade. Green is good, but However, Mr Bhagwati also considers several more respectable motives for wanting harmonisation. Some Americans might argue that Mexico, say, should have higher standards of environmental protection, or tougher labour laws, because they believe that Mexicans have a right to the same air quality, or wages, as Americans. Or they might believe, out of concern for humanity as a whole, that Mexicans should do their bit to protect the global environment. Either way, some advocate the threat of trade sanctions to force Mexico to mend its ways. Mr Bhagwati says this is wrong. It is fine, he says, for lobbyists to ask their own governments to cough up for good causes. But in this instance, they are asking them to make foreigners do the coughing. That makes it likely that those who would benefit from such trade protection will try to put more demands on poorer countries. Moreover, sanctions may not lead to less pollution or better working conditions: if Mexico spends more on clean air than it can afford, or raises its labour standards, its ability to grow and improve its record later will be damaged. A further reason for wanting less diversity is a fear of a «race to the bottom» in environmental and labour standards. Multinational companies, the argument runs, will be attracted to countries with slack rules; countries where standards are high now will have to relax them or see factories close. The result ? Miserably paid workers everywhere, and a ruined planet. Maybe. Mr Bhagwati points out that the «bottom» is just one of several theoretically possible outcomes, and that the evidence of such a race is far from conclusive. If the American government wants to protect the environment and workers’ rights, he suggests, that rather than force poor countries to adopt higher standards, it would be better to require American firms operating abroad to adopt the same employment and environmental practices as they would at home. (Indeed, plenty already do.) If the idea is to make the planet greener and workers less poor, surely they would not object ? VOCABULARY 1 . harmonisation of national standards гармонизация (выравнивание) национальных стандартов 2 . to hobble trade препятствовать, мешать торговле 3 . wares товары 4 . to coddle local produces зд. защищать местных производителей 5 . diversity зд. различия 6 . keiretsu system = (cross-shareholding system) система взаимного владения акциями 7 . green laws законы, регулирующие защиту окружающей среды 2. Напишите и аннотацию по данной статье. Text C. 1. Прочтите и переведите следующий текст: SPOILLING WORLD TRADE. Ây the sorry standards of much of this century, world trade looks in rude health. In the 1930 S, protectionism helped poison the world economy. After the second world war, tariffs and other trade barriers fell too slowly. However, over the past decade, many of the restrictions that stifle interna­tional commerce have been relaxed - thanks in large part to the lengthy Uruguay round of GATT talks, completed in 1993. Since 1990 world trade has grown by 6% a year, com­pared with less than 4% a year in the 1980s. As if to confirm the importance that govern­ments now attach to the subject, there is now a World Trade Organisation (WTO), with 126 members, to police the new regime and to take the cause of free trade further into areas where there are still far too many restrictions, such as agriculture, services and investment. However, the greatest damage to free trads will be done by what is left often unmentioned: the threat “regionalism” poses to global trade. Thanks to the recent explosion of regional trade arrange­ments, whose members agree to liberalise trade among them­selves, the WTO is just one cook among many stirring the free-trade broth. Only a handful of the WTO’s members are not already part of some other local club. The European Union has 25 members and could soon have more. Some Americans are already looking for ways to meld together the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was formed with Mexico and Canada, with Mercosur, a customs union formed by four South American countries. Free-trade areas are planned in both South-East Asia and South Asia. And the 19-strong Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum has a grand plan for “free trade in the Pacific” by 2020. Put this way, it sounds like something to applaud.What is it about their cumulative effect that should give pause for thought? Most governments and many free traders believe that re­gional free-trade areas are a step in the right direction. Their defence is usually a mixture of economic principle, practical diplomacy and visionary politics. First, they ask, how can it be possible for countries to agree to scrap tar­iffs among themselves and not make trade freer? Then they argue that it is often easier to make a deal in a small group than in the un­wieldy WTO. And, finally, trade agreements, they say, are politically valuable: if countries are tied by commerce, they are less likely to start shooting at each other. The first of these arguments, plausible as it seems, is simply false. Regional “free-trade areas” need not make trade freer. By liberalis­ing trade only with their neighbours, coun­tries are by definition discriminating against those not lucky enough to be in the local club. Some goods will be imported from other members of the free-trade area at the expense of producers elsewhere; and members will begin to specialise in industries in which they lack comparative advantage. Thus, the EU has a bloated farming industry while many producers in poorer countries suffer from not being able to serve its markets; and NAFTA has complicated “rules of ori­gin” requirements, stipulating how much of a car needs to be made in Mexico to qualify as “NAFTAN”, and so enter Amer­ica tariff-free. It is always better to liberalise without discrimi­nation than to open up only to neighbours; sometimes, selec­tive opening is worse than doing nothing at all. The argument that, despite this danger, regional free trade ar­eas represent a speedier, more practical way to proceed than does the WTO, is also open to question. True, the Uruguay round lasted more than seven years, and even now govern­ments are struggling to finish off some outstanding negotia­tions, but slow progress bedevils regional arrangements, too. Despite much talk about expansion, the membership of NAFTA is stuck at three. APEC is moving at a glacial pace. Simi­larly, although the local clubs sometimes broach subjects long before the WTO (for instance, NAFTA has a treaty on foreign direct investment), they can also introduce possible bugbears (NAFTA also contains worrying agreements on standards for labour and environmental protection). Moreover, the standard against which each regional trade pact needs to be measured has, mercifully, been raised. Back in the 1950s, the idea of a customs union in Europe (even if it was linked to an idea as awful as the common agricultural policy) was attractive because the alternative (no customs union at all) was plainly worse. Now, the emergence of the WTO has raised the hurdle: the architects of regional agree­ments know they will have to defend their plans against the charge of setting back liberal trade, and adjust their plans ac­cordingly. That is fine, but it raises a question: would it not be simpler, after all, to make these deals at the WTO? That leaves the last “political” argument - that bodies such as APEC and Mercosur have brought old enemies together. So they have. Again, however, would this be any less true of broader multilateral agreements? And there are limits to how far the goal of international amity, worthy as it is, should be used to justify economic lunacy. Invoking France’s post-war friendship with Germany seems an odd way to defend the EU’s limits on imports of Argentine chocolate. If governments paid more attention to the threat of regionalism, that would be an exellent start. One excuse for their not doing so is that the WTO’s own system for policing regional trade agreements is a mess. At present, each new free-trade area or customs union is appraised by a committee, open to all members and with extremely vague terms of refer­ence. Unsurprisingly, only six of the 70-odd committees formed since GATT began have ever reached a firm conclu­sion. It would be much better if agreements were examined by a smaller team of independent scrutineers with a precise mandate to assess the effect on world trade - and, in particular, the way that the new agreement treats outsiders. It can be hard to say whether any free-trade area is so restrictive that its costs outweigh its benefits - though Mercosur, by some calculations, fails the test, and the case for the new ASEAN agreements also looks weak. Most agreements are a mixture of good and bad. The long-term challenge for the ministers about to meet in Singapore is thus twofold: to change the worst details in their own regional deals; and, even more important, to press ahead with multilateral trade liberalisation in the WTO. Governments now have a chance to make this new institution the strong catalyst for liberal trade which they have long said they wanted. They should seize the opportunity. VOCABULARY 1 . to liberalise trade либерализировать торговлю; устранить ограничения 2 . North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Североамериканское соглашение о свободной торговле (НАФТА) 3 . Mercosur таможенный союз 4-х южноамериканских стран (Меркосур) 4 . Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Азиатскотихоокеанское экономическое сотрудничество 5 . «rules of origin» правила происхождения (товара) 6 . outstanding negotiations зд. незавершенные переговоры 7 . multilateral agreements многосторонние соглашения 8 . ASEAN Association of South East Asia nations Ассщциация государств Юго-Восточной Азии 2. Напишите и аннотаацию данного текста.. «World Trade» Topics for discussion 1. International trade is the most obvious manifistation of a globalising world. 2. Free trade is a blessing. 3. So long as each country specialises in products in which it has a comparative advantage, it will gain from trade. 4. Comparative advantage can be created through subsidies and «strategic trade policy». 5. International differences in market regulation, enviromental protection and competition policy are often said to make trade «unfair». 6. «Regionalism» poses the greatest threat to free trade. UNIT III. ECONOMIC AND MONETARY POLICY. THE FUTURE OF THE STATE ECONOMIC POLICY Text A. BEARING THE WEIGHT OF THE MARKET ? 1. Дайте ответы на следующие 1. Have the growing international flows вопросы без предварительного of goods, services and money чтения текста : diminished the power of the state ? 2. Дайте ответы на следующие 1. Does the growing world integration вопросы после беглого просмотра reduce the freedom of governments текста : to act ? 2. What are the instruments of government involvement in the economy ? 3. Прочитайте следующий текст и найдите ключевые слова и предложения в каждом абзаце: BEARING THE WEIGHT OF THE MARKET ? Most people in the ad­vanced economies seem willing to accept, most of the time, that economic integration through international flows of trade and finance is a good thing. They acknowledge, for instance, that foreign investment can help poor economies to modernise, and that international compe­tition helps to raise productivity and, at least in the aggregate, in­comes as well. Yet people also recognise the costs, such as unemployment or lower wages, that integration may force on particular groups at certain times. When weighing these costs of globalisation against the benefits, economists typically point to the role of government. Through taxes and public spending, they say, soci­eties can use some of the extra in­come created by globalisation to cushion the losers. In principle, governments could go further, ensuring that everybody ended up better off. Which is very reas­suring - unless it turns out that integration itself reduces the freedom of governments to act. The view that globalisation makes it harder for governments to govern has come to be widely accepted. The basic idea is sim­ple enough. Globalisation adds to the reach and power of the market: now even governments, not just firms and people, must bow down before the new mas­ter of worldwide competition. A government might want to prohibit dangerous or unde­sirable working practices, for in­stance. But if it did, the affected industries might move abroad or shut down, because the new regulation could put domestic firms at a disadvantage in com­petition with foreign producers. Or suppose the government wants to raise taxes and spend­ing. However popular more pub­lic spending may be with voters, the market might well forbid it. In the new global economy, peo­ple and firms can flee to other tax jurisdictions rather than paying an onerous tax. Governments do not even have their former freedom to de­sign their own social policies, the argument continues. The finan­cial markets now sit as judge; if they deem that a new national health-care scheme or a massive education reform will prove too costly, they will punish the coun­try with higher interest rates or a collapsing currency. In this way global market forces not only rule out the kind of compensa­tion to losers that would make globalisation easier to live with, they also seem to challenge de­mocracy itself. If this thinking were correct, there would be good reason to oppose further globalisation, or to regret that the process has gone as far as it has. But it is not correct. In part it is muddled and in part it is simply wrong. New thinking During the 1980s, and especially since the collapse of the Soviet empire at the end of the decade, governments have changed the way they think about the role of the state. The failure of commu­nism rattled faith even in far milder forms of socialism. Governments had also learned from experience: evi­dence down the years suggested that ambitious economic inter­vention was often unsuccessful. Politicians in rich and poor countries alike, regardless of whether they were of “the left” or “the right”, began calling for lower taxes and public spending, for lighter regulation of industry, for privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and in general for their economies to be given greater “flexibility”. In other words, governments have freely chosen to give market forces more sway, in the hope that this will raise living stan­dards. It is odd therefore to say that the global economy has seized power from the state - and it is plain wrong to say that dem­ocratic rights have been trampled on. Many would argue, however, that things are not so simple. Having started to liberalise their economies, governments were left with less power than they had expected. And having sur­rendered more control than they meant to, politicians found they could not go back. As a result, ac­cording to this view, globalisation is running out of control. Governments themselves have done a lot to foster this idea. Nowadays no statement on eco­nomic policy is complete, it seems, without a declaration of impotence which says, in effect, “Our plans reflect not what we would like to do, but what the global market requires us to do.” Advancing technology adds to the sense of helplessness. Things that governments could once for­bid or restrict -foreign borrow­ing; imports of computer soft­ware; pornography; political ideas - are now far harder to con­trol because moderm communi­cations have eroded the bound­aries between nations. It is true that when technol­ogy and liberalisation come to­gether,governments can be taken by surprise. Anomalies ap­pear, sometimes requiring further deregulation, at other times quiring new forms of regulation that previously mattered little. It is also true that governments have sometimes done the right things in the wrong order; liberalising cross-border flows of capital without updating regulation of the banking industry, for example, is one of the factors behind the recent series of finan­cial crises in Asia. One of the clearest examples of an apparently small measure of deregulation having larger consequences was Britain’s abolition of exchange controls in 1979. This let banks combine foreign capital and new financial technology, and thus compete more vigorously both with each other and with non-bank lend­ers, such as building societies. Soon, to enable these other lenders to fight back on equal terms, more rules had to be scrapped. This caused new problems - and so the process went on, until the rules that separated banks and building societies had been en­tirely removed. This inadvertently radical deregulation, and the financial competition it en­gendered, was instrumental in Britain’s boom and bust of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Even so, the view that govern­ments today stand helpless be­fore the gale of international market forces is a gross exaggera­tion. Certainly, it is often a useful idea for governments to take up - what more powerful argu­ment could there be against those opposing any given change of policy than to say “we have no choice”? But, useful as the claim may be, the evidence shows that it is not in fact true. Like Topsy The best and simplest measure of a government’s involvement in the economy is public spend­ing. In rich industrial countries this has followed a persistently upward trend since the latter part of the 19th century. Public spending increased as a share of national income in the 40 years before the first world war, a time when the world econ­omy was arguably more open to trade and international flows of capital than it is today. Between 1918 and 1939, when barriers to trade and capital flows were high, spending as a share of na­tional income rose further. Since the second world war, as econo­mies have once more been opened to the outside world, the trend of rising expenditure has continued. The in­crease in the economic role of the state has been especially rapid since 1960. True, many governments have tried hard to cut their out­lays and their budget deficits of late. By and large, however, they have succeeded only in slowing, not reversing, the rate of growth of spending. Where budget defi­cits have been reduced, this has been done more by raising taxes than by curbing expenditure. On average, public spending in the advanced economies is bigger in relation to national income than it was in 1990. Even in the un­usual case of Britain, after nearly 20 years of strenuous efforts to roll back the state, public spend­ing accounts for about the same share of the national income as it did in 1980. On the face of it, this is puz­zling. Over the long term, a gov­ernment’s ability to spend is lim­ited by its ability to raise taxes. In the past 20 years, better interna­tional communications and freer movement of capital should have made it easier for taxpayers to avoid high-tax juris­dictions, putting downward pressure on public spending. Why does this appear not to have happened in a significant way? The answer is partly that tax­payers remain less mobile than one might think. Financial capi­tal, to be sure, now moves in­stantly from country to country. But once capital has been turned into physical assets such as buildings or equipment, moving it is costly. Governments may grant tax preferences to attract new capital to their countries, but they can continue to tax the profits from physical capital that is already in place. Labour, in any case, remains far less mobile than capital -rooted by ties of family, culture and language. In recent years, therefore, many governments have reduced their rates of com­pany taxation (as well as grant­ing special concessions for new investment), and have shifted the burden on to people instead. Taxes on wages and salaries have risen. This has more than made up for the fall in reve­nues due to lower company taxes. Extremely high rates of per­sonal taxation in many coun­tries, notably in Europe, confirm that people cannot readily es­cape the clutches of high-spend­ing governments. It is true that competition among governments has changed the structure of personal taxes in many countries, as the extremely high rates paid by the highest-in­come taxpayers have been cut. So far, however, this has failed to reduce the overall tax burden. Only in the most ex­treme cases - such as Sweden, where public spending reached 71% of national income in 1993 - has emigration of high-income taxpayers forced a retrenchment (and even then only a compara­tively modest one) on the government. Free to borrow So much for taxes and spending. What about public borrowing and monetary policy? It is often argued that today’s global mar­ket for capital applies a particu­larly severe discipline in these ar­eas. Again, this is misleading. In the first instance, greater mobil­ity of capital gives governments more freedom of manoeuvre in fiscal policy, not less. By borrow­ing from abroad, they are able to let their spending exceed their revenues by more and for longer than would be possible if their economies were closed to inter­national finance. Of course, if they abuse this freedom, capital markets will turn against them, and raise the offenders’ cost of borrowing. But this is only like saying that peo­ple who run up too big a bank overdraft will be offered poor terms for further loans. The fact remains that an overdraft facility increases financial freedom, it does not reduce it. Admittedly, living with fi­nancial freedom can be more complicated than living without it. In particular, the extreme mo­bility of modern financial capi­tal makes monetary policy more difficult to conduct For in­stance, it has become difficult for governments to peg their ex­change rates indefinitely in the face of adverse circumstances. Numerous crises, from the col­lapse of Europe’s exchange-rate mechanism in 1992-93 to the trauma in East Asia, make this clear. The risk of “contagion”, when a crisis in one country leads the market to change its view of prospects in others, is a further complication, as recent events in Asia have emphasised. Nonetheless it remains entirely possible for a government to use monetary policy to steer the do­mestic economy, provided that it is willing to let its currency float. Today’s global capital market only rules out sooner what has always been impossible in the longer term - namely, treating interest rates and the value of the currency as entirely separate in­struments matters. Globalisation has not altered the basic limits: monetary policy can be used to regulate the domestic economy or to regulate the exchange rate, but it cannot successfully accom­plish both goals at once. Finally, what of the argument that the new global economy makes it impossible for govern­ments to mandate social protec­tion, such as minimum-wage laws, rules on working hours, health-and-safety standards in the workplace, and so forth. Ac­cording to this popular view, if governments grant such protec­tion, they will make their firms uncompetitive and put workers on the dole. Globalisation is thus blamed for a “race to the bot­tom” in economic regulation. There is no reason why this should be true. Certainly, social protection does carry economic costs, reducing the amount of output that can be squeezed from any given amount of capi­tal, labour and other resources. This is not to say that social pro­tection is wrong. Citizens may well decide the cost is worth pay­ing. But the cost must be borne. The only question is how. In an economy closed to flows of trade and finance, the cost will take the form of lower incomes. In an open economy, the same must ultimately be true. This basic logic is the same whether the economy is closed, partially open or globalised. The only difference is that open economies with floating curren­cies may experience that fall in incomes through currency depreciation - and thus higher prices for consumer goods-while a closed economy will suf­fer a decline in wages as ex­pressed in the local currency. The important thing to re­member about social-protection. Rules is simply that, in econom­ics, you rarely get something for nothing. That is the bad news. The good news is that social-pro­tection rules are as feasible, and in the end no more costly, in a globalised economy than they are in a closed economy. Much the same goes for fi­nancial regulation, public spending and macroeconomic policy. Governments, always ea­ger to deflect political pressure, may prefer to justify unpopular decisions by pretending that their hands are tied. In truth, de­spite all the changes in global markets, they have about as much, or as little, control of their economies as they ever had. VOCABULARY 1 . in the aggregate в совокупности, в целом 2 . income (s) доходы (ы) 3 . benefit (s) выгоды, преимущества 4 . public spending государственные расходы 5 . to cushion зд.оказывать финансовую помощь; перераспреде-лять средства в пользу...; 6 . working practices организация труда 7 . collapsing currency валюта, курс который неуклонно снижается 8 . lighter regulation смягчение регулирования (контроля) 9 . health-care system система здравоохранения 10 . education reform реформа в сфере образования 11 . privatization of state-owned enterprises приватизация государственных предприятий 12 . «flexibility» «гибкость» 13 . foreign borrowing займы (заимствование) за границей 14 . deregulation отмена государственного регулирования 15 . banking industry банковская система 16 . abolition of exchange controls отмена валютного контроля 17 . non-bank lenders небанковские кредиты 18 . building societies строительное кооперативное сообщество с функциями ипотечного банка 19 . boom «бум», бурный рост (экономики) 20 . bust резкий спад (экономики) 21 . upward trend повышенная тенденция; тенденция к повышению 22 . share of national income доля национального дохода 23 . physical assets материальные активы 24 . to grant tax prefere-nces (concessions) предоставить налоговые льготы 25 . revenues поступления, доход 26 . personal tax налог на личную собственность 27 . public borrowing государственное заимствование 28 . monetary policy денежно-кредитная политика 29 . fiscal policy фискальная политика; бюджетная политика; налогово-кредитная политика 30 . a bank overdraft банковский овердрафт (кредитование суммы превышающей остаток средств на счете) 31 . to peg exchange rate «привязать» курс национальной валюты к движению курса другой твердой валюты (например, доллара) 4. Переведите отрывок «Free to Borrow». 5. Напишите и аннотацию данного текста. Text B. 1. Переведите следующий текст: ARE THE POOR DIFFERENT ? Developing countries have their own branch of economics. It is far from obvious that they need it. Michel Camdessus, the manag­ing director of the IMF, calls it the “silent revolution”. Wall Street financiers talk of the “emerging market era”. Other commentators refer more sourly to the “triumph of free-market economics”. They are all describing the same phenom­enon: the dramatic shift in economic pol­icy that has swept the developing world in the past few years. The individual prescriptions are, by now, familiar: dismantle trade barriers, tighten fiscal policy, privatise state-owned firms, attack inflation, and so forth. Underlying them all, however, is an implicit assumption that the basic premises of prudent economic manage­ment are the same whether you are in Bra­zil, Benin or Belgium. But is this assumption right? Three de­cades ago most economists would have answered, No. Spawned by the end of the colonial era in the 1950s and 1960s, a whole branch of economic theory grew up around the question of how to pro­mote economic development in poor countries. The proposition on which “development economics” was built was that poor countries were intrinsically dif­ferent from rich ones, and so needed their own set of economic models. Some development economists ar­gued, for instance, that the self-inter­ested, rational individual (the basic actor in most economists’ models since Adam Smith’s time), did not exist in “tradi­tional” tribal societies. And they claimed that because many poor countries had large agricultural populations and were often dependent on a few commodity ex­ports for foreign-exchange earnings, eco­nomic policies that suited rich nations would not be appropriate for them. With hindsight, much of this was mis­guided, and policies based on it had di­sastrous effects. Development economists believed that the state had to play a big role in fostering modernisation. But this led to huge, corrupt and inefficient bureaucracies, massive budget deficits and, indirectly, to rampant inflation. Much of the “silent revolution” of the past decade has consisted of correcting these mistakes. So what, if anything, is left of develop­ment economics? Pierre-Richard Agenor, an economist at the IMF, argues that while the ba­sic microeconomic assumptions about how people behave are similar for all countries, developing economies still dif­fer “structurally” from rich ones, and therefore demand different models. To support their case, the author lists the traits that he reckons “typical” devel­oping countries still share. They tend to be more open than richer ones (that is to say, trade contributes a bigger fraction of national income), and to depend more on foreign capital. They tend to have fixed exchange rates and, often, exchange con­trols. Their financial markets are rudi­mentary and often distorted by heavy government regulation. The public sector plays a bigger role than in rich countries, particularly in directing the pattern of investment. One obvious difficulty with this ap­proach is that there is, in fact, no such thing as a “typical” developing country. Remember that the official “developing world” includes the fast-growing Asian ti­gers, the volatile economies of Latin America and the poorest nations in Af­rica. While some countries may share a number of the traits that the authors out­line, few share them all. A second objection is that many of the “structural differences” are, in fact, the relics of old policies inspired bydevelopment economics. Exchange controls are an example. As countries begin their re­form process, these have been quickly lifted. Ditto for some of the restrictions on local financial markets. Moreover, other apparent differences such as the importance of trade and capital flows in emerg­ing markets - are nothing of the sort. They apply equally to many industrialised countries. This does have an implication for macroeconomics, but for the field in general, not just for the poor world. For simplicity’s sake, most traditional main­stream macroeconomic models assumed that an economy was closed (ie, that it had no relations with the rest of the world). In an increasingly integrated global econ­omy, this assumption makes little sense. Macroeconomics, in rich and poor coun­tries alike, must take the rest of the world into account. That said, certain specific policy is­sues do seem to matter more in develop­ing countries than in rich ones. Few de­veloped countries, for example, have to contend with inflation rates of 20-30% a year; none has to worry about taming hyperinflation. In poorer countries, this problem is still high on the economic-pol­icy agenda. In less developed economies, policymakers have a smaller range of fi­nancial tools at their disposal. Conduct­ing monetary policy in an African coun­try where domestic bond markets barely exist is clearly different from influencing interest rates in, say, France. Behind the times In the early 1990’s stabilising high inflation and the aftermath of the 1980s debt crisis preoccupied many goverments. Nowadays, the problems of coping with rapid swings in capital flows are more pressing - a fact that was high­lighted by Mexico’s financial crisis, 1998. As poor countries continue to free their markets and to curb the role of the state, many of the remaining “structural differences” with rich ones will disap­pear. Sooner rather than later, there will only be two types of macroeconomic pol­icy: good and bad. VOCABULARY 1 . emerging markets развивающиеся рынки 2 . emerging countries страны с развивающимися рыночными отношениями (часто новые индустриальные страны) 3 . development economics экономическая теория развития 4 . a fraction of national income доля (часть) национального дохода 5 . trait(s) характерные черты 6 . macroeconomics макроэкономическая теория 7 . taming hyperinflation обуздание гиперинфляции